Abstract

We construct trapdoor permutations based on (sub-exponential) indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions, thereby providing the first candidate that is not based on the hardness of factoring.

Our construction shows that even highly structured primitives, such as trapdoor permutations, can be potentially based on hardness assumptions with noisy structures such as those used in candidate constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation. It also suggest a possible way to construct trapdoor permutations that resist quantum attacks, and that their hardness may be based on problems outside the complexity class SZK — indeed, while factoring-based candidates do not possess such security, future constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation might.

As a corollary, we eliminate the need to assume trapdoor permutations and injective one-way function in many recent constructions based on indistinguishability obfuscation.

1 Introduction

In the mid 70’s and early 80’s, powerful number-theoretic constructions related to factoring and discrete-logs had kick-started modern cryptography. As these constructions gradually evolved into a comprehensive theory, generic primitives, such as one-way functions, collision-resistant hash functions, and trapdoor permutations, where defined with the aim of abstracting the properties needed in different applications. The aforementioned number-theoretic problems provided instantiations for each of these primitives, but at the same time appeared to offer a much richer algebraic structure. Whereas this structure is highly fruitful, it also limits the hardness of the corresponding problems to low complexity classes such as statistical zero-knowledge (SZK) [GK88] and makes them susceptible to quantum attacks [Sho97]. Therefore, a fundamental goal is to base cryptographic primitives on other less structured assumptions.

In some cases, such as one-way functions, it seems that we can avoid structured assumptions altogether. Indeed, one-way functions can be constructed generically from essentially any cryptographic primitive and have candidates from purely combinatorial assumptions [BFKL93, Gol01, JP00, AC08]. However, as we consider primitives that intrinsically require some structure, candidates become more scarce. For example, injective one-way functions are only known based on assumptions with some algebraic homomorphism, albeit these may feature noisy structures, such as the ones arising from lattices [PW08]. In particular, such assumptions can be placed in SZK, but are not known to be susceptible to quantum attacks. If we also require the one-way function to be a permutation, candidates become even more scarce, and only known based on

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the hardness of discrete-log and factoring (or RSA) [RSA83, Rab79]. Further, trapdoor permutations (TDPs) are known exclusively based on factoring (or RSA).

**Obfuscation.** A promising source for new constructions, replacing ones that so far depended exclusively on specific algebraic assumptions, is program obfuscation — a method for shielding programs such that their implementation becomes hidden. Indeed, an ideal notion of obfuscation would allow us to securely express any required structure in the obfuscated programs. Understanding to what extent this intuition can be fulfilled requires looking into concrete notions of secure obfuscation. The question is what is the “right” notion to consider and under what kind of assumptions it can be achieved.

Of particular interest is the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), which have recently found candidate constructions [GGH+13b]. The notion of iO requires that the obfuscations of any two programs of the same size and functionality are indistinguishable. While this notion may not capture ideal obfuscation, it turns out to be sufficient for many known cryptographic primitives, suggesting an alternative for previous number theoretic constructions [SW14, BPT14, CLTV14].

From an assumption perspective, the existing constructions of iO all fall into Gentry’s world of computing on the edge of chaos — they all rely on noisy structures in an essential way [Gen14, GGH13a, GGH+13b]. Beyond the existing candidates, understanding on which assumptions iO can be based (and how structured they should be) is an open question; in particular, as far as we know iO might be based on problems outside AM \( \cap \) coAM and/or outside BQP.

### 1.1 This Work

Our main result is a construction of trapdoor permutations based on sub-exponential indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions. As far as we know, this is the first construction of trapdoor permutation since the introduction of the RSA and Rabin trapdoor permutations [RSA83, Rab79] (and their variants). We also construct injective one-way functions based on standard iO and one-way functions. As a tool used in our constructions and a result of potentially independent interest, we show how to convert any one-way function into a sometimes-injective one-way function that is simultaneously injective and hard-to-invert on some sub-domain of noticeable density.

**Properties.** Our permutations have the following additional features. First, they are doubly-enhanced. Additionally, they can be generated so to have any prescribed cycle structure with the necessary property that small cycles are rare enough. So far this property has only been achieved for pseudo-random permutations [NR02]. Another feature is that inverting the permutation consists of simple symmetric-key operations (unlike in existing candidates). Finally, like in the RSA permutation, given the trapdoor it is possible to iterate the permutation (or its inverse) any number of times at the same cost as computing the function once.

