Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/682

Integral Cryptanalysis on Full MISTY1

Yosuke Todo

Abstract: MISTY1 is a block cipher designed by Matsui in 1997. It was well evaluated and standardized by projects, such as CRYPTREC, ISO/IEC, and NESSIE. In this paper, we propose a key recovery attack on the full MISTY1, i.e., we show that 8-round MISTY1 with 5 FL layers does not have 128-bit security. Many attacks against MISTY1 have been proposed, but there is no attack against the full MISTY1. Therefore, our attack is the first cryptanalysis against the full MISTY1. We construct a new integral characteristic by using the propagation characteristic of the division property, which was proposed in 2015. We first improve the division property by optimizing a public S-box and then construct a 6-round integral characteristic on MISTY1. Finally, we recover the secret key of the full MISTY1 with $2^{63.58}$ chosen plaintexts and $2^{121}$ time complexity. Moreover, if we can use $2^{63.994}$ chosen plaintexts, the time complexity for our attack is reduced to $2^{107.9}$. Note that our cryptanalysis is a theoretical attack. Therefore, the practical use of MISTY1 will not be affected by our attack.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / cryptanalysis

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-CRYPTO-2015

Date: received 6 Jul 2015

Contact author: todo yosuke at lab ntt co jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20150707:131142 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/682

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