Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/1004
Private Circuits III: Hardware Trojan-Resilience via Testing Amplification
Stefan Dziembowski and Sebastian Faust and Francois-Xavier Standaert
Abstract: Security against hardware trojans is currently becoming an essential ingredient to ensure trust in information systems. A variety of solutions have been introduced to reach this goal, ranging from reactive (i.e., detection-based) to preventive (i.e., trying to make the insertion of a trojan more difficult for the adversary). In this paper, we show how testing (which is a typical detection tool) can be used to state concrete security guarantees for preventive approaches to trojan-resilience. For this purpose, we build on and formalize two important previous works which introduced ``input scrambling" and ``split manufacturing" as countermeasures to hardware trojans. Using these ingredients, we present a generic compiler that can transform any circuit into a trojan-resilient one, for which we can state quantitative security guarantees on the number of correct executions of the circuit thanks to a new tool denoted as ``testing amplification". Compared to previous works, our threat model covers an extended range of hardware trojans while we stick with the goal of minimizing the number of honest elements in our transformed circuits. Since transformed circuits essentially correspond to redundant multiparty computations of the target functionality, they also allow reasonably efficient implementations, which can be further optimized if specialized to certain cryptographic primitives and security goals.
Category / Keywords: implementation / hardware trojan horses, secure multiparty computations
Original Publication (with major differences): 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Date: received 22 Oct 2016, last revised 22 Oct 2016
Contact author: stefan dziembowski at gmail com
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: An extended version of the paper that appears in the ACM CCS'16 proceedings.
Version: 20161026:140500 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2016/1004
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