Two Round Multiparty Computation via Multi-Key FHE

Pratyay Mukherjee*  Daniel Wichs†

September 2, 2015

Abstract

We construct a general multiparty computation (MPC) protocol with only two rounds of interaction in the common random string model, which is known to be optimal. In the honest-but-curious setting we only rely on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption, and in the fully malicious setting we additionally assume the existence of non-interactive zero knowledge arguments (NIZKs). Previously, Asharov et al. (EUROCRYPT ’12) showed how to achieve three rounds based on LWE and NIZKs, while Garg et al. (TCC ’14) showed how to achieve the optimal two rounds based on indistinguishability obfuscation, but it was unknown if two rounds were possible under standard assumptions without obfuscation.

Our approach relies on multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MFHE), introduced by Lopez-Alt et al. (STOC ’12), which enables homomorphic computation over data encrypted under different keys. We present a construction of MFHE based on LWE that significantly simplifies a recent scheme of Clear and McGoldrick (CRYPTO ’15). We then extend this construction to allow for a one-round distributed decryption of a multi-key ciphertext. Our entire MPC protocol consists of the following two rounds:

1. Each party individually encrypts its input under its own key and broadcasts the ciphertext. All parties can then homomorphically compute a multi-key encryption of the output.

2. Each party broadcasts a partial decryption of the output using its secret key. The partial decryptions can be combined to recover the output in plaintext.

—

* Aarhus University. E-mail: pratyay85@gmail.com. Partly supported by European Research Council Starting Grant 279447, the CTIC and CFEM research center (under the Sino-Danish grant no. 61061130540).

† Northeastern University. E-mail: wichs@ccs.neu.edu. Research supported by NSF grants CNS-1347350, CNS-1314722, CNS-1413964.
Contents

1 Introduction .................................................. 2

2 Overview of Our Techniques .............................. 3
   2.1 MPC via Threshold (Multi-Key) FHE ................. 3
   2.2 Constructing Threshold Multi-Key FHE ............... 4
   2.3 Road-Map Through the Paper ....................... 7

3 Preliminaries .................................................. 8

4 Defining Threshold Multi-Key FHE .................... 8
   4.1 Multi-Key FHE (MFHE) ................................. 8
   4.2 Threshold Decryption for MFHE ..................... 10

5 Constructing Threshold Multi-Key FHE from LWE .......... 11
   5.1 GSW Fully Homomorphic Encryption ......... 11
      5.1.1 Homomorphic Linear Combinations and Pseudo Encryption ........ 12
   5.2 A Masking Scheme for GSW ...................... 13
   5.3 Construction of Multi-Key FHE ................. 15
      5.3.1 Correctness and Security of MFHE Construction .......... 17
   5.4 Threshold Decryption for Multi-key FHE ......... 18
      5.4.1 Correctness and Simulation Security .... 18
   5.5 Bootstrapping ........................................... 19

6 Secure MPC via Threshold MFHE .......................... 19
   6.1 Protocol Secure against Exactly \( N - 1 \) Corruptions .......... 20
   6.2 An Extended Protocol for Arbitrary Many Corruptions .... 23
   6.3 Extensions and Applications ..................... 26

7 Conclusions .................................................. 27

8 Acknowledgments ............................................. 27

A Definitions of MPC ........................................ 30
   A.1 The Universal Composability Framework (UC) ...... 30
   A.2 Security Against Semi-Malicious Adversaries .... 31
1 Introduction

Multiparty Computation. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows multiple parties to evaluate an arbitrary function over their inputs privately, without revealing anything about their inputs to each other beyond the function’s output. This problem was initially studied by Yao [Yao82, Yao86], in the case of two honest-but-curious parties (who follow the protocol honestly but hope to learn information from its execution) and later by Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson [GMW87] in the case of an arbitrary number of fully malicious parties (who can deviate arbitrarily from the specified protocol execution). By now, MPC is a fundamental part of cryptography and a subject of intense study.

One of the main challenges is to optimize the efficiency of MPC protocols. In this work, our main focus will be on constructing MPC protocols with the optimal round complexity.¹

Round Complexity of MPC. We refer the reader to [AJLA+12] for a comprehensive overview of prior work on round complexity of MPC. In the honest-but-curious setting, it was known how to achieve a constant number of rounds assuming the existence of oblivious transfer [BMR90, IK00, Lin01, KOS03, AIK05]. However, the concrete constants were not explicitly stated and they seem to require at least 4 rounds. These protocols can also be compiled into secure constructions in the fully malicious setting with only a constant number of additional rounds by using coin-flipping and concurrent zero-knowledge proofs [Lin01, KOS03, Goy11, LP11]. In the plain model and the fully malicious setting, there is a known lower bounds of 5 rounds for general MPC [KO04]. However, in the honest-but-curious setting or even in the fully malicious setting with a common random string (CRS) the above lower bound does not hold and there is only a simple lower bound of 2 rounds [HLP11]. In this work, we will assume the CRS model.

Recently, a result of Asharov et al. [AJLA+12] showed how to achieve a 3 round MPC protocol in the CRS model, by relying on techniques from fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). Their construction achieves semi-honest security under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption, and fully malicious security (in the universal composability (UC) framework) by further assuming the existence of non-interactive zero knowledge arguments (NIZKs). The construction also yields a 2 round protocol in the public-key infrastructure (PKI) model, but it was left as an open problem to achieve 2 rounds in the CRS model.

Even more recently, the results of Garg et al. [GGHR14, GP15] achieve a 2 round MPC protocol in the CRS model by relying on indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and statistically sound NIZKs. On a high level, the main idea of that work is to have each party obfuscates its “next-message” function, after an initial round where the parties commit to their input. Making this work under the iO assumption is non-trivial and requires much care. However, this approach appears to crucially rely on obfuscation and does not easily lend itself to instantiations under simpler assumptions.

The main open question left by these works is whether 2 round MPC is achievable under more “standard” cryptographic assumptions, without relying on obfuscation.

Our Result. In this work, we construct a 2 round MPC protocol in the CRS model. We achieve honest-but-curious security under only the LWE assumption, and fully malicious security (in the

¹We assume a broadcast communication channel and in each round of a protocol all parties broadcast a message to all other parties. Each honest party must broadcast their round i message right away prior to receiving the round i messages of other parties. On the other hand, we assume a “rushing” adversary that can wait to collect the round i messages of all honest parties prior to selecting the round i messages of the corrupted parties.
UC framework) by additionally assuming the existence of NIZKs. As our main technical result, which may be of independent interest, we show how to construct a multi-key fully homomorphic encryption scheme with a one-round threshold decryption protocol.

2 Overview of Our Techniques

We now give an overview of our techniques by first describing how to construct MPC from multi-key FHE with threshold decryption, and then how to construct the latter from LWE.

2.1 MPC via Threshold (Multi-Key) FHE

MPC via Threshold FHE. We begin with the approach of Asharov et al. [AJLA+12] (variants of which were used in many preceding works [FH96, JJ00, CDN01, DN03, BD10, BDOZ11, MSS11] for constructing MPC based on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). At a high level, this approach is based on the following simple template:

1. The parties first run a secure distributed protocol for the “threshold key-generation” of an FHE scheme to agree on a common public key \( pk \) and a secret sharing of the corresponding secret key \( sk \) so that each party holds one share, and all shares are needed to recover \( sk \).

2. Each party \( i \) then broadcasts an encryption of its input \( x_i \) under the common public key \( pk \). Note that no individual party or incomplete set of parties can decrypt this ciphertext and so the privacy of the input is maintained. At the end of this round, each party can homomorphically compute the desired function \( f \) on the received ciphertexts and derive a common output ciphertext which encrypts \( y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_N) \).

3. The parties run a secure distributed protocol for “threshold decryption” using their shares of the secret key \( sk \) to decrypt the output ciphertext and recover the output \( y \) in plaintext.\(^2\)

Secure protocols for threshold key-generation and decryption can be implemented generically for any FHE scheme by using general MPC techniques, but this would require many rounds. Instead [AJLA+12] show that specific FHE schemes by Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan [BV11, BGV12] based on the LWE assumption have a “key homomorphic” property which can be leveraged to get distributed key-generation and decryption protocols consisting of one round each. Therefore, when instantiated with these schemes, the above template results in a 3 round MPC protocol.\(^3\)

MPC via Threshold Multi-Key FHE. One could hope to shave off an additional round from the above template by using multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MFHE), recently introduced by Lopez-Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan [LTV12]. An MFHE schemes allows parties to independently encrypt their data under different individually chosen keys, while still allowing homomorphic

\(^2\)Throughout this work, we use the term “threshold” to denote distributed schemes where all parties are needed to perform an operation and security is maintained from any incomplete subset of parties.

\(^3\)We note that one the main challenges in the work of [AJLA+12] is to implement the threshold generation of the FHE “evaluation key” which has a complex structure in the FHE schemes of [BV11, BGV12]. This could be vastly simplified using a more recent FHE scheme of Gentry-Sahai-Waters [GSW13] which does not require an evaluation key. However, this would still not improve the final round complexity of the MPC construction below 3 rounds.
computations over such ciphertexts. The output of such homomorphic computation is a “multi-key ciphertext” which cannot be decrypted by any single party individually (as this would violate semantic security of the other parties) but can be decrypted by the parties jointly using the combination of all their secret keys. The work of [LTV12] constructed such an MFHE scheme based on (a variant of) the NTRU assumption.

Using MFHE, we naturally get the following simplified template for MPC:

1. Each party individually chooses its own MFHE key pair \((pk_i, sk_i)\), encrypts its input \(x_i\) under \(pk_i\), and broadcasts the resulting ciphertext. At the end of this round, each party can homomorphically compute the desired function \(f\) on the received ciphertexts and derive a common multi-key ciphertext which encrypts the output \(y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_N)\).

2. The parties run a secure distributed protocol for “threshold decryption” using their secret keys \(sk_i\) to decrypt the multi-key ciphertext and recover the output \(y\) in plaintext.

As before, a distributed threshold decryption can be implemented generically using general MPC techniques, but this would require many rounds. Unfortunately, the MFHE scheme of [LTV12] does not appear to admit any simpler threshold decryption protocol and therefore it is not known how to use this scheme to get a 2 round MPC.

A recent work of Clear and McGoldrick [CM15] gives an alternate construction of MFHE based on the LWE assumption, by cleverly adapting an FHE scheme of Gentry, Sahai and Waters [GSW13]. We first present a significantly simplified construction of MFHE from LWE and give a stand-alone presentation of this scheme. We then show that this scheme admits a simple 1-round threshold decryption protocol. This threshold decryption protocol only satisfies a weak notion of security which doesn’t allow us to directly plug it into the above template for MPC. However, we show that we can make this approach work with only minor additional modifications.

As in [AJLA+12], we show that our basic scheme (based on LWE) achieves security in semi-malicious setting, which is a strengthening of the honest-but-curious setting, where parties follow the protocol specification but can choose their random coins adversarially. By using NIZKs, we can then compile such a scheme into one which is secure in the fully malicious setting (and even universally composable) without additional rounds.

### 2.2 Constructing Threshold Multi-Key FHE

We now give a high-level description of the MFHE construction and the threshold decryption protocol. We begin by describing a recent FHE construction by Gentry, Sahai and Waters (GSW) [GSW13] using the notation and exposition of [AP14]. Then describe how to convert it into a MFHE scheme. Finally, we discuss how to perform threshold decryption.

**Public Short Preimage Matrix.** Before we describe the GSW encryption, we state a useful fact from [MP12] which we heavily rely on in the construction.