One difference between the trapdoor permutations we construct and those typically defined in the literature [GR13] is that we only support sampling of pseudo-uniform elements in the domain rather than elements that are statistically close to uniform. The sampled elements are pseudo-uniform in a strong sense, namely, even given the trapdoor or more generally the coins used to sample the function. The double-enhancement requirement is relaxed in a somewhat similar manner (see details below). As far as we know, these relaxation are sufficient in known applications. Additionally we note that our permutations are not certifiable, meaning that we do not know of an efficient way to certify that a key is well-formed and describes a valid permutation.

**iO as a hub.** Based on our results, several constructions previously based on iO and additional structured assumptions, can now be based only on iO and one-way functions. Examples include: non-interactive
commitments [Blu81], actively secure two-message oblivious transfer [SW14], non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proofs [BP14], obfuscation for Turing machines [KLW14], hardness of the complexity class PPAD [BPR14], and more.

1.2 Technical Overview

We now describe the main ideas behind constructing TDPs from iO. The construction consists of two main components. We first show how to build TDPs from iO, but the proof of security relies on the existence of injective one-way functions (even though they are not used in the construction). We then show how to construct injective one-way functions based on iO and one-way functions.

1.2.1 TDPs from iO (Assuming Existence of Injective OWFs)

Trapdoor permutations from obfuscation? sounds easy. Thinking of obfuscation in ideal terms gives rise to a natural attempt at constructing TDPs: simply obfuscate a pseudo-random permutation. Clearly, with only black-box access to such a permutation, inversion is as impossible as inverting a random function. However, ideal virtual black-box obfuscation [BGI01] of pseudo-random permutations is unknown, and is in fact subject to strong limitations [BCC+14]. Nevertheless, we show that some of this intuition can be recovered also when relying on the (not so ideal) notion of iO.

The construction. Rather than considering a pseudo-random permutation, we consider a somewhat more structured permutation where nodes are not completely pseudo-random, but still very unpredictable. Concretely, the permutations can be thought of as a cycle over nodes

\[ x_1 \rightarrow x_2 \rightarrow \cdots \rightarrow x_T \rightarrow x_1, \]

where each node \( x_i \) is a pair \((i, \text{PRF}_S(i))\), \( \text{PRF}_S : \mathbb{Z}_T^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \) is sampled from a family of pseudo-random functions, and \( T \in \mathbb{N} \) is super-polynomial in the security parameter \( \lambda \).

The public key describing the permutation consists of an obfuscated program \( \widetilde{F} \) that maps \( x_i \) to \( x_{i+1} \) (where \( i + 1 \) is computed modulo \( T \)) and outputs \( \perp \) on any other input pair outside the permutation’s domain. The trapdoor is simply the key \( S \) of the pseudo-random function, which allows us to efficiently invert the permutation. To complete the construction we need to augment the public key of the permutation to allow public sampling of random domain elements.

Before describing how such sampling is done, we restrict attention to a simpler case, showing that the current construction (without any domain sampler) is one-way. That is, given \( \widetilde{F} \) and \( x_i \) for a random \( i \in \mathbb{Z}_T \), it is hard to obtain \( x_{i-1} \) (in fact we prove this for every \( i \in \mathbb{Z}_T \)). The argument follows closely the one in [BPR14] (see a comparison below). For completeness, we include here the overview of the proof taken almost verbatim from [BPR14].

Intuition. The path from \( x_i \) all the way back to \( x_{i-1} \) on the cycle defined by \( \widetilde{F} \) should be thought of as an authenticated chain where a signature \( \sigma \) corresponding to some pair \((j, \sigma)\) cannot be obtained without first

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1 Non-interactive commitments can be based on any family of injective one-way functions that are injective even when the randomness for the key-generation algorithm is chosen maliciously. While our injective one-way function do not have this property, our trapdoor permutations do.

2 The result of [BPR14] is stated based on a single (keyless) one-way permutation. We observe that it can also be obtained based on any family of one-way permutations.

3 Formally, [KLW14] rely on injective PRGs, but these can be replaced with injective one-way functions using an observation of [BCP14], as explained in Section 4.2.
obtaining all previous signatures on the path. It is not difficult to show that any efficient algorithm that only invokes \( \widetilde{F} \) as a black box cannot find the signature \( \text{PRF}_S(i−1) \). We prove that the same hardness holds even given full access to the obfuscated circuit \( \widetilde{F} \).

To prove that finding the signature \( \text{PRF}_S(i−1) \) is hard, we show that the obfuscated \( \widetilde{F} \) is computationally indistinguishable from a circuit that on input \( x_{i−1} \) returns \( \perp \), rather than \( x_i \) as \( \widetilde{F} \) would. This implies that an efficient algorithm would not be able to obtain \( x_{i−1} \) from either one of the circuits, or it could distinguish the two. We next go in more detail into how indistinguishability of these two circuits is shown.

