Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2016/059

Secure positioning and quantum non-local correlations

Muhammad Nadeem

Abstract: Recently, the problem of quantum position-verification has been extensively analyzed in the formal notion but all existing ceremonial single-round position-verification schemes are insecure. We call here the quantum position-verification schemes formal if verifiers initiate the scheme at time t = ti and later verify the received outcome at time t = tf while they perform no other local unitary transformations in time interval ti < t <tf. We propose here a different notion for quantum position-verification where, instead of sending challenge encoded over flying qubits at time t = ti, one of the verifiers teleports the challenge to the prover while prover is required to measure encoded challenge in specified basis as well as teleport to another verifier while being on the same time slice t = (tf - ti)/2. After receiving outcomes of single qubit measurements as well as Bell state measurements from prover at time t = tf, the scheme enables verifiers to trace the origin of received outcome and hence identify dishonest provers with very high probability &#961; &#8805; 1-1/2n where n is the number of entangled pairs used. No-signaling principle assures that any group of dishonest provers, not at the position to be verified, cannot simulate their actions with the prover who is supposed to be at the specified position.

Category / Keywords: Quantum information; No-signaling; Position-based quantum cryptography

Date: received 24 Jan 2016, last revised 14 Jun 2016

Contact author: muhammad nadeem at seecs edu pk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: After receiving reviews, differences in constructions of formal QPV schemes and the proposed QPV scheme and hence impact of these differences in their security security analysis is explicitly included.

Version: 20160614:220451 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2016/059

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]