We describe a new meta-reduction technique for proving such impossibility results, which improves on known ones in several ways. First, it enables interesting novel applications. This includes a formal proof that for certain cryptographic primitives (including public-key encryption/key encapsulation mechanisms and digital signatures), the security loss incurred when the primitive is transferred from an idealized single-user setting to the more realistic multi-user setting is impossible to avoid, and a lower tightness bound for non-interactive key exchange protocols. Second, the technique allows to rule out tight reductions from a very general class of non-interactive complexity assumptions. Third, the provided bounds are quantitatively and qualitatively better, yet simpler, than the bounds derived from Coron's technique and its extensions.
Category / Keywords: foundations / tight security, impossibility, meta-reduction Date: received 23 Apr 2015, last revised 27 Apr 2015 Contact author: christoph bader at rub de Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20150427:105251 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2015/374 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion