Paper 2015/372

Security Analysis of PRINCE

Jeremy Jean, Ivica Nikolic, Thomas Peyrin, Lei Wang, and Shuang Wu

Abstract

In this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCE_core. First, while no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the single-key model for the full PRINCE_core for several instances of the parameter (yet not the one randomly chosen by the designers). We also show how to exploit the structural linear relations that exist for PRINCE in order to obtain a key recovery attack that slightly breaks the security claims for the full cipher. We analyze the application of integral attacks to get the best known key-recovery attack on a reduced version of the PRINCE cipher. Finally, we provide time-memory-data tradeoffs, that require only known plaintext-ciphertext data, and that can be applied to full PRINCE.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published by the IACR in FSE 2013
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-43933-3_6
Keywords
PRINCEblock ciphercryptanalysisrelated-key boomerangtime-memory-data tradeoff
Contact author(s)
JJean @ ntu edu sg
History
2015-04-24: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/372
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/372,
      author = {Jeremy Jean and Ivica Nikolic and Thomas Peyrin and Lei Wang and Shuang Wu},
      title = {Security Analysis of {PRINCE}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/372},
      year = {2015},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-43933-3_6},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/372}
}
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