Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/681

ANONIZE: A Large-Scale Anonymous Survey System

Susan Hohenberger and Steven Myers and Rafael Pass and abhi shelat

Abstract: A secure ad-hoc survey scheme enables a survey authority to independently (without any interaction) select an ad-hoc group of registered users based only on their identities (e.g., their email addresses), and create a survey where only selected users can anonymously submit exactly one response. We present a formalization of secure ad-hoc surveys and present:

* an abstract provably-secure implementation based on standard cryptographic building blocks (which in particular are implied by the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations in the CRS model);

* a practical instantiation of our abstract protocol, called ANONIZE, which is provably-secure in the random oracle model based on cryptographic assumptions on groups with bilinear maps.

As far as we know, ANONIZE constitutes the first implementation of a large-scale secure computation protocol (of non-trivial functionalities) that can scale to millions of users.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / anonymous survey, accountability

Original Publication (with major differences): IEEE Security and Privacy 2014

Date: received 6 Jul 2015

Contact author: abhi at virginia edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Journal version of our Oakland 2014 paper, substantially augmented with proofs, definitions, etc.

Version: 20150707:131106 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/681

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