Broadcast from Minicast Secure Against General Adversaries
Pavel Raykov
Abstract
Byzantine broadcast is a distributed primitive that allows a specific party to consistently distribute a message among parties in the presence of potential misbehavior of up to of the parties. The celebrated result of \cite{PSL80} shows that broadcast is achievable from point-to-point channels if and only if .
The following two generalizations have been proposed to the original broadcast problem. In~\cite{FM98} the authors considered a \emph{general adversary} characterized by the sets of parties that can be corrupted. It was shown that broadcast is achievable from point-to-point channels if and only if no three possible corrupted sets can cover the whole party set. In~\cite{CFFLMM05} the notion of point-to-point channels has been extended to the -minicast channels allowing to locally broadcast among any subset of parties. It has been shown that broadcast secure against adversaries corrupting up to parties is achievable from -minicast if and only if .
In this paper we combine both generalizations by considering the problem of achieving broadcast from -minicast channels secure against general adversaries. Our main result is a condition on the possible corrupted sets such that broadcast is achievable from -minicast if and only if this condition holds.
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/352,
author = {Pavel Raykov},
title = {Broadcast from Minicast Secure Against General Adversaries},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/352},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/352}
}
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