**Lemma 2.1 ([MP12]).** For any \(m \geq n \lceil \log q \rceil\) there exists a fixed efficiently computable matrix \(G \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\) and an efficiently computable deterministic “short preimage” function \(G^{-1}(\cdot)\) satisfying the following. On input a matrix \(M \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m'}\) for any \(m'\), the function \(G^{-1}(M)\) outputs a bit-matrix \(G^{-1}(M) \in \{0,1\}^{n \times m'}\) such that \(GG^{-1}(M) = M\).
We can think of $G$ as a special matrix with a “public trapdoor” that allows us to solve the short integer solution (SIS) problem. For those familiar with GSW encryption, multiplication by $G$ is the BitDecomp$^{-1}$ operation and the function $G^{-1}(\cdot)$ is called BitDecomp, but we can ignore the low-level detail of how this is implemented. Note that $G^{-1}(\cdot)$ is not itself a matrix but rather an efficiently computable function.

**Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) FHE.** Firstly, choose a random public matrix $B \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{(n-1) \times m}$ where $m = O(n \log q)$. We can think of this as a common public parameter used by all parties. A public/secret key pair is chosen by selecting a random vector $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-1}$ and setting $b = sB + e$ where $e$ is some short “error vector”. We set the secret key to $t = (-s, 1) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and the public key to the matrix

$$A := \begin{bmatrix} B \\ b \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$$

which ensures that $tA = e \approx 0$ (throughout the introduction, we use $\approx$ to hide “short” values).

A valid GSW ciphertext of a bit $\mu \in \{0, 1\}$ with respect to a secret key $t$ is a matrix $C \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ such that $tC \approx \mu tG$. To encrypt a bit $\mu$ using the public key $A$ we set $C = AR + \mu tG$ where $R \in \{0, 1\}^{m \times m}$ is chosen as a random bit-matrix. This ensures that the result is a valid encryption of $\mu$ under the secret key $t$ since $tC = tAR + \mu tG \approx \mu tG$.

Given two valid GSW ciphertexts $C_1, C_2$ encrypting the bits $\mu_1, \mu_2$ with respect to a secret key $t$ we can perform homomorphic addition by setting $C^+ = C_1 + C_2$ and multiplication by setting $C^\times = C_1 G^{-1}(C_2)$. It is a simple exercise to check that $tC^+ \approx (\mu_1 + \mu_2) tG$ and $tC^\times \approx (\mu_1 \mu_2) tG$. This allows us to homomorphically evaluate any circuit, subject to the error not getting “too large”.

Finally, to decrypt a ciphertext $C$ we set $w := (0, \ldots, 0, [q/2])$ and compute $v = tCG^{-1}(wT)$. If $C$ is a valid encryption of $\mu$ under $t$ then $v \approx \mu[q/2]$. We recover $\mu$ by checking whether $v$ is closer to 0 or to $q/2$.

**Multi-Key variant of GSW.** We now describe how to convert the above GSW FHE into a multi-key FHE. For simplicity, let’s assume that we only have $N = 2$ parties, but everything extends naturally to any polynomial number of parties $N$. We assume that the matrix $B$ of the GSW encryption scheme is a common public parameter which is used by all parties.

The two parties choose independent GSW secret keys $t_1 = (-s_1, 1), t_2 = (-s_2, 1)$ and compute the corresponding public key components $b_1 = s_1B + e_1$ and $b_2 = s_2B + e_2$ using the common (and random) $B$. We let

$$A_1 := \begin{bmatrix} B \\ b_1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad A_2 := \begin{bmatrix} B \\ b_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

be the two GSW public keys for parties 1 and 2 respectively.

Now assume that the two parties independently encrypt some data under their respective keys. Unfortunately, we will not get anything meaningful by naively attempting to perform the GSW homomorphic operations on these ciphertexts under different keys. Instead, our goal will be to first convert both ciphertexts into a “common format” that will allow us to perform homomorphic operations over them.

In particular, we define a “combined secret key” $\hat{t} = (t_1, t_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{2n}$ as the concatenation of the two individual secret keys. Our goal will be to take a ciphertext $C \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ which encrypts a bit $\mu$ with respect to the secret key of a single party (along with some helper information specified later) and expand it into multi-key ciphertext $\hat{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{2n \times 2m}$ which encrypts $\mu$ with respect to
the combined secret key \( \hat{t} \). In particular, a multi-key encryption of a bit \( \mu \) satisfies \( \hat{t}\hat{C} \approx \mu\hat{G} \)
where \( \hat{G} = \begin{bmatrix} G & 0 \\ 0 & G \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{2n \times 2m} \) is an expanded public matrix with a corresponding short preimage function \( \hat{G}^{-1}( \cdot ) \). Once we do this, we can expand all ciphertexts under individual keys into multi-key ciphertexts under the key \( \hat{t} \) and then perform homomorphic operations on the multi-key ciphertexts just like in basic GSW scheme (just with larger parameters \( n' = 2n, m' = 2m \)). Therefore, the only challenge is how to perform the above “ciphertext expansion step”.

**Ciphertext Expansion.** To perform ciphertext expansion, we use a new primitive called “masking scheme” introduced by Clear and McGoldrick in [CM15]. Let \( C \) be a GSW encryption of some bit \( \mu \). A masking scheme allows party 1 to create some additional helper information \( U \) about the ciphertext \( C \) at encryption time and release the tuple \( (U, C) \) while keeping the semantic security of the message intact. This information is completely independent of party 2 whose identity is unknown at encryption time. Later, if we are given the public key \( A_2 \) for party 2, we can use the information \( U \) to create a matrix \( X \) such that \( t_1X + t_2C \approx \mu t_2G \) where \( t_2 \) is the secret key of party 2. This allows us to perform ciphertext expansion by creating the expanded ciphertext:

\[
\hat{C} = \begin{bmatrix} C & X \\ 0 & C \end{bmatrix}
\]

so that,

\[
\hat{t}\hat{C} = \begin{bmatrix} t_1C, t_1X + t_2C \end{bmatrix} \approx \begin{bmatrix} \mu t_1G, \mu t_2G \end{bmatrix} = \mu\hat{t}\hat{G}.
\]

We can similarly expand the individually created ciphertexts of party 2 and then perform GSW style homomorphic operations on the expanded ciphertexts. Therefore, the only thing left to do is to construct such a “masking scheme” which we briefly describe below.

**A Masking Scheme for GSW.** The masking scheme consists of party 1 creating tuple \( (U, C) \) where \( C \) is a GSW encryption of the message \( \mu \) under its own public key \( pk_1 = A_1 \) so that

\[
C := A_1R + \mu G = \begin{bmatrix} BR \\ b_1R \end{bmatrix} + \mu G
\]

for some random matrix \( R \in \{0, 1\}^{m \times m} \). The additional helper information \( U \) consists of \( m^2 \) GSW encryptions of each of the scalars \( \{R[a, b] \}_{a \in \mathbb{Z}_m, b \in \mathbb{Z}_m} \) under the public key \( pk_1 \). It is easy to show that the pair \( (U, C) \) computationally hides \( \mu \) by relying on semantic security of the GSW scheme.

Later, assume we are given the public key \( A_2 := \begin{bmatrix} B \\ b_2 \end{bmatrix} \) for party 2, corresponding to a secret key \( t_2 = (-s_2, 1) \). Then

\[
t_2C = -s_2BR + b_1R + \mu t_2G \approx (b_1 - b_2)R + \mu t_2G
\]

since \( b_2 \approx s_2B \). The value \( t_2C \) corresponds to decrypting the GSW ciphertext \( C \) with the “incorrect” secret key \( t_2 \) and it yields the correct value \( \mu t_2G \) except that it is “masked” by the additional term \( (b_1 - b_2)R \).

\[\text{4In the actual scheme involving } N \text{ parties we first expand the single-key ciphertext of each party into a multi-key ciphertext (under the concatenated keys of all the parties) and subsequently perform homomorphic operations on the expanded ciphertexts.}\]
Our goal is to come up with a matrix $X$ for which $t_1X \approx (b_2 - b_1)R$ and therefore adding $t_1X + t_2C \approx \mu t_2G$ as desired. One can do this by homomorphically combining the $m^2$ ciphertexts contained in $U$, which encrypt each of the scalars $R[a, b]$ of the matrix $R$ under $t_1$, to get a “pseudo ciphertext” $X$ which acts like an encryption of the vector $(b_2 - b_1)R$ in the sense that $t_1X \approx (b_2 - b_1)R$. This is not a standard homomorphic operation yielding a standard ciphertext – for example, the output is a vector rather than a scalar – but the idea for how to do this is very similar to the way we do standard GSW homomorphic operations. We skip the details of this step in the introduction, and refer the reader to Section 5.1.1 for details.

**Threshold Decryption of Multi-Key GSW.** A multi-key GSW ciphertext encrypting a bit $\mu$ with respect to the expanded secret key $\hat{t} = (t_1, \ldots, t_N)$ corresponding to $N$ parties, is a matrix $\hat{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_{qN \times mN}^n$ such that $\hat{t}\hat{C} \approx \mu\hat{G}$.

If we were given all of the secret keys $\hat{t} = (t_1, \ldots, t_N)$ simultaneously, we could decrypt this ciphertext using the GSW decryption procedure, scaled up to the larger dimension: let $\hat{w} = (0, \ldots, 0, \lceil q/2 \rceil) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{N}$ and compute $v = \hat{t}\hat{C}\hat{G}^{-1}(\hat{w}^T) \approx \mu \lceil q/2 \rceil$.

However, our goal is to design a distributed decryption protocol, where the parties collaboratively decrypt $\mu$ without revealing their secret keys to each other. We do this as follows. Let’s think of $\hat{C}$ as consisting of $N$ matrices $\hat{C}^{(i)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times mN}$ stacked on top of each other. Then each party $i$ uses its secret key $t_i$ to output a “partial decryption” $p_i = t_i\hat{C}^{(i)}\hat{G}^{-1}(\hat{w}^T) + e_i$ where $e_i$ is some “medium-sized smudging error”. This error is needed to smudge out any information about the error contained in the ciphertext $\hat{C}$, which might contain sensitive information beyond just the plaintext bit. These partial decryptions can be combined to compute $\sum_i p_i \approx v \approx \mu \lceil q/2 \rceil$ and therefore recover the plaintext bit $\mu$.

The above process satisfies the following security notion: given the ciphertext $\hat{C}$, the bit $\mu$ that it encrypts, and the secret keys $\{t_i : i \neq j\}$ of all-but-one of the parties, we can simulate the partial decryption $p_j$ of party $j$ without knowing its secret key $t_j$. Intuitively, this property says that the partial decryption $p_j$ cannot reveal too much information about $t_j$.

The above security property of partial decryption is tricky to use since it allows us to simulate the partial decryption of only one party at a time. Nevertheless, we show that this security property of threshold decryption is sufficient in the context of implementing MPC.

### 2.3 Road-Map Through the Paper

We begin by giving a definition of multi-key FHE (MFHE) first and then MFHE with threshold decryption in Section 4. Then in Section 5 we construct such a scheme from the LWE assumption and in Section 6 we show how to construct MPC from such a scheme. These two sections are independent of each other and can be read in any order. The construction of MFHE with threshold decryption in Section 5 follows in four parts. First, we present the GSW encryption scheme along with a non-standard but useful homomorphic property that it satisfies. Secondly, we define the notion of a masking scheme for GSW and show how to construct it. Thirdly, we use GSW and the masking scheme to construct multi-key FHE. Finally, we show how to perform threshold decryption for such scheme.
3 Preliminaries

Throughout, we let $\lambda$ denote the security parameter and $\negl(\lambda)$ denote a negligible function. We represent elements in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ as integers in the range $(-q/2, q/2]$. Let $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ be a vector. We use the notation $x[i]$ to denote the $i$th component scalar. Similarly for a matrix $M \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}$ we use $M[i,j]$ to denote the scalar element located in the $i$-th row and the $j$-th column. In general, vectors are represented as single row matrices. The infinity norm (often called simply norm) of a vector $x$ is defined as $\|x\|_{\infty} = \max_i(|x[i]|)$. The norm of matrices is defined similarly. An $n$-dimensional all-zero vector is usually denoted by $0^n$ and similarly $0^{n \times m}$ denotes an all-zero matrix.

