Paper 2015/802
Ciphertext-only attack on d*d Hill in O(d13^d)
Shahram Khazaei and Siavash Ahmadi
Abstract
Hill is a classical cipher which is generally believed to be resistant against ciphertext-only attack. In this paper, by using a divide-and-conquer technique, it is first shown that Hill with d*d key matrix over Z_26 can be broken with computational complexity of O(d26^d), for the English language. This is much less than the only publicly known attack, i.e., the brute-force with complexity of O(d^3(26)^(d^2)). Then by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem, it is shown that the computational complexity of the proposed attack can be reduced to O(d13^d). Using an information-theoretic approach, supported by extensive simulation results, it is shown that the minimum ciphertext length required for a successful attack increases by a factor of about 7 and 9.8, respectively for these two attacks in comparison with the brute-force attack. This is the only serious attack on Hill since its invention in 1929.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Hill cipherciphertext-only attackclassical ciphersChinese Remainder Theorementropyredundancy
- Contact author(s)
- siavashaaa32002 @ yahoo com
- History
- 2015-08-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/802
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/802, author = {Shahram Khazaei and Siavash Ahmadi}, title = {Ciphertext-only attack on d*d Hill in O(d13^d)}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/802}, year = {2015}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/802} }