Paper 2015/809

New Techniques for Electronic Voting

Alan Szepieniec and Bart Preneel

Abstract

This paper presents a novel unifying framework for electronic voting in the universal composability model that includes a property which is new to universal composability but well-known to voting systems: universal verifiability. Additionally, we propose three new techniques for secure electronic voting and prove their security and universal verifiability in the universal composability framework. 1. A tally-hiding voting system, in which the tally that is released consists of only the winner without the vote count. Our proposal builds on a novel solution to the millionaire problem which is of independent interest. 2. A self-tallying vote, in which the tally can be calculated by any observer as soon as the last vote has been cast --- but before this happens, no information about the tally is leaked. 3. Authentication of voting credentials, which is a new approach for electronic voting systems based on anonymous credentials. In this approach, the vote authenticates the credential so that it cannot afterwards be used for any other purpose but to cast that vote. We propose a practical voting system that instantiates this high-level concept.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems Workshop 2015
Keywords
electronic voting
Contact author(s)
alan szepieniec @ esat kuleuven be
History
2015-08-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/809
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/809,
      author = {Alan Szepieniec and Bart Preneel},
      title = {New Techniques for Electronic Voting},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/809},
      year = {2015},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/809}
}
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