Expiration and Revocation of Keys for Attribute-based Signatures (Full Version)

Stephen R.  Tate; Roopa Vishwanathan

Paper 2015/400

Expiration and Revocation of Keys for Attribute-based Signatures (Full Version)

Stephen R. Tate and Roopa Vishwanathan

Abstract

Attribute-based signatures, introduced by Maji \emph{et al.}, are signatures that prove that an authority has issued the signer ``attributes'' that satisfy some specified predicate. In existing attribute-based signature schemes, keys are valid indefinitely once issued. In this paper, we initiate the study of incorporating time into attribute-based signatures, where a time instance is embedded in every signature, and attributes are restricted to producing signatures with times that fall in designated validity intervals. We provide three implementations that vary in granularity of assigning validity intervals to attributes, including a scheme in which each attribute has its own independent validity interval, a scheme in which all attributes share a common validity interval, and a scheme in which sets of attributes share validity intervals. All of our schemes provide anonymity to a signer, hide the attributes used to create the signature, and provide collusion-resistance between users.

Note: This is the full version of the paper.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. DBSec 2015
Keywords: attribute-based signatures
Contact author(s): vishwar @ sunyit edu
History: 2015-07-13: last of 2 revisions; 2015-05-01: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2015/400
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/400,
      author = {Stephen R.  Tate and Roopa Vishwanathan},
      title = {Expiration and Revocation of Keys for Attribute-based Signatures (Full Version)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/400},
      year = {2015},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/400}
}