For two distributions $X, Y$, over a finite domain $\Omega$, the statistical distance between $X$ and $Y$ is defined by $\Delta(X, Y) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} |X(\omega) - Y(\omega)|$. If $X, Y$ are distribution ensembles parameterized by the security parameter, we write $X \approx Y$ if the quantity $\Delta(X, Y)$ is negligible. Similarly, we write $X \approx Y$ if they are computationally indistinguishable. We write $\omega \leftarrow X$ to denote that $\omega$ is sampled at random according to distribution $X$. We write $\omega \leftarrow \Omega$ to denote that it is sampled uniformly at random from the set $\Omega$. For a distribution ensemble $\chi = \chi(\lambda)$ over the integers, and integers bounds $B = B(\lambda)$, we say that $\chi$ is $B$-bounded if $\Pr_{x \leftarrow \chi(\lambda)}[|x| \leq B(\lambda)] = 1$.

We rely on the following lemma, which says that adding large noise “smudges out” any small values (see e.g., [AJW11] for proof).

Lemma 3.1 (Smudging Lemma). Let $B_1 = B_1(\lambda)$, and $B_2 = B_2(\lambda)$ be positive integers and let $e_1 \in [-B_1, B_1]$ be a fixed integer. Let $e_2 \leftarrow [-B_2, B_2]$ be chosen uniformly at random. Then the distribution of $e_2$ is statistically indistinguishable from that of $e_2 + e_1$ as long as $B_1/B_2 = \negl(\lambda)$.

Learning With Errors. The decisional learning with errors (LWE) problem, introduced by Regev [Reg05], is defined as follows.

Definition 3.2 (LWE [Reg05]). Let $\lambda$ be the security parameter, $n = n(\lambda), q = q(\lambda)$ be integers and let $\chi = \chi(\lambda)$, be distributions over $\mathbb{Z}$. The $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\chi}$ assumption says that for any polynomial $m = m(\lambda)$ we have

$$(A, sA + e) \overset{\text{comp}}{\approx} (A, z)$$

where $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, $e \leftarrow \chi^m$ and $z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$.

The works of [Reg05, Pei09] show that the LWE problem is as hard as approximating the shortest vector problem in lattices (for appropriate parameters). The version of the LWE assumption that we need here is that for any polynomial $p = p(\lambda)$ there is a polynomial $n = n(\lambda)$, a modulus $q = q(\lambda)$ of singly-exponential size, and a distribution $\chi = \chi(\lambda)$ such that $\chi$ is $B_\chi$-bounded and $q \geq 2^p B_\chi$ such that $\text{LWE}_{n,q,\chi}$ holds. This is as hard as approximating the shortest vector with sub-exponential approximation factors.

4 Defining Threshold Multi-Key FHE

4.1 Multi-Key FHE (MFHE)

We start with our definition of (leveled) multi-key FHE which is adapted from the definition given by Lopez-Alt, Tromer and Vaikuntanathan [LTV12] with some minor differences which reflect
MFHE = (A multi-key (leveled) FHE is a tuple of algorithms
Definition 4.1. (Multi-key (Leveled) FHE) A multi-key (leveled) FHE is a tuple of algorithms MFHE = (Setup, Keygen, Encrypt, Expand, Eval, Decrypt) described as follows:

- params ← Setup(1^λ, 1^d): Setup takes as input the security parameter λ and the circuit depth d and outputs the system parameters params. We assume that all the other algorithms take params as an input implicitly.

- (sk, pk) ← Keygen(params): Output secret key sk and public key pk.

- c ← Encrypt(pk, μ): On input pk and some message μ output a ciphertext c.

- ˆc ← Expand((pk_1, ..., pk_N), i, c): Given a sequence of N public-keys and a fresh ciphertext c under the i-th key pk_i, it outputs an “expanded” ciphertext ˆc.

- ˆc := Eval(params, C, (ˆc_1, ..., ˆc_ℓ)): Given a (description of ) boolean circuit C of depth ≤ d along with ℓ expanded ciphertexts (ˆc_1, ..., ˆc_ℓ), outputs an evaluated ciphertext ˆc.

- μ := Decrypt(params, (sk_1, ..., sk_N), c): On input some ciphertext ˆc and a sequence of N secret keys output a message μ.

We require the following properties:

Semantic security of encryption: For any polynomial d = d(λ) and any two messages μ_0, μ_1 the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

$$\text{(params, pk, Encrypt(pk, μ_0))} \approx_{\text{comp}} \text{(params, pk, Encrypt(pk, μ_1))}$$

where params ← Setup(1^λ, 1^d), (sk, pk) ← Keygen(params).

Correctness and compactness: Let params ← Setup(1^λ, 1^d). Consider any sequences of N correctly generated key pairs {(pk_i, sk_i) ← Keygen(params)}_{i∈[N]} and any ℓ-tuple of messages (μ_1, ..., μ_ℓ). For any sequence of indices (I_1, ..., I_ℓ) where each I_i ∈ [N] let {c_i ← Encrypt(pk_{I_i}, μ_i)}_{i∈[ℓ]} be encryptions of the messages μ_i under the I_i-th public key and let ˆc_i ← Expand((pk_1, ..., pk_N), I_i, c_i)_{i∈[ℓ]} be the corresponding expanded ciphertexts. Let C be any (boolean) circuit of depth ≤ d and let ˆc := Eval(C, (ˆc_1, ..., ˆc_ℓ) be the evaluated ciphertext. Then the following holds:

Correctness of Expansion: ∀ i ∈ [ℓ] , Decrypt((sk_1, ..., sk_N), ˆc_i) = μ_i.

Correctness of Evaluation: Decrypt((sk_1, ..., sk_N), ˆc) = C(μ_1, ..., μ_ℓ).

Compactness: There exists a polynomial p(· · ·) such that | ˆc | ≤ p(λ, d, N). In other words the size of ˆc should be independent of C and ℓ, but can depend on λ, d and N.
Public-Coin Parameter Generation. By default, we will consider schemes where the Setup algorithm is “public-coin” meaning that its randomness is included in its output. For such algorithms, we can derive params from a common random string.

4.2 Threshold Decryption for MFHE

We now define a multi-key FHE which supports a one-round threshold distributed decryption protocol. Such a protocol consists of two components: (1) given an expanded ciphertext (possibly evaluated) \( \hat{c} \) each party can compute a partial decryption using its secret key \( sk_i \); (2) there is a way to combine the partial decryptions computed by each party to recover the plaintext.

Definition 4.2. A Threshold multi-key FHE scheme (TMFHE) is a multi-key FHE scheme with two additional algorithms MFHE PartDec, MFHE FinDec described as follows:

- \( p \leftarrow \text{MFHE.PartDec}(\hat{c}, (pk_1, \ldots, pk_N), i, sk_i) \): On input an expanded ciphertext under a sequence of \( N \) keys and the \( i \)-th secret key output a partial decryption \( p_i \).
- \( \mu \leftarrow \text{MFHE.FinDec}(p_1, \ldots, p_N) \): On input \( N \) partial decryption output the plaintext \( \mu \).

Along with the properties of multi-key FHE we require the scheme to satisfy the following properties.

Correctness and Simulation: Let params \( \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d) \). Consider any sequences of \( N \) correctly generated key pairs \( \{(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{Keygen}(\text{params})\}_{i \in [N]} \) and any \( \ell \)-tuple of messages \((\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_\ell)\). For any sequence of indices \((I_1, \ldots, I_\ell)\) where each \( I_i \in [N] \) let \( \{c_i \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(pk_i, \mu_i)\}_{i \in [\ell]} \) be encryptions of the messages \( \mu_i \) under the \( I_i \)-th public key and let \( \hat{c}_i \leftarrow \text{Expand}((pk_1, \ldots, pk_N), I_i, c_i) \}_{i \in [\ell]} \) be the corresponding expanded ciphertexts. Let \( C \) be any (boolean) circuit of depth \( \leq d \) and let \( \hat{c} := \text{Eval}(C, (\hat{c}_1, \ldots, \hat{c}_\ell)) \) be the evaluated ciphertext.

**Correctness of Decryption:** The following holds with probability 1:

\[
\text{MFHE.FinDec}(\hat{c}, (p_1, \ldots, p_N)) = C(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_\ell)
\]

where \( \{p_i \leftarrow \text{MFHE.PartDec}(\hat{c}, (pk_1, \ldots, pk_N), i, sk_i)\}_{i \in [N]} \) are the partial decryptions.

**Simulatability of partial decryption:** There exists a PPT simulator \( S^{\text{thr}} \) which, on input and index \( i \in [N] \) and all but the \( i \)-th keys \( \{sk_j\}_{j \in [N] \setminus \{i\}} \) the ciphertext \( \hat{c} \) and the output message \( \mu := C(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_\ell) \) produces a simulated partial decryption \( p'_i := S^{\text{thr}}(\mu, \hat{c}, i, \{sk_j\}_{j \in [N] \setminus \{i\}}) \) such that

\[
p_i \approx \text{stat}_i p'_i
\]

where \( p_i \leftarrow \text{MFHE.PartDec}(\hat{c}, (pk_1, \ldots, pk_N), i, sk_i) \). Note that the randomness is only over the random coins of the simulator and the MFHE PartDec procedure and all other values are assumed to be fixed (and known).

The simulatability of partial decryptions property says that we can simulate the partial decryption \( p_i \) produced by a single party \( i \) given the plaintext value \( \mu \) and the secret keys of all other parties. Ideally, we would have a stronger definition that allows us to simulate the partial decryptions \( \{p_i\}_{i \in S} \) of any subset of the parties \( S \) given the secret keys of all other parties (rather than just a single values), but unfortunately we do not know how to achieve this type of security. It turns out that, with a little additional work, the given definition suffices in our MPC construction.
5 Constructing Threshold Multi-Key FHE from LWE

We now show how to construct threshold multi-key FHE from LWE. The construction proceeds in four parts. First, we present the GSW encryption scheme along with a non-standard but useful homomorphic property that it satisfies. Secondly, we define the notion of a masking scheme for GSW and show how to construct it. Thirdly, we use GSW and the masking scheme to construct multi-key FHE. Finally, we show to perform threshold decryption for this scheme.

5.1 GSW Fully Homomorphic Encryption

We now describe the GSW fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

- **params** ← **GSW.SetUp**(1\(\lambda\), 1\(d\)):: Choose a lattice dimension parameters \(n = n(\lambda, d)\) and \(B_\chi\)-bounded error distribution \(\chi = \chi(\lambda, d)\) and a modulus \(q = B_\chi 2^{\omega(d \lambda \log \lambda)}\) such that \(\text{LWE}_{n-1,q,\chi,B_\chi}\) holds. Choose \(m = n \log(q) + \omega(\log \lambda)\). Finally choose a random matrix \(B \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-1 \times m}\). Output **params** := \((q, n, m, \chi, B_\chi, B)\). We stress that all the other algorithms implicitly get **params** as input even if we usually do not write this explicitly.

- **GSW.Keygen**(params): We separately describe two sub-algorithms to generate secret-key and public-key respectively:
  - **GSW.SKGen**(params): Sample \(s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-1}\). Output \(sk = t = (-s, 1) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n\).
  - **GSW.PKGen**(params, sk): Sample \(e \leftarrow \chi_m\). Set \(b := sB + e \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m\). Output \(pk = A\)
    where, \(A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\) is defined as \(A := \begin{bmatrix} B \\ b \end{bmatrix}\)

- **GSW.Encrypt**(pk, \(\mu\)): Choose a short random matrix as the randomness \(R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{m \times m}\) for the homomorphic encryption property. Then output the encryption of message \(\mu \in \{0, 1\}\) as 
  \[
  C := AR + \mu G
  \]

- **GSW.Decrypt**(sk, C): Let \(t := sk\). Define a vector \(w \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n\) as follows:
  \[
  w = [0, \ldots, 0, \lfloor q/2 \rfloor]
  \]
  Then compute \(v = tCG^{-1}(w^T) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m\). Finally output \(\mu' = \left\lfloor \frac{v}{q/2} \right\rfloor\) as the decrypted message.

- On input two ciphertexts \(C_1, C_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\) we can define homomorphic addition, multiplication:
  - **GSW.Add**(C1, C2): Output \(C_1 + C_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\).
  - **GSW.Mult**(C1, C2): Output the matrix product \(C_1 G^{-1}(C_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\).

This also allows us to compute a homomorphic NAND gate by outputting \(G - C_1 G^{-1}(C_2)\).

We sketch the proof of the following theorem for completeness.

**Theorem 5.1** ([GSW13]). The scheme described above is a secure FHE under the \(\text{LWE}_{n-1,q,\chi,B_\chi}\) assumption.

---

\(^5\)The size of \(q\) here is bigger than needed for GSW encryption alone in order to support our extensions.
Security. The proof of semantic security consists of two steps. First, we can use the LWE assumption to replace the public key $pk = A$ with a uniformly random matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. Then we can use the leftover hash lemma to replace the ciphertext $C := AR + \mu G$ with a uniformly random value $C'$. We refer the reader to [GSW13] for details.

Correctness. To analyze correctness, it is helpful to define the following notion of a “noisy ciphertext”.

**Definition 5.2.** ($\beta$-noisy ciphertext) A $\beta$-noisy ciphertext of some message $\mu$ under secret-key sk $t \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is a matrix $C \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ such that: $tC = \mu tG + e$ for some $e$ with $\|e\|_\infty \leq \beta$.

**Encryption:** Consider a fresh ciphertext $C = AR + \mu G$ which is generated by encrypting some message $\mu$ with some public key $A$ with corresponding secret key $t$. First recall that $tA = e$ such that $\|e\|_\infty \leq B_\chi$. Therefore $tC = \mu tG + e$ where $e = eR$ which implies $\|e\|_\infty \leq mB_\chi$. Hence $C$ is $mB_\chi$-noisy encryption of $\mu$ under $t$. Let us call this value initial noise or $\beta_{init} = mB_{\chi}$.

**Evaluation:** Let $C_1$ and $C_2$ be two ciphertexts which are $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$ noisy encryption of $\mu_1, \mu_2 \in \{0, 1\}$ under the key $t$ respectively, so that: $tC_1 = e_1 + \mu_1 tG$ and $tC_2 = e_2 + \mu_2 tG$ with $\|e_1\|_\infty \leq \beta_1, \|e_2\|_\infty \leq \beta_2$.

- **Addition:** Then their addition will result in a ciphertext $C^{(+)} = C_1 + C_2$ such that, $tC^{(+)} = e' + (\mu_1 + \mu_2) tG$ where $e' = e_1 + e_2$. Clearly this is $\beta_1 + \beta_2$-noisy.

- **Multiplication:** On the other hand the multiplication would produce a ciphertext $C^{(x)} = C_1 G^{-1}(C_2)$ such that $tC^{(x)} = e'' + \mu_1 \mu_2 G$ where $e'' = eG^{-1}(C_2) + \mu_1 e_2$. Clearly $\|e''\|_\infty \leq (m\beta_1 + \beta_2)$ and the ciphertext $C^{(x)}$ is $(m\beta_1 + \beta_2)$-noisy. The same calculation holds for NAND gates.

**Decryption:** Let $C$ be a $\beta$-noisy encryption of $\mu$ so that: $tC = e + \mu tG$ where $\|e\|_\infty = \beta$. Then $v = tCG^{-1}(w^T) = e' + \mu(q/2)$ such that $e' = \langle e, G^{-1}(w^T) \rangle$. Clearly, $\|e'\|_\infty \leq m\beta$. Now one can observe that decryption works correctly as long as $\|e'\|_\infty < q/4$. Therefore correctness holds as long as $\beta < q/(4m)$. We call this value $\beta_{max} := q/(4m)$.

Consider evaluating a (boolean) circuit of depth $d$ consisting of NAND gates. It takes input fresh ciphertexts ($\beta_{init}$-noisy) and each level multiplies the noise by a factor of at most $(m+1)$. Therefore, the final output is $\beta_{final}$-noisy ciphertexts where $\beta_{final} = (m + 1)^d \beta_{init}$. To ensure correctness of decryption we need $\beta_{final} \leq \beta_{max}$ meaning $B_\chi 4m^2 (m + 1)^d < q$ which is satisfied by our choice of parameters. This concludes the proof.

### 5.1.1 Homomorphic Linear Combinations and Pseudo Encryption

We now define an additional homomorphic operation. This operation takes as input GSW ciphertexts $C_{i,j}$ encrypting the individual entries $M[i,j]$ of some matrix $M \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times m}$ under a secret key $t$. It also takes a plaintext vector $v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ which specifies the homomorphic function to be computed. The operations outputs a “pseudo ciphertext” $C_{lc}$ which we can think of as a pseudo encryption of the vector $vM$, meaning that $tC_{lc} \approx vM$. Note that the “pseudo ciphertext” $C_{lc}$ cannot be correctly decrypted (we can only recover something close to $vM$ but not the exact value) nor can we further perform any of the standard GSW homomorphic operations on it.
Property 5.3. (Linear combination) Let $M \in \{0, 1\}^{m \times m}$ be a matrix and for $i \in [m], j \in [m]$ let $C_{i,j} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ be a $\beta$-noisy GSW encryption of $M[i,j]$ under a secret key $t \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Let $v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ be some vector (not necessarily short). Then there is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm

$$C_{lc} = \text{GSW.LComb}((C_{1,1}, \ldots, C_{m,m}), v)$$

which outputs $C_{lc} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ such that $tC_{lc} = vM + e$ where $\|e\|_\infty \leq m^3 \beta$.

**Implementation.** The algorithm GSW.LComb($(C_{1,1}, \ldots, C_{m,m}), v$) is implemented as follows:

1. For each $i \in [m], j \in [m]$ define a matrix $Z_{i,j} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ as follows:

   $$Z_{i,j}[a,b] := \begin{cases} v[i] & \text{when } a = n \text{ and } b = j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

   In other words $Z_{i,j}$ will have 0 everywhere except the $n$-th (final) row and $j$-th column where it has the value $v[i]$.

2. Now output $C_{lc} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ where:

   $$C_{lc} = \sum_{i=1,j=1}^{m,m} C_{i,j}G^{-1}(Z_{i,j})$$

**Correctness.** Correctness follows because,

$$tC_{lc} = t\sum_{i,j} C_{i,j}G^{-1}(Z_{i,j})$$

$$= \sum_{i,j} (M[i,j]tG + e_{i,j})G^{-1}(Z_{i,j})$$

$$= \sum_{i,j} (M[i,j]tZ_{i,j} + e'_{i,j})$$

$$= t\sum_{i,j} M[i,j]Z_{i,j} + \sum_{i,j} e'_{i,j}$$

$$= (-s,1)^T \begin{bmatrix} 0^{n-1} \\ vM \end{bmatrix} + e'' = vM + e''$$

where $e_{i,j}$ is the noise contained in $C_{i,j}$ which is of magnitude $\|e_{i,j}\|_\infty \leq \beta$, $e'_{i,j} = e_{i,j}G^{-1}(Z_{i,j})$ has magnitude $\|e_{i,j}\|_\infty \leq m\beta$, and finally $e'' = \sum_{i,j} e'_{i,j}$ has magnitude $\|e''\|_\infty \leq m^3 \beta$.

5.2 A Masking Scheme for GSW

We now define and show how to construct a “masking scheme” for GSW, which serves as the main component of the multi-key FHE scheme. Intuitively, a masking scheme allows us to take a GSW public key $pk = A$ (having a corresponding secret key $t$) and a bit $\mu$ and output a pair of values $(U, C)$ such that $C$ is a GSW encryption of $\mu$ with $pk$ and $U$ is an auxiliary value such that (1) the pair $(U, C)$ computationally hide $\mu$ (just like $C$ alone) and (2) later, given another GSW public key $pk = A'$ (having a corresponding secret key $t'$) we can compute a matrix $X$ such that $tX + t'C = \mu t'G$. 

13
**Property 5.4. (GSW Masking Scheme)** There exists a pair of algorithms (UniEnc, Extend):

- **UniEnc(μ, pk):** On input a message μ ∈ {0, 1} and a GSW public key pk it generates a pair (U, C) where C ∈ Z_q^{n×m} and U ∈ {0, 1}^*.

- **Extend(U, pk, pk'):** On input U and GSW public keys pk, pk' it outputs X ∈ Z_q^{n×m}.

for which the following properties holds:

**Semantic Security:** For any polynomial d = d(λ) security of GSW encryption implies that:

\[(\text{params}, pk, \text{UniEnc}(0, pk)) \approx (\text{params}, pk, \text{UniEnc}(1, pk))\]

where params ← GSW.SetUp(1^λ, 1^d), (sk, pk) ← GSW.Keygen(params).

**Correctness:** Let params ← GSW.SetUp(1^λ, 1^d) and let (sk = t, pk), (sk' = t', pk') be two independent key pairs generated with GSW.Keygen(params). For any μ ∈ {0, 1} let (U, C) ← UniEnc(μ, pk) and X ← Extend(U, pk, pk'). Then

\[μ := \text{GSW.Decrypt}(sk, C) \quad \text{and} \quad tX + t'C = μt'G + e\]

where \(\|e\|_∞ \leq β_{mask}\) for \(β_{mask} := (m^4 + m)B_\chi\).

**Instantiation.** We now show how to implement such masking scheme.

- **UniEnc(pk, μ):** On input a message μ and a public key pk the algorithm outputs U, which is a \(m^2\)-tuple of matrices in \(Z_q^{n×m}\), and C ∈ \(Z_q^{n×m}\) as follows.

1. Let \(A = pk\). Set C ← GSW.Encrypt(pk, μ) ∈ \(Z_q^{n×m}\) so that C = AR + μG where R ∈ \{0, 1\}^{m×m} is the encryption randomness.

2. Encrypt each element of the random matrix R (chosen in Step 1) to get \(m^2\) ciphertexts: \(V^{(a,b)} \leftarrow \text{GSW.Encrypt}(pk, R[a, b])\). Set \(U := (V^{(1,1)}, \ldots, V^{(m,m)}) \in (Z_q^{n×m})^{(m^2)}\).

- **Extend(U, pk, pk'):** On input a U ∈ \((Z_q^{n×m})^{(m^2)}\) and public keys pk, pk' the algorithm computes X ∈ \(Z_q^{n×m}\) as follows:

1. Parse \(pk = A = \begin{bmatrix} B \backslash b \end{bmatrix}\), \(pk' = A' = \begin{bmatrix} B' \backslash b' \end{bmatrix}\) and, \(U = (V^{(a,b)})_{a,b∈[m]}\).

2. Set \(X = \text{GSW.LComb}((V^{(1,1)}, \ldots, V^{(m,m)}), b' - b)\).

**Semantic Security.** The view of the attacker is the following distribution:

\[
\left(\text{params, A, C, } U = (V^{(1)}, \ldots, V^{(m,m)})\right)
\]

generated via params ← GSW.SetUp(1^λ, 1^d), (sk, pk = A) ← GSW.Keygen(params) and (C, U) ← UniEnc(pk, μ), where either μ = 0 or μ = 1. We prove semantic security of the masking scheme by relying on the semantic security of the underlying GSW scheme. The proof consists of the following hybrids:
Let \((sk = t, pk = A), (sk' = t', pk' = A')\) be two correctly generated GSW key-pairs. Now recall that,\(sk = t = (-s, 1) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n\), and \(sk' = t' = (-s', 1) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n\); \(pk = A = \begin{bmatrix} B \\ b \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\), \(pk' = A' = \begin{bmatrix} B' \\ b' \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\) where \(b = sB + e, b' = s'B + e'\) with \(\|e\|_\infty, \|e'\|_\infty \leq \beta_\chi\).

Furthermore, for any message \(\mu\) let \((U, C) \leftarrow \text{UniEnc}(pk, \mu)\) and \(X \leftarrow \text{Extend}(U, pk, pk')\) where \(U = (V^{(1,1)}, \ldots, V^{(nm)})\). Then it is easy to see that \(\mu \leftarrow GSW.\text{Decrypt}(sk, C)\) which implies that
\[
C = AR + \mu G = \begin{bmatrix} B \\ b \end{bmatrix} R + \mu G\]
for some \(R \in \{0, 1\}^{m \times m}\) and hence
\[
t' C = (-s', 1) \begin{bmatrix} B \\ b \end{bmatrix} R + \mu t' G
= -s'BR + bR + \mu t' G
= -(b' - e')R + bR + \mu t' G
= (b - b')R + \mu t' G + e_C
\]
where \(e_C = e' R\) has norm \(\|e_C\|_\infty = mB_\chi\).

On the other hand, by the correctness of linear combinations, we have:
\[
t X = (b' - b)R + e_X
\]
where \(\|e_X\|_\infty = m^4 B_\chi\).

Combining these equations, we get \(t X + t' C = \mu t' G + e^*\) where \(\|e^*\|_\infty \leq (m^4 + m)B_\chi\) as claimed.

### 5.3 Construction of Multi-Key FHE
First recall the fixed matrix \(G \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\) that played an important role for the earlier construction and analysis. In this section we define an “expanded matrix” \(\tilde{G}_N \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{nN \times mN}\) as:

\[
\tilde{G}_N = \begin{bmatrix}
G & \cdots & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & G & \cdots & \vdots \\
\vdots & \cdots & G & 0 \\
0 & \cdots & \cdots & G
\end{bmatrix}
\]
We note that there exists a corresponding efficiently computable function $\widehat{G}_N^{-1}(-\cdot)$ such that for any $m' \in \mathbb{N}$ any matrix $\mathbf{M} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m' \times m'}$, $\widehat{G}_N^{-1}(\mathbf{M}') \in \{0,1\}^{mN \times mN}$ is “short” and $\widehat{G}_N\widehat{G}_N^{-1}(\mathbf{M}) = \mathbf{M}$. Such $\widehat{G}_N^{-1}(-\cdot)$ can be computed using $\mathbf{G}^{-1}(-\cdot)$ in the natural way.

**Construction.** Now we describe our multi-key FHE construction.

- **MFHE.SetUp($1^λ, 1^d$):** Run the set-up algorithm of GSW to generate the parameters:
  \[
  \text{params} := (q,n,m,\chi,B,\mathbf{B}) \leftarrow \text{GSW.SetUp}(1^λ, 1^d).
  \]

- **MFHE.Keygen(params):** Run the key-generation algorithm of GSW to generate:
  \[
  sk := t \leftarrow \text{GSW.SKGen(params)} \quad pk := A \leftarrow \text{GSW.PKGen(params, sk)}
  \]

- **MFHE.Encrypt($pk, \mu$):** Execute the following steps:
  - Just use the masking scheme: $(\mathcal{U}, \mathbf{C}) \leftarrow \text{UniEnc}(\mu, pk)$.
  - Output the pair $c := (\mathcal{U}, \mathbf{C})$ as the ciphertext for $\mu$.

- **MFHE.Expand((pk_1, \ldots, pk_N), i, c):** On receiving a sequence of public-keys $(pk_1, \ldots, pk_N)$ and a fresh ciphertext $c = (\mathcal{U}, \mathbf{C})$ under the public key $pk_i$ run the $\text{Extend}$ algorithm for all $pk_j$ where $i \neq j$.
  - For $j \in \{pk_1, \ldots, pk_N\} \setminus \{i\}$, compute $\mathbf{X}_j \leftarrow \text{Extend}(\mathcal{U}, pk_i, pk_j)$.
  - Then define a matrix $\widehat{\mathbf{C}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\mathcal{N} \times m}$ as a concatenation of $\mathcal{N}^2$ sub-matrices where each sub-matrix $\mathbf{C}_{a,b} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times m}$ for $a, b \in [\mathcal{N}]$ is defined as:

  \[
  \mathbf{C}_{a,b} := \begin{cases} 
  \mathbf{C} & \text{when } a = b \\
  \mathbf{X}_j & \text{when } a = i \neq j \text{ and } b = j \\
  \mathbf{0}^{m \times m} & \text{otherwise}
  \end{cases}
  \]

  For reader’s convenience we provide a pictorial representation of $\widehat{\mathbf{C}}$ in Fig. [1]

  Finally output $\widehat{c} := \widehat{\mathbf{C}}$ as the expanded ciphertext.

- **MFHE.Eval(params, $\mathcal{C}$, ($\widehat{c}_1, \ldots, \widehat{c}_\ell$))** On input $\ell$ expanded ciphertexts simply use the GSW homomorphic evaluation algorithms namely $\text{GSW.Add}$ and $\text{GSW.Mult}$, albeit with expanded dimensions $n' = n\mathcal{N}$ and $m' = m\mathcal{N}$ and the expanded $\mathbf{G}_N, \mathbf{G}_N^{-1}$ (in place of $n, m$ and $\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{G}^{-1}$).

- **MFHE.Decrypt(params, ($sk_1, \ldots, sk_N$), $c$):** On input a ciphertext $c = \widehat{\mathbf{C}}$ and the sequence of secret keys $(sk_1, \ldots, sk_N)$ parse each $t_i := sk_i$ and then construct the joint secret key by horizontally appending all the secret-keys in sequence $\hat{t} := [t_1 \ t_2 \ \ldots \ t_N] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{N}}$. Then run the GSW decryption algorithm albeit with expanded dimensions $n' = n\mathcal{N}$ and $m' = m\mathcal{N}$ and the expanded $\mathbf{G}_N, \mathbf{G}_N^{-1}$ (in place of $n, m$ and $\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{G}^{-1}$).
Correctness of Evaluation. Let $\beta$ be guaranteed as long as $\hat{\beta}$ in Fig. 1. Let $\mu$ for any message $t$ so that, by the above correctness property, $\beta$ Let’s call this value $\|e\|_\infty$ where $\hat{\beta}$ key and the corresponding expanded ciphertext $\hat{C}$ of the GSW masking scheme.

Semantic security. The semantic security of the above multi-key FHE follows directly from that of the GSW masking scheme.

Correctness of Expansion. Consider a sequences of $N$ correctly generated key pairs $((sk_1 = t_1, pk_1), \ldots, (sk_N = t_N, pk_N))$ such that $(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow$ MFHE.Keygen$(\text{params})$. Now suppose for any message $\mu$ and any $i \in [N]$ we have a ciphertext $c \leftarrow$ MFHE.Encrypt$(pk_i, \mu)$ under the $i$-th key and the corresponding expanded ciphertext $\hat{C} \leftarrow$ MFHE.Expand$((pk_1, \ldots, pk_N), i, c)$ as shown in Fig. 1. Let $\hat{t} = [t_1, \ldots, t_N]$. Then

$$\hat{\beta} = [t_1X_1 + t_1C, \ldots, t_iC, \ldots, t_NX_N + t_NC]$$

where $\|e\|_\infty \leq mB_\chi$ by the correctness of GSW encryption and for $j \neq i$, $\|e_j\|_\infty \leq (m^4 + m)B_\chi$ by the correctness of the GSW masking scheme. Therefore, $\hat{\beta} = \mu \hat{G} + e$ where $\|e\|_\infty \leq (m^4 + m)B_\chi$. Let’s call this value $\beta'_\text{init} = (m^4 + m)B_\chi = 2^{O(\log \lambda)}B_\chi$. The correctness of GSW encryption is guaranteed as long as $\beta'_\text{init} \leq q/(4m')$ which holds with the choice of $q$ we defined.

Correctness of Evaluation. Let $\hat{C}_1, \ldots, \hat{C}_\ell$ be expanded ciphertexts corresponding to bit $\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_\ell$ so that, by the above correctness property, $\hat{\beta}_i = \mu_i \hat{\beta} + e_i$ where $\|e_i\|_\infty \leq \beta'_\text{init}$. If $\hat{\beta}$ is the output of a homomorphic evaluation of a circuit $\hat{C}$ of depth $d$ over the above ciphertexts such that $\mu = \hat{C}(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_\ell)$ then by the correctness of GSW homomorphic evaluation with scaled up parameters $n' = nN, m' = mN$ we have $\hat{\beta} = \mu \hat{G} + e$ where $\|e\|_\infty \leq \beta'_\text{init}(m' + 1)^d = (m^4 + m)B_\chi(mN + 1)^d$. Let’s call this value $\beta'_\text{final} = B_\chi(m^4 + m)(mN + 1)^d = 2^{O(d \log \lambda)}B_\chi$. The correctness of GSW encryption is guaranteed as long as $\beta'_\text{final} \leq q/(4m')$ which holds with the choice of $q$ we defined.

Figure 1: Structure of the expanded ciphertext $\hat{C}$

5.3.1 Correctness and Security of MFHE Construction

Theorem 5.5. The scheme described above is a secure MFHE under the LWE$_{n-1,q,\chi,\lambda}$ assumption (with the same parameters as we defined for GSW encryption).
5.4 Threshold Decryption for Multi-key FHE

We now show how to implement threshold decryption for the MFHE construction outlined in the previous section.

**MFHE PartDec** \(\hat{\mathcal{C}}, (pk_1, \ldots, pk_N), i, sk_i\): On input an expanded ciphertext \(\hat{\mathcal{C}} = \hat{\mathcal{C}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{nN \times mN}\) under a sequence of keys \((pk_1, \ldots, pk_N)\) and the \(i\)-th secret key \(sk_i = t_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n\) do the following:

- Parse \(\hat{\mathcal{C}}\) as consisting of \(N\) sub-matrices \(\hat{\mathcal{C}}(i) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times mN}\) such that
  \[
  \hat{\mathcal{C}} = \begin{bmatrix}
  \hat{\mathcal{C}}^{(1)} \\
  \vdots \\
  \hat{\mathcal{C}}^{(N)}
  \end{bmatrix}.
  \]

- Define \(\hat{\mathbf{w}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{nN}\) as \(\hat{\mathbf{w}} = [0, \ldots, 0, \lceil q/2 \rceil]\).

- Then compute \(\gamma_i = t_i \hat{\mathcal{C}}(i)^{-1}(\hat{\mathbf{w}}^T) \in \mathbb{Z}_q\) and output \(p_i = \gamma_i + e_i^{sm} \in \mathbb{Z}_q\) where \(e_i^{sm} \sim [-B_{smdg}^{dec}, -B_{smdg}^{dec}]\) is some random “smudging noise” where \(B_{smdg}^{dec} = 2^{O(\lambda \log \lambda)} B_\chi\).

**MFHE FinDec** \(p_1, \ldots, p_N\): Given \(p_1, \ldots, p_N\), compute the sum \(p := \sum_{i=1}^N p_i\). Output \(\mu := \lceil p / q \rceil\).

### 5.4.1 Correctness and Simulation Security

**Theorem 5.6.** The above threshold decryption procedures for MFHE satisfy correctness and (statistical) simulation security.

**Correctness.** Here the entire scheme is same as MFHE except the decryption. So if \(\hat{\mathcal{C}}\) is an evaluated ciphertext encrypting a bit \(\mu\) and the secret keys are \(\hat{t} = [\hat{t}_1, \ldots, \hat{t}_N]\) then, by the analysis used for non-threshold correctness, we have

\[
\hat{t} \hat{\mathcal{C}} = \sum_{i \in [N]} t_i \hat{\mathcal{C}}^{(i)} = \mu \hat{t} \hat{G} + e
\]

where \(\|e\|_\infty \leq \beta'_\text{final} = (m^4 + m) B_\chi (mN + 1)^d\). Therefore if the partial decryptions \(p_i\) are computed as specified we have:

\[
\sum_{i \in [N]} p_i = \sum_{i \in [N]} \gamma_i + \sum_{i \in [N]} e_i^{sm} = \sum_{i \in [N]} t_i \hat{\mathcal{C}}^{(i)} \hat{G}^{-1}(\hat{\mathbf{w}}^T) + e^{sm}
\]

\[
= (\mu \hat{t} \hat{G} + e) \hat{G}^{-1}(\hat{\mathbf{w}}^T) + e^{sm}
\]

\[
= \mu \lceil q/2 \rceil + e' + e^{sm}
\]

where \(e^{sm} = \sum_{i \in [N]} e_i^{sm}\) has norm \(|e^{sm}| \leq N B_{smdg}^{dec} = 2^{O(\lambda \log \lambda)} B_\chi\) and \(e' = e \hat{G}^{-1}(\hat{\mathbf{w}}^T)\) has norm \(|e'| \leq \beta'_\text{final} mN = 2^{O(\log \lambda)} B_\chi\). Since \(q = 2^{\omega(\lambda \log \lambda)} B_\chi\) we have \(|e' + e^{sm}| < q/4\) and correctness holds.
Simulatability: The simulator \( S_{th}^{\mu C, i, \{t_j\}_{j \in [N] \setminus \{i\}}} \), on input the secrets keys \( \{t_j\}_{j \neq i} \) the evaluated ciphertext \( \hat{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{nN \times mN} \) and the output value \( \mu = C(\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_\ell) \) encrypted in \( \hat{C} \) outputs the simulated partial decryption:

\[
p'_i = \mu \left\lceil \frac{q}{2} \right\rceil + e_{i}^{sm} - \sum_{i \neq j} \gamma_j
\]

for \( e_{i}^{sm} \leftarrow [-B_{dec_{sm}}^{dec}, B_{dec_{sm}}^{dec}] \) where \( \gamma_j = t_j \hat{C}^{(j)} \hat{G}^{-1}(\hat{w}^T) \).

To see the indistinguishability note that, by the same calculation as used to argue correctness, we know that \( \sum_{j \in [N]} \gamma_j = \mu \left\lceil \frac{q}{2} \right\rceil + e' \) where \( |e'| \leq \beta'_{final} mN = 2^{O(d \log \lambda)} B_X \). Therefore if \( p_i = \gamma_i + e_{i}^{sm} \) is the real partial decryption then

\[
p_i = \mu \left\lceil \frac{q}{2} \right\rceil + e' + e_{i}^{sm} - \sum_{i \neq j} \gamma_j
\]

The difference between the real value \( p_i \) and the simulated value \( p'_i \) is the noise \( e' \) of norm \( |e'| = 2^{O(d \log \lambda)} B_X \). But by the smudging lemma \( 3.1 \) the distributions of \( e_{i}^{sm} \) and \( e_{i}^{sm} + e' \) are statistically close since \( e_{i}^{sm} \leftarrow [-B_{sm}^{dec}, B_{sm}^{dec}] \) where \( B_{sm}^{dec} = 2^{d \lambda \log \lambda} B_X \) so that \( B_{sm}^{dec}/|e'| \geq 2^\lambda \). Therefore the simulated partial decryption and the real one are statistically indistinguishable.

5.5 Bootstrapping

Note that the above MFHE scheme is leveled i.e., it depends on the multiplicative depth of the circuit to be computed. However, this dependency can be avoided easily by boot-strapping and assuming circular security. We briefly describe the straightforward procedure and omit the details.

During key generation, each party \( i \) chooses a key pair \( (sk_i, pk_i) \) and uses the MFHE scheme to encrypt the secret key \( sk_i \) under \( pk_i \) bit-by-bit\(^6\). It appends these encryptions to the public key. Later, given a sequence of public keys \( \{pk_1, \ldots, pk_N\} \) anyone can create an expanded multi-key encryption of each \( sk_i \) using the MFHE expansion procedure. This allows us to use Gentry’s boot-strapping technique [Gen09] to “refresh” a highly noisy multi-key ciphertext by homomorphically computing the MFHE decryption procedure. Therefore, to compute a circuit of arbitrary depth, we only need to set the parameters of the MFHE scheme so as to be evaluate circuits of some fixed depth \( d + 1 \) where \( d \) is the depth of the MFHE decryption procedure.

Note that, by circular security it is assured that an encryption of a secret key under itself is semantically secure which implies that the semantic security of the above modified MFHE scheme remains intact.

6 Secure MPC via Threshold MFHE

Basic Template. We now present a protocol for general MPC, using any threshold multi-key fully homomorphic scheme. The protocol is based on the template discussed in the introduction which we recall below:

\[^{6}\text{We ignore the algebraic structure of the secret key here and assume each element in } \mathbb{Z}_q \text{ can be represented as a } \lceil \log(q) \rceil + 1 \text{ binary string.}\]
1. Each party individually chooses its own MFHE key pair \((pk_i, sk_i)\), encrypts its input \(x_i\) under \(pk_i\), and broadcasts the resulting ciphertext. At the end of this round, each party can homomorphically compute the desired function \(f\) on the received ciphertexts and derive a common multi-key ciphertext which encrypts the output \(y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_N)\).

2. The parties run a distributed protocol for “threshold decryption” using their secret keys \(sk_i\) to decrypt the multi-key ciphertext and recover the output \(y\) in plaintext. In particular each party first generates partial decryptions \(p_i\) from the common (evaluated) ciphertext \(\hat{c}\) and then broadcasts them. Finally each party, on receiving all those partial decryptions can compute the final decryption \(y\).

Our goal is to prove the security of this protocol (as least in the honest-but-curious setting, as a start). The natural attempt to construct a MPC simulator \(S\) would be to first use the simulator of threshold decryption, \(S^{thr}\) to replace the correct partial decryptions \(p_i\) with simulated ones \(p'_i\) and then use semantic security of the encryption to replace each ciphertext (broadcast in the first round) by encryptions of 0.

**The Problem.** Unfortunately, we notice that the simulatability of the threshold decryption does not suffice when there is more than one honest party. Essentially, our definition of simulation security for threshold decryption only allows us to simulate the partial decryption of a single party at a time while knowing the secret keys of all other parties. We cannot, however, simultaneously simulate the partial decryptions of (even) two honest parties without knowing either of their secret keys.

**Solution.** Essentially we solve the above problem by two steps. We first show that the “basic” protocol as described above is already secure when there is exactly one honest party. Then, later in Sec. 6.2 we extend the basic protocol to another protocol which can handle any arbitrary number of corruption. The extended protocol additionally requires only pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and thus no new assumptions are used. Combining, we get a protocol which securely realizes any functionality against any arbitrary number of corruptions. Below we provide the basic protocol from any MFHE scheme and prove security against exactly \(N - 1\) corruptions. Later in Sec. 6.2 we present the extension in detail.

**Semi-Malicious Security.** Following \cite{AJLA12}, we will actually prove that the above protocol satisfies something called “semi-malicious” security which is stronger than honest-but-curious. Intuitively, it means that adversarial parties need to follow the protocol specification, but can use arbitrary values for their random coins. In fact, the adversary only needs to decide on the input and the random coins to use for each party in each round at the time that the party sends the first message. See Appendix A for a formal definition. We will then rely on a theorem of \cite{AJLA12} showing that one can compile any such protocol which is secure in the semi-malicious setting into one that is secure in the fully malicious setting, without adding any rounds, by using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs).

### 6.1 Protocol Secure against Exactly \(N - 1\) Corruptions
Let $f : (\{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}})^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_{out}}$ be the function to compute. Let $d$ be the depth of the circuit for $f$.

**Preprocessing.** Run $\text{setup} \leftarrow \text{MFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d)$. All the parties share the common $\text{setup}$.

**Input:** Each party $P_k$ has input $x_k \in \{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}}$.

**The Protocol:**

**Round I.** Each party $P_k$ executes the following steps.

- Generate a key-pair $(sk_k, pk_k) \leftarrow \text{MFHE.Keygen(setup)}$.
- Encrypt the message bit-by-bit:
  \[
  \{c_{k,j} \leftarrow \text{MFHE.Encrypt}(pk_k, x_k[j])\}_{j \in [\ell_{in}]}.
  \]
- Broadcast the public-key and the ciphertexts $(pk_k, \{c_{k,j}\}_{j \in [\ell_{in}]}).

**Round II.** Each party $P_k$ on receiving values $\{pk_i, c_{i,j}\}_{i \in [N] \setminus \{k\}, j \in [\ell_{in}]}$ executes the following steps:

- First expand each $c_{i,j}$:
  \[
  \{\hat{c}_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{MFHE.Expand}((pk_1, \ldots, pk_N, i, c_{i,j})\}_{i \in [N], j \in [\ell_{in}]}.
  \]
- Run the evaluation algorithm to generate the evaluated ciphertext:
  \[
  \{\hat{c}_j \leftarrow \text{MFHE.Eval}(f_j, (\hat{c}_1, \ldots, \hat{c}_N, \ell_{in}))\}_{j \in [\ell_{out}]}.
  \]
  where $f_j$ is the boolean function for $j$-th bit of the output of $f$.
- Finally all the parties concurrently take part in one-round threshold decryption to obtain the output message bit-by-bit as follows:
  - Each $P_k$ computes the partial decryption for all $j \in [\ell_{out}]$:
    \[
    p_k^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{MFHE.PartDec}(\hat{c}_j, (pk_1, \ldots, pk_N), k, sk_k)
    \]
  - $P_k$ broadcasts all the values $\{p_k^{(j)}\}_{j \in \ell_{out}}$.

**Output.** On receiving all the values $\{p_i^{(j)}\}_{i \in [N], j \in [\ell_{out}]}$ run the final decryption to obtain the $j$-th output bit: $y_j \leftarrow \text{MFHE.FinDec}(p_1^{(j)}, \ldots, p_N^{(j)})_{j \in [\ell_{out}]}$. Output $y = y_1 \ldots y_{\ell_{out}}$.

Figure 2: $\pi_f$: A basic MPC protocol for $f$ secure against $N - 1$ corruptions
The protocol, given in Figure 2, realizes general multiparty computation for any polynomial-time deterministic functions $f$ which produces a common output for all parties. It does so with respect to a static semi-malicious attackers corrupting exactly $N - 1$ parties (see Appendix A). Formally we prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 6.1.** Let $f$ be a poly-time computable deterministic function with $N$ inputs and 1 output. Let the scheme $\text{MFHE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Keygen}, \text{Encrypt}, \text{Expand}, \text{Eval}, \text{PartDec}, \text{FinDec})$ be a multi-key FHE scheme with threshold decryption. Then the protocol $\pi_f$ described in Fig. 2 UC-realizes the function $f$ against any static semi-malicious adversary corrupting exactly $N - 1$ parties.

**Proof:** The correctness of the protocol follows in a straightforward way from the correctness of the underlying threshold $\text{MFHE}$ scheme.

To prove security basically we need to construct an efficient (PPT) simulator $S$ for any adversary corrupting exactly $N - 1$ parties. Let $A$ be a static semi-malicious adversary and $P_h$ be the only honest party. The simulator simulates the protocol execution on behalf of the honest party $P_h$ as follows.

**The Simulator.** In round-I, the simulator encrypts 0s instead of the real input bits of the honest party $P_h$. After round-I it gets the inputs and the secret keys of the $N - 1$ corrupt parties from the “witness tape”. It gives these inputs to the ideal functionality and receives the output bits $y_j$ for each $j \in \ell_{\text{out}}$. At this point it can also compute the evaluated ciphertexts $\hat{c}_j$. Then it computes the simulated partial decryptions for the honest party $\tilde{p}_h^{(j)} \leftarrow S^{\text{thr}}(y_j, \hat{c}_j, h, \{sk_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N} \backslash \{h\}})$ and broadcast those in round-II instead of correctly computed partial decryptions $p_h^{(j)}$ generated via $\text{MFHE}$.PartDec(·).

