Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/233

Election Verifiability: Cryptographic Definitions and an Analysis of Helios and JCJ

Ben Smyth and Steven Frink and Michael R. Clarkson

Abstract: Definitions of election verifiability in the computational model of cryptography are proposed. The definitions formalize notions of voters verifying their own votes, auditors verifying the tally of votes, and auditors verifying that only eligible voters vote. The Helios (Adida et al., 2009) and JCJ (Juels et al., 2010) election schemes are analyzed using these definitions. Helios 4.0 satisfies the definitions, but Helios 2.0 does not because of previously known attacks. JCJ does not satisfy the definitions because of a trust assumption it makes, but it does satisfy a weakened definition. Two previous definitions of verifiability (Juels et al., 2010; Cortier et al., 2014) are shown to permit election schemes vulnerable to attacks, whereas the new definitions prohibit those schemes.

Category / Keywords: foundations / election schemes; individual verifiability; universal verifiability; eligibility verifiability; collusion attack; authentication; applied cryptography

Date: received 11 Mar 2015, last revised 7 Aug 2015

Contact author: huawei at bensmyth com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20150807:085847 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/233

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