Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/172

Silent Simon: A Threshold Implementation under 100 Slices

Aria Shahverdi and Mostafa Taha and Thomas Eisenbarth

Abstract: Lightweight Cryptography aims at achieving security comparable to conventional cryptography at a much lower cost. Simon is a lightweight alternative to AES, as it shares same cryptographic parameters, but has been shown to be extremely area-efficient on FPGAs. However, in the embedded setting, protection against side channel analysis is often required. In this work we present a threshold implementation of Simon. The proposed core splits the information between three shares and achieves provable security against first order side-channel attacks. The core can be implemented in less than 100 slices of a low-cost FPGA, making it the world smallest threshold implementation of a block-cipher. Hence, the proposed core perfectly suits highly-constrained embedded systems including sensor nodes and RFIDs. Security of the proposed core is validated by provable arguments as well as practical DPA attacks and tests for leakage quantification.

Category / Keywords:

Original Publication (in the same form): IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST 2015)

Date: received 27 Feb 2015

Contact author: ashahverdi at wpi edu, mtaha@wpi edu, teisenbarth@wpi edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20150228:034250 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/172

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]