Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/400

Expiration and Revocation of Keys for Attribute-based Signatures (Full Version)

Stephen R. Tate and Roopa Vishwanathan

Abstract: Attribute-based signatures, introduced by Maji \emph{et al.}, are signatures that prove that an authority has issued the signer ``attributes'' that satisfy some specified predicate. In existing attribute-based signature schemes, keys are valid indefinitely once issued. In this paper, we initiate the study of incorporating time into attribute-based signatures, where a time instance is embedded in every signature, and attributes are restricted to producing signatures with times that fall in designated validity intervals. We provide three implementations that vary in granularity of assigning validity intervals to attributes, including a scheme in which each attribute has its own independent validity interval, a scheme in which all attributes share a common validity interval, and a scheme in which sets of attributes share validity intervals. All of our schemes provide anonymity to a signer, hide the attributes used to create the signature, and provide collusion-resistance between users.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / attribute-based signatures

Original Publication (with minor differences): DBSec 2015

Date: received 27 Apr 2015, last revised 13 Jul 2015

Contact author: vishwar at sunyit edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This is the full version of the paper.

Version: 20150713:145125 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/400

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