Paper 2016/032
On the Leakage-Resilient Key Exchange
Janaka Alawatugoda
Abstract
Typically, secure channels are constructed from an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol, which authenticates the communicating parties based on long-term public keys and establishes secret session keys. In this paper we address the partial leakage of long-term secret keys of key exchange protocol participants due to various side-channel attacks. Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange protocols have developed over time to provide security even when the adversary learns certain secret values. This paper combines and extends the advances of security modelling for AKE protocols addressing more granular partial leakage of long-term secrets of protocol participants.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Public Key CryptographyKey Exchange ProtocolsLeakage-Resilient Cryptography
- Contact author(s)
- janaka alawatugoda @ qut edu au
- History
- 2016-01-13: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2016/032
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/032,
author = {Janaka Alawatugoda},
title = {On the Leakage-Resilient Key Exchange},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/032},
year = {2016},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/032}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/032}
}
