Paper 2015/845

Cryptanalysis of the Quadratic Zero-Testing of GGH

Zvika Brakerski, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Tancrède Lepoint, Amit Sahai, and Mehdi Tibouchi

Abstract

In this short note, we analyze the security of the quadratic zero-testing procedure for the GGH13 graded encoding scheme, which was recently proposed by Gentry, Halevi and Lepoint. We show that this modification fails to immunize the GGH13 construction against zeroizing attacks, and that the modified scheme is susceptible to the same attacks as the original one.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
multilinear mapsGGHzeroizing attack
Contact author(s)
tancrede lepoint @ cryptoexperts com
History
2015-09-01: revised
2015-09-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/845
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/845,
      author = {Zvika Brakerski and Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi and Tancrède Lepoint and Amit Sahai and Mehdi Tibouchi},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of the Quadratic Zero-Testing of {GGH}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/845},
      year = {2015},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/845}
}
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