**Hybrid Games.** We now define a series of hybrid games that will be used to prove the indistinguishability of the real and ideal worlds:

\[
\text{IDEAL}_{F,S,Z} \overset{\text{comp}}{\approx} \text{REAL}_{\pi,A,Z}
\]

The output of each game is always just the output of the environment.

**The game** $\text{REAL}_{\pi,A,Z}$: This is exactly an execution of the protocol $\pi$ in the real world with environment $Z$ and semi-malicious adversary $A$.

**The game** $\text{HYB}^1_{\pi,A,Z}$: In this game, we modify the real world experiment as follows. Assume (as a mental experiment) that $P_h$ is given all the secret keys $\{sk_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N} \backslash \{h\}}$ (as written on the “witness tape” of the adversary) after round I. In the second round, instead of broadcasting a correctly generated partial decryptions $p_h^{(j)}$ generated via $\text{MFHE}$.PartDec(·), it broadcasts simulated ones $\{\tilde{p}_h^{(j)} \leftarrow S^{\text{thr}}(y_j, \hat{c}_j, h_1, \{sk_i\}_{i \neq h})\}_{j \in \ell_{\text{out}}}$.

**The game** $\text{IDEAL}_{F,S,Z}$: This is similar to the game $\text{HYB}^1_{\pi,A,Z}$ except instead of encrypting its real input, $P_h$ now broadcasts encryption of 0s in the first round.

**Claim 6.2.** $\text{REAL}_{\pi,A,Z} \overset{\text{stat}}{\approx} \text{HYB}^1_{\pi,A,Z}$
Proof: Notice that, the only change between those experiments are that, the partial decryption of party $P_h$ is generated through simulator $S^{thr}$ instead of correctly using MFHE.PartDec. By simulatability of threshold decryption the partial decryptions are statistically indistinguishable hence so are the experiments.

Claim 6.3. \( HYB^1_{\pi,A,Z} \approx IDEAL_{\pi,F,S,Z} \)

Proof: The only change between those experiments are in generating encryptions of party $P_h$. By semantic security of the underlying MFHE the encryptions are computationally indistinguishable. Hence the experiments are also computationally indistinguishable. Note that here it is possible to use the semantic security as the partial decryptions of $P_h$ in both the experiments are simulated and hence independent of the secret key $sk_h$.

This concludes the proof of the theorem.

6.2 An Extended Protocol for Arbitrary Many Corruptions

In this section we construct an “extended” MPC protocol $\tilde{\pi}_f$ which securely computes any function $f$ against any semi-malicious adversary that can corrupt any $t \in [N]$ parties. We do so by relying on the “basic” MPC protocol $\pi_f$ from the previous section, which is secure against a semi-malicious adversary that corrupts exactly $N - 1$ parties. To compute a function $f$, our extended protocol simply runs the basic protocol $\pi_f$ on an extended function $\tilde{f}$ defined as follows.

Definition 6.4. (Extended function) For any polynomial $\ell_{in}, \ell_{out}, N \in \mathbb{N}$ let $f : \{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_{out}}$ be a poly-time computable function and \( \text{PRF} : \{0,1\}^\lambda \times [N] \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}} \) be a PRF. Then we define an extended function $\tilde{f} : \{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}} \times \{1,2,3\} \times \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_{out}}$ which takes as input $(x_1, \text{mode}_1, z_1), \ldots, (x_N, \text{mode}_N, z_N)$ and does the following:

- If $\forall i \in [N], \text{mode}_i = 1$ then output $f(x_1, \ldots, x_N)$.
- If $\exists$ unique $i \in [n]$ such that $\text{mode}_i = 2$ then let $K := z_i$. For all $j \in [N]$:
  - If $\text{mode}_j = 3$ then set $x'_j := \text{PRF}(K, j) \oplus x_j$.
  - Else set $x'_j := x_j$.
  Output $f(x'_1, \ldots, x'_N)$.
- Otherwise output $0^{\ell_{out}}$.

Roughly speaking, the extended function does the same thing as the original function if all the inputs have $\text{mode}_i = 1$. However, if there is one special party with $\text{mode}_i = 2$ then the function uses a PRF key $K = z_i$ provided by that party to “decrypt” the inputs of all the parties with $\text{mode}_j = 3$.

We define an “extended protocol” $\tilde{\pi}_f$ in Figure 3. It essentially just runs the original basic protocol $\pi_f$ with an extended function $\tilde{f}$ and appropriately extended inputs.

We now prove that that the extended protocol $\tilde{\pi}_f$ is secure against any arbitrary number of semi-malicious corruptions.

Theorem 6.5. Let $f$ be a function with $N$ inputs and 1 output. Let \( \text{PRF} : \{0,1\}^\lambda \times [N] \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_{out}} \) be a PRF. Then, under the LWE assumption, the protocol $\tilde{\pi}_f$ shown in Figure 3 UC-realizes $f$ against a static semi-malicious adversary that can corrupt any number of parties.
Let \( f : \{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}} \rightarrow \ell_{out} \) be the function we wish to compute and let and \( \text{PRF} : \{0,1\}^\lambda \times [N] \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}} \) be a PRF. Let \( \tilde{f} : \{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}} \times \{1,2,3\} \times \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_{out}} \) be the corresponding extended function (Definition 6.4). Let \( \pi_{\tilde{f}} \) be the protocol from Figure 2 applied to the extended function \( \tilde{f} \). The extended protocol \( \tilde{\pi}_{\tilde{f}} \) is defined as follows:

**Setup:** The setup is the same as the that of the protocol \( \pi_{\tilde{f}} \).

**Input:** Each party \( P_k \) has input \( x_k \in \{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}} \). Additionally each party sets \( \text{mode}_k := 1, z_k := 0, \) and defines its extended input as \( \hat{x}_k := (x_k, \text{mode}_k, z_k) \in \{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}} \) where \( \ell_{in} = \ell_{in} + \lambda + 2 \).

**Protocol:** The parties run the protocol \( \pi_{\tilde{f}} \) using the extended inputs \( \{\hat{x}_k\}_{k \in [N]} \). They output whatever \( \pi_{\tilde{f}} \) outputs.

---

**Proof:** Correctness is clear from the definition of extended function. In particular note that each extended input has the flag \( \text{mode}_k \) set to 1 which means the extended function computes the correct output \( f(x_1, \ldots, x_N) \).

Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be a static semi-malicious adversary against \( \tilde{\pi}_{\tilde{f}} \), and let \( I \) be the set of corrupt parties with \( |I| = t \). We can assume \( 0 < t \leq N - 1 \) as otherwise security is trivial to show. Let \( (h_1, h_2, \ldots, h_{N-t}) \in [N] \setminus I \) be some arbitrary ordering of the honest parties \( \{P_i\}_{i \in [N-t]} \).

**The Simulator \( S \).** The simulator \( S \) executes the protocol with the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) acting on behalf of the honest parties as specified, except that:

- In round-I: For party \( P_{h_1} \) the simulator uses the input \( \hat{x}_{h_1} = 0^{\ell_{in}} \) and for all other honest parties \( P_{h_i}, i > 1 \) it uses the input \( \hat{x}_{h_i} = (x'_{h_i}, \text{mode}_{h_i} = 3, z_{h_i} = 0^{\ell_{in}}) \) where \( x'_{h_i} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell_{in}} \) is chosen uniformly at random. It follows round I of the protocol \( \pi_{\tilde{f}} \) honestly with these inputs.

- After round-I it gets the inputs and the secret keys of the \( t \) corrupt parties from the “witness tape”. It gives the inputs to the ideal functionality and received the output \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_{\ell_{out}}) \).

- In round-II: The simulator homomorphically computes the evaluated ciphertexts \( \hat{c}_j \) for \( j \in \ell_{out} \), encrypting the output. For honest parties \( P_{h_i}, i > 1 \) it gives the correctly generated partial decrpytions \( \hat{p}_{h_i}^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{MFHE.PartDec}(\hat{c}_j, (pk_1, \ldots, pk_N), h_i, sk_{h_i}) \) using the secret key \( sk_{h_i} \) chosen for that party in round I. For the honest party \( P_{h_1} \) it computes simulated partial decrpytions \( \hat{p}_{h_1}^{(j)} \leftarrow S^{thi}(y_j, \hat{c}_j, h_1, \{sk_i\}_{i \in [N]\setminus\{h_1\}}) \) using the secret keys \( sk_i \) of the other honest and corrupted parties.

Below we argue that the simulated view is computationally indistinguishable from the view of the adversary in the real world:

\[
\text{IDEAL}_{f, S, \mathcal{Z}} \overset{\text{comp}}{\approx} \text{REAL}_{\tilde{\pi}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}}
\]  

(3)
**Hybrid Games.** We move from the real execution to the ideal execution through a series of hybrid games as defined below. The output of each game is always just the output of the environment.

The game REALartz, A, Z: This is exactly an execution of the protocol \( \tilde{\pi}_f \) in the real world with environment \( Z \) and semi-malicious adversary \( A \). Recall that, here each honest party \( P_k \) follows protocol \( \pi_f \) with inputs \( (x_k, 1, 0) \).

The game HYB\(^{1,1} \): In this game, we modify the real world experiment as follows. After round I, let \( \{sk_1\}_{i \in [N]} \) be the secret keys chosen by the honest parties and written on the “witness tape” of the corrupt parties. Let \( y = (y_1, \ldots, y_{\ell_{out}}) \) be the output of the ideal functionality \( f \) when given the actual inputs of the honest parties and the inputs written on the “witness tape” of the corrupt parties. In the second round of the protocol, instead of party \( P_{h_1} \) broadcasting correctly generated partial decryptions \( p_{h_1}^{(j)} \) generated via MFHE.PartDec(\cdots), it broadcasts simulated partial decryptions \( \{\tilde{p}_{h_1}^{(j)} \leftarrow S_{\text{thr}}(y_j, \tilde{c}_j, h_1, \{sk_i\}_{i \neq h_1})\}_{j \in [\ell_{out}]} \).

The game HYB\(^{1,2} \): In this same as HYB\(^{1,1} \) except that, in round I, instead of \( P_{h_1} \) using the value \( (x_{h_1}, \text{mode}_{h_1} = 1, z_{h_1} = 0) \) as its input for \( \pi_f \), it now chooses a random PRF key \( K \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \). It is the same as HYB\(^{1,1} \) except that, in round I, instead of \( P_{h_1} \), it now uses the value \( (x_{h_1}, \text{mode}_{h_1} = 2, z_{h_1} = K) \) as its input.

The game HYB\(^{1,3} \): In this same as HYB\(^{1,2} \) except that, in round II, the party \( P_{h_1} \) goes back to broadcasting the correctly generated partial decryptions \( p_{h_1}^{(j)} \) generated via MFHE.PartDec(\cdots).

The games \( \{HYB^{i,1}\}_{i = 2, \ldots, N-1} \): Each game HYB\(^{i,1} \) is same as the game HYB\(^{i-1,3} \) except that, in round II of the protocol, instead of party \( P_{h_1} \) broadcasting correctly generated partial decryptions \( p_{h_1}^{(j)} \) generated via MFHE.PartDec(\cdots), it broadcasts simulated ones \( \{\tilde{p}_{h_1}^{(j)} \leftarrow S_{\text{thr}}(y_j, \tilde{c}_j, h_i, \{sk_k\}_{k \neq h_i})\}_{j \in [\ell_{out}]} \), where \( sk_k \) and \( y \) are defined the same way as in HYB\(^{1,1} \).

The games \( \{HYB^{i,2}\}_{i = 2, \ldots, N-1} \): Each game HYB\(^{i,2} \) is same as the game HYB\(^{i,1} \) except that, in round I of the protocol, instead of \( P_{h_i} \) using the value \( (x_{h_i}, 1, 0) \) as its input for \( \pi_f \), it now uses the input \( (x_{h_i} \oplus \text{PRF}(K, h_i), 3, 0) \), where \( K \) is the same PRF key that was defined in Hybrid HYB\(^{1,2} \).

