Paper 2015/317
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography over Large Finite Fields: Theory and Practice
Marcin Andrychowicz, Daniel Masny, and Edoardo Persichetti
Abstract
Information leakage is a major concern in modern day IT-security. In fact, a malicious user is often able to extract information about private values from the computation performed on the devices. In specific settings, such as RFID, where a low computational complexity is required, it is hard to apply standard techniques to achieve resilience against this kind of attacks. In this paper, we present a framework to make cryptographic primitives based on large finite fields robust against information leakage with a bounded computational cost. The approach makes use of the inner product extractor and guarantees security in the presence of leakage in a widely accepted model. Furthermore, we show how to apply the proposed techniques to the authentication protocol Lapin, and we compare it to existing solutions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACNS 2015
- Keywords
- leakage resilientLPN
- Contact author(s)
- edoardo persichetti @ dsu edu
- History
- 2015-04-11: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/317
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/317,
author = {Marcin Andrychowicz and Daniel Masny and Edoardo Persichetti},
title = {Leakage-Resilient Cryptography over Large Finite Fields: Theory and Practice},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/317},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/317}
}
