Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/932

Using Tweaks To Design Fault Resistant Ciphers

Sikhar Patranabis and Debapriya Basu Roy and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay

Abstract: Side channel analysis and active fault analysis are now major threats to even mathematically robust cryptographic algorithms that are otherwise resistant to classical cryptanalysis. It is necessary to design suitable countermeasures to protect cryptographic primitives against such attacks. This paper focuses on designing encryption schemes that are innately secure against fault analysis. The paper formally proves that one such design strategy, namely the use of key-dependent SBoxes, is only partially secure against DFA. The paper then examines the fault tolerance of encryption schemes that use a key-independent secret tweak value for randomization. In particular, the paper focuses on a linear tweak based and a non-linear tweak based version of a recently proposed block cipher DRECON. The paper demonstrates that while both versions are secure against classical DFA, the non-linear tweak based version provides greater fault coverage against stronger fault models. This fact, together with the DPA resistance provided by the use of variable S-Boxes, makes DRECON a strong candidate for the design of secure cryptographic primitives. All claims have been validated by experimental results on a SASEBO GII platform.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Fault Attacks, Countermeasures, SBox, DFA, DPA, DRECON, Secret Tweaks

Original Publication (with major differences): VLSID 2016

Date: received 24 Sep 2015

Contact author: sikharpatranabis at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: An abridged version of this paper will appear in the proceedings of VLSID 2016

Version: 20150927:092358 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/932

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