Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/963
When Organized Crime Applies Academic Results - A Forensic Analysis of an In-Card Listening Device
Houda Ferradi and Rémi Géraud and David Naccache and Assia Tria
Abstract: This paper describes the forensic analysis of what the authors believe to be the most sophisticated smart card fraud encountered to date. In 2010, Murdoch et al. [7] described a man-in-the-middle attack against EMV cards. [7] demonstrated the attack using a general purpose FPGA board, noting that “miniaturization is mostly a mechanical challenge, and well within the expertise of criminal gangs”. This indeed happened in 2011, when about 40 sophisticated card forgeries surfaced in the field.
These forgeries are remarkable in that they embed two chips wired top-to-tail. The first chip is clipped from a genuine stolen card. The second chip plays the role of the man-in-the-middle and
communicates directly with the point of sale (PoS) terminal. The entire assembly is embedded in the plastic body of yet another stolen card.
The forensic analysis relied on X-ray chip imaging, side-channel analysis, protocol analysis, and microscopic optical inspections.
Category / Keywords: applications / EMV, smartcards, man-in-the-middle
Date: received 5 Oct 2015
Contact author: david naccache at ens fr
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20151006:143458 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2015/963
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