Paper 2015/411
Side-Channel Analysis of MAC-Keccak Hardware Implementations
Pei Luo, Yunsi Fei, Xin Fang, A. Adam Ding, David R. Kaeli, and Miriam Leeser
Abstract
As Keccak has been selected as the new SHA-3 standard, Message Authentication Code (MAC) (MAC-Keccak) using a secret key will be widely used for integrity checking and authenticity assurance. Recent works have shown the feasibility of side-channel attacks against software implementations of MAC-Keccak to retrieve the key, with the security assessment of hardware implementations remaining an open problem. In this paper, we present a comprehensive and practical side-channel analysis of a hardware implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGA. Different from previous works, we propose a new attack method targeting the first round output of MAC-Keccak rather than the linear operation $\theta$ only. The results on sampled power traces show that the unprotected hardware implementation of MAC-Keccak is vulnerable to side-channel attacks, and attacking the nonlinear operation of MAC-Keccak is very effective. We further discuss countermeasures against side-channel analysis on hardware MAC-Keccak. Finally, we discuss the impact of the key length on side-channel analysis and compare the attack complexity between MAC-Keccak and other cryptographic algorithms.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP) 2015
- Keywords
- side-channel attacksSHA-3
- Contact author(s)
- silenceluo @ gmail com
- History
- 2015-05-01: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/411
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/411,
author = {Pei Luo and Yunsi Fei and Xin Fang and A. Adam Ding and David R. Kaeli and Miriam Leeser},
title = {Side-Channel Analysis of {MAC}-Keccak Hardware Implementations},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/411},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/411}
}
