Paper 2015/809
New Techniques for Electronic Voting
Alan Szepieniec and Bart Preneel
Abstract
This paper presents a novel unifying framework for electronic voting in the universal composability model that includes a property which is new to universal composability but well-known to voting systems: universal verifiability. Additionally, we propose three new techniques for secure electronic voting and prove their security and universal verifiability in the universal composability framework. 1. A tally-hiding voting system, in which the tally that is released consists of only the winner without the vote count. Our proposal builds on a novel solution to the millionaire problem which is of independent interest. 2. A self-tallying vote, in which the tally can be calculated by any observer as soon as the last vote has been cast --- but before this happens, no information about the tally is leaked. 3. Authentication of voting credentials, which is a new approach for electronic voting systems based on anonymous credentials. In this approach, the vote authenticates the credential so that it cannot afterwards be used for any other purpose but to cast that vote. We propose a practical voting system that instantiates this high-level concept.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems Workshop 2015
- Keywords
- electronic voting
- Contact author(s)
- alan szepieniec @ esat kuleuven be
- History
- 2015-08-14: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/809
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/809,
author = {Alan Szepieniec and Bart Preneel},
title = {New Techniques for Electronic Voting},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/809},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/809}
}