The games \( \{HYB^{i,3}\}_{i = 2, \ldots, N-1} \): Each game HYB\(^{i,3} \) is same as the game HYB\(^{i,2} \) except that, in round II of the protocol, the party \( P_{h_i} \) goes back to broadcasting the correctly generated partial decryptions \( p_{h_i}^{(j)} \) generated via MFHE.PartDec(\cdots).

The game HYB\(^{N-t+1,1} \). This is the same as HYB\(^{N-t,3} \) except that, in round II of the protocol, instead of party \( P_{h_1} \) broadcasting correctly generated partial decryptions \( p_{h_1}^{(j)} \) generated via MFHE.PartDec(\cdots), it broadcasts simulated ones \( \{\tilde{p}_{h_1}^{(j)} \leftarrow S_{\text{thr}}(y_j, \tilde{c}_j, h_i, \{sk_k\}_{k \neq h_i})\}_{j \in [\ell_{out}]} \), where \( sk_k \) and \( y \) are defined the same way as in HYB\(^{1,1} \).

The game HYB\(^{N-t+1,2} \). This is the same as HYB\(^{N-t+1,1} \) except that, in round I of the protocol, instead of \( P_{h_1} \) using the value \( (x_{h_1}, 2, K) \) as its input to \( \pi_f \), it now uses the value \( 0^{\ell_{in}} \).

The game IDEAL\(_f, S, Z_\): This is the ideal-world execution with simulator \( S \) and environment \( Z \). It is the same as HYB\(^{N-t+1,2} \) except that, instead of the honest parties \( P_{h_1}, i > 1 \) using the values \( (x_{h_i} \oplus \text{PRF}(K, h_i), 3, 0) \) as their inputs to \( \pi_f \) they use the inputs \( (x'_{h_i}, 3, 0) \) where \( x'_{h_i} \) is random.
For notational convenience let us rename the real game $\text{REAL}_{\vec{\pi},A,Z}$ as $\text{HYB}^{0,3}$. Let us also define $h_{N-t+1} = h_1$.

**Claim 6.6.** For all $i \in [N-t+1]$: $\text{HYB}^{i-1,3}^{\text{stat}} \approx \text{HYB}^{i,1}$.

**Proof:** Notice that, the only change between these hybrids is in whether a single party $P_{h_i}$ computes its partial decryptions honestly via $p_{h_i}^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{MFHE} \cdot \text{PartDec}(\vec{c}_j, (pk_1,\ldots,pk_N), h_i, sk_{h_i})$ or whether it gives simulated ones $\tilde{p}_{h_i}^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{S}^{\text{thr}}(y_j, \vec{c}_j, h_i, \{sk_k\}_{k \neq h_i})$. Each of the evaluated ciphertexts $\vec{c}_j$ is an encryption of $y_j$ by correctness and the way we chose the inputs of all honest parties. Therefore the above indistinguishability holds by the simulatability of partial decryption of the MFHE scheme.

**Claim 6.7.** For all $i \in [N-t+1]$: $\text{HYB}^{i,1}^{\text{comp}} \approx \text{HYB}^{i,2}$.

**Proof:** Notice that, the only change between these hybrids is in the value encrypted by the party $P_{h_i}$ in round I. However, the secret key $sk_{h_i}$ of that party is not used anywhere in either of these hybrids. Therefore the hybrids are indistinguishable by the semantic security of the MFHE scheme.

**Claim 6.8.** For all $i \in [N-t]$: $\text{HYB}^{i,2}^{\text{stat}} \approx \text{HYB}^{i,3}$.

**Proof:** Notice that, the only change between these hybrids is in whether a single party $P_{h_i}$ computes its partial decryptions honestly via $p_{h_i}^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{MFHE} \cdot \text{PartDec}(\vec{c}_j, (pk_1,\ldots,pk_N), h_i, sk_{h_i})$ or whether it gives simulated ones $\tilde{p}_{h_i}^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{S}^{\text{thr}}(y_j, \vec{c}_j, h_i, \{sk_k\}_{k \neq h_i})$. Each of the evaluated ciphertexts $\vec{c}_j$ is an encryption of $y_j$ by correctness and the way we chose the inputs of all honest parties. Therefore the above indistinguishability holds by the simulatability of partial decryption of the MFHE scheme.

**Claim 6.9.** $\text{HYB}^{N-t+1,2}^{\text{comp}} \approx \text{IDEAL}_{\vec{F},\vec{S},Z}$

**Proof:** The only difference between these hybrids is whether the inputs of the honest parties $P_{h_i}$ $i \in [2,\ldots,N-t]$ are of the form $(x_{h_i} \oplus \text{PRF}(K, h_i), 3, 0^{t_{\text{in}}})$ or $(x'_{h_i}, 3, 0^{t_{\text{in}}})$ where $x'_{h_i} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{t_{\text{in}}}$.

This is indistinguishable by PRF security. Note that the key $K$ is not used anywhere else in either of these hybrids other than the PRF evaluations $\text{PRF}(K, h_i)$.

Combining the above claims, we get $\text{IDEAL}_{\vec{F},\vec{S},Z}^{\text{comp}} \approx \text{REAL}_{\vec{\pi},A,Z}$ which concludes the proof of Theorem 6.5.

### 6.3 Extensions and Applications

**Generalized functionalities.** Our protocol (Fig. 2) considers deterministic functionalities where all the parties receive the same output. One can extend that to handle randomized functionalities and individual output in a straightforward manner using known standard techniques just like [AJW11]. We refer to [AJW11] for more details.
Fully malicious adversary. Our protocol protects only against semi-malicious adversaries. However, since we are in the CRS model such protocol can be generically converted to one secure against fully-malicious adversary using non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments. For more detail on this again we refer to [AJW11].

Communication Complexity. Although our main focus was on round complexity, we mention that our scheme also achieves essentially optimal communication complexity which is only proportional to the total input size, output size and circuit depth. We can get rid of the reliance on circuit depth by using bootstrapping and relying on circular security: each party would simply send a GSW encryption of its secret key under its public key and then we would perform a bootstrapping step after each homomorphic operation to reduce the noise in the ciphertext.

Computation on the Web. Our results also relate to the idea of “computation on the web” [HLP11] where parties can’t interact with each other but can only interact with some central website without further coordination. Using our scheme (or any 2 round protocol) each party needs to log in twice: once to give its ciphertext to the server and once to give a partial decryption of the output.

7 Conclusions

We have shown how to implement MPC with only two rounds of interaction by relying on the LWE assumption (and NIZKs for malicious security). Several interesting open problems remain. Firstly, is it possible to get a 2 round MPC protocol under general assumptions such as the existence of oblivious transfer? Secondly, is it possible to get a protocol that achieves adaptive security? A recent work of [GP15] does this using indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) but it remains an open problem to do this using more standard assumptions such as LWE. Lastly, it would be interesting to get a 2 round protocol in the honest-but-curious model without a CRS. As far as we know this is not known even under strong assumptions such as iO, let alone LWE. One way to achieve this would be to build a threshold multi-key FHE without any common public parameters.

8 Acknowledgments

We thank Antigoni Polychroniadou for her helpful comments and helping us find and fix a subtle error with the extended MPC protocol given in a previous version of this work.

References


A Definitions of MPC

The content of this section is taken essentially verbatim from [AJW11] and is included for completeness.

A.1 The Universal Composability Framework (UC)

We work in the standard universal composability framework of Canetti [Can01] with static corruption. The UC framework defines a PPT environment \( \mathcal{Z} \) that is invoked on security parameter \( 1^\lambda \) and an auxiliary input \( z \), and oversees the execution of a protocol in one of two worlds. The “ideal world” executions involves dummy parties \( P_1, \ldots, P_N \), an ideal adversary \( \mathcal{S} \) who may corrupt some of the dummy parties, and a functionality \( \mathcal{F} \). The “real world” execution involves the PPT parties \( P_1, \ldots, P_N \), and a real-world adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) who may corrupt some of the parties. The environment \( \mathcal{Z} \) chooses the inputs of the parties, may interact with the ideal / real adversary during the execution, and at the end of the execution need to decide whether a real or ideal execution has been taken place. The output of the execution is simply the output of the environment. We refer to [Can01] for further details.

Let \( \text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}}(1^\lambda, z) \) denote the random variable describing the output of the environment \( \mathcal{Z} \) after interacting in the ideal process with adversary \( \mathcal{S} \), the functionality \( \mathcal{F} \), on security parameter \( 1^\lambda \) and input \( z \). Let \( \text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}} \) denote the ensemble \( \{ \text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}}(1^\lambda, z) \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \). Similarly, let \( \text{REAL}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}}(1^\lambda, z) \) denote the random variable describing the output of the environment \( \mathcal{Z} \) after interacting with the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) and parties running protocol \( \pi \) on security parameter \( \lambda \), and input \( z \). Let \( \text{REAL}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}} \) denote the ensemble \( \{ \text{REAL}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}}(1^\lambda, z) \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, z \in \{0,1\}^*} \).
Definition A.1. For $N \in \mathbb{N}$, let $F$ be an $N$-ary functionality, and let $\pi$ be a $N$-party protocol. We say that $\pi$ securely realizes $F$ if for any ppt adversary $A$ there exists a ppt ideal adversary $S$ such that for any ppt environment $Z$ we have:

$$\text{IDEAL}_{F,S,Z} \approx_{\text{comp}} \text{REAL}_{\pi,A,Z}$$

We sometime want to restrict the definition so that it quantifies over adversaries from a certain class: semi-honest adversaries, or malicious adversary that corrupted only a certain number of parties. That is done in a straightforward way.

General functionality. We consider the general UC–functionality $F$, which securely evaluates any function $f : (\{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{in}}} \times N) \rightarrow (\{0,1\}^{\ell_{\text{out}}} \times N)$. The functionality $F_f$ is parameterized with a function $f$ and is defined as follows:

- Each party $P_i$ sends $(x_i, \text{sid})$ to the functionality.
- Once all parties send their inputs, evaluate $(y_1, \ldots, y_N) \leftarrow f(x_1, \ldots, x_N)$.
- Send to each party $P_i$ the output $(y_i, \text{sid})$.

A.2 Security Against Semi-Malicious Adversaries

As a stepping stone towards realizing the standard definition of secure multi-party computation against active adversaries, we provide definition of a semi-malicious adversary below which is taken verbatim from [AJW11]. We formalize security against semi-malicious adversaries, however one can use the generic transformation provided in [AJW11] from an MPC protocol that is secure against semi-malicious adversaries, to a protocol that is secure against fully malicious adversaries.

Semi–malicious adversary. A semi-malicious adversary is modeled as an interactive Turing machine (ITM) which, in addition to the standard tapes, has a special witness tape. In each round of the protocol, whenever the adversary produces a new protocol message $m$ on behalf of some party $P_k$, it must also write to its special witness tape some pair $(x, r)$ of input $x$ and randomness $r$ that explains its behavior. More specifically, all of the protocol messages sent by the adversary on behalf of $P_k$ up to that point, including the new message $m$, must exactly match the honest protocol specification for $P_k$ when executed with input $x$ and randomness $r$. Note that the witnesses given in different rounds need not be consistent. Also, we assume that the attacker is rushing and hence may choose the message $m$ and the witness $(x, r)$ in each round adaptively, after seeing the protocol messages of the honest parties in that round (and all prior rounds). Lastly, the adversary may also choose to abort the execution on behalf of $P_k$ in any step of the interaction.

Definition A.2. We say that a protocol $\pi$ securely realizes $F$ for semi-malicious adversaries if it satisfies Definition A.1 when we only quantify over all semi-malicious adversaries $A$.

We remark that this definition captures the semi-honest adversary who always follows the protocol with honestly chosen random coins (and can be easily modified to write those on its witness tape). On the other hand, a semi-malicious adversary is more restrictive than a fully malicious adversary, since its behavior follows the protocol with some input and randomness which it must know. Note that the semi-malicious adversary may choose the different input or random tape in an adaptive fashion using any ppt strategy according to the partial view it has seen.