In this work, we remove the above restriction by considering a stronger adversarial model that we call the block-wise tampering model. In this model, the adversary can tamper every block of the codeword, with the only restriction being that he can tamper every block at most once. As an example, if a codeword c = (c_1,c_2), then the first tampering function f_1 could produce a tampered part c_1'=f_1(c_1) and the second tampering function f_2 could produce c_2' = f_2(c_1,c_2) which can depend on both c_2 and c_1. An example is when the blocks are being sent one by one and the adversary must temper and send the first block before the second block comes along.
- Surprisingly, defining non-malleability in the block-wise tampering model is challenging. Our first contribution is that of providing a relaxed, yet meaningful definition of non-malleability for this model. Unfortunately, we show, that even this notion is impossible to achieve in the information-theoretic setting (i.e., when the tampering functions can be unbounded) and we must turn our attention towards computationally bounded adversaries.
- Next, we provide an interesting connection between block-wise non-malleable codes and non-malleable commitments. We show that any block-wise non-malleable code can be converted into a non-malleable (wrt opening) commitment. In the other direction, we show that any non-interactive non-malleable (wrt opening) commitment can be used to construct a block-wise non-malleable code (with 2 blocks).
- While the above transformation gives us a construction of a block-wise non-malleable code, it is based on the highly non-standard assumption of adaptive one-way functions (which can only be realized based on assumptions such as Oracle DDH). As our main result, we show, how to construct a block-wise non-malleable code from any sub-exponentially hard one-way permutations. Our techniques, quite surprisingly, also give rise to a non-malleable commitment scheme (secure against so-called synchronizing adversaries), in which only the committer sends messages. We believe this result to be of independent interest.
Category / Keywords: Non-malleable Codes, Non-malleable Commitments, Split-state Date: received 18 Feb 2015, last revised 3 Mar 2015 Contact author: pratyay85 at gmail com Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20150303:082619 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2015/129 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion