Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/872

Traceability Improvements of a New RFID Protocol Based On EPC C1G2

Seyed Salman Sajjadi GhaemMaghami, Afrooz Haghbin, Mahtab Mirmohseni

Abstract: Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) applications have spread all over the world and, in order to provide their security and pri-vacy, researchers proposed different kind of protocols. In this pa-per, we analyzes the privacy of a new protocol, proposed by Yu-Jehn in 2015 which is based on Electronic Product Code Class1 Generation 2 (EPC C1 G2) standard. By applying the Ouafi-Phan privacy model, we show that the Yu-Jehn protocol is vulnerable against traceability attack and forward traceability attack and it does not provide the privacy of RFID users. Then, to enhance the privacy of the analyzed protocol, an improved version of the pro-tocol is proposed which eliminates the existing weaknesses of Yu-Jehn protocol.

Category / Keywords: RFID authentication protocols, Yu-Jehn protocol, Privacy, Traceability Attack, Forward Traceability Attack

Date: received 8 Sep 2015, last revised 19 Sep 2015

Contact author: Salman ghaemmaghami at srbiau ac ir

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20150919:094947 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/872

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]