For every \( \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_T \) we consider the circuit \( \widetilde{F}_{\alpha, \beta} \) that is identical to \( \widetilde{F} \), except that for every \( j \) in the range from \( \alpha \) to \( \beta \) (wrapping around \( T \) in case that \( \alpha > \beta \)) \( \widetilde{F}_{\alpha, \beta} \) on the input \( x_j \) outputs \( \perp \). The argument proceeds in two steps. First, we show that for a random \( u \in [T] \), the obfuscation \( \widetilde{F}_{u,u} \) is computationally indistinguishable from \( \widetilde{F} \). Intuitively this “splits” the authenticated chain into two parts: from \( x_1 \) to \( x_u \) and from \( x_{u+1} \) to \( x_{i−1} \). While given \( \widetilde{F}_{u,u} \) and \( x_i \) it is possible to compute additional signatures in the first part of the chain, we show that it is it hard to find a signature for any \( j \) in the second part of the chain. More concretely, in the second step, we prove that the obfuscated circuits \( \widetilde{F}_{u,u} \) and \( \widetilde{F}_{u,i−1} \) are computationally indistinguishable by a sequence of hybrids. For every \( j \) in the range between \( u \) and \( i−2 \), we show that the obfuscations \( \widetilde{F}_{u,j} \) and \( \widetilde{F}_{u,j+1} \) are computationally indistinguishable. In total, we have at most \( T \) hybrids; relying on injective one-way functions and iO with super-polynomial hardness (related to \( T \)), we show that each two obfuscations are \( T−\Theta(1) \)-indistinguishable. Overall we deduce that the obfuscations \( \widetilde{F} \) and \( \widetilde{F}_{u,i−1} \) are also computationally indistinguishable as required.

To summarize, the hardness proof follows two steps:

1. **Split the chain into two parts:** For a random \( u \in \mathbb{Z}_T \), prove that \( \widetilde{F} \) and \( \widetilde{F}_{u,i−1} \) are indistinguishable.

2. **Erase second part:** For every \( j \) in the range between \( u \) and \( i−2 \) prove that \( \widetilde{F}_{u,j} \) and \( \widetilde{F}_{u,j+1} \) are \( T−\Theta(1) \)-indistinguishable.

We next explain how the two steps described above are proven. For simplicity, we shall assume the existence of a length-doubling pseudo-random generator \( \text{PRG} : \mathbb{Z}_T \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{T2} \) that is injective; in the body, we relax this assumption and rely only on injective one-way functions. The two steps rely the ideas of hidden triggers and punctured programs introduced by Sahai and Waters [SW14].

**First step.** To prove that \( \widetilde{F} \) is indistinguishable from \( \widetilde{F}_{u,u} \), we first note that \( \widetilde{F} \) is indistinguishable from an obfuscation \( \widetilde{F}^v(j, \sigma) \) of a circuit that has an extra “if statement”:

1. If \( \sigma = \text{PRF}_S(j) \) and \( \text{PRG}(j) = v \), return \( \perp \).
2. Otherwise return \( x_{j+1} \) (as \( \widetilde{F} \) would);

here \( v \) is chosen at random from the range \( \mathbb{Z}_{T2} \) of \( \text{PRG} \). Observe that, with overwhelming probability \( 1−\frac{1}{T} \), \( v \) is not in the image of \( \text{PRG} \), the condition in (1) is never met, and the alternative behavior is never triggered. Thus, \( \widetilde{F} \) and \( \widetilde{F}^v \) compute the same function and their obfuscations are indistinguishable. Next, relying on the pseudo-randomness guarantee of \( \text{PRG} \), we can indistinguishably replace the uniformly random \( v \) with a pseudo-random value \( \text{PRG}(u) \). It is left to note that, because \( \text{PRG} \) is injective, \( \widetilde{F}^v \), with \( v = \text{PRG}(u) \), computes the exact same function as \( \widetilde{F}_{u,u} \). Indeed, both compute the same function as \( \widetilde{F} \) except on \( x_u \), where an alternative behavior is triggered and \( \perp \) is returned.

**Second step.** To prove that \( \widetilde{F}_{u,j} \) and \( \widetilde{F}_{u,j+1} \) are indistinguishable, we require that \( \text{PRF}_S \) is puncturable. This means that for every input \( k \in \mathbb{Z}_T \), we can sample a punctured \( \text{PRF}_S\{k\} \) that agrees with \( \text{PRF}_S \) on
all inputs \( \ell \neq k \), but computationally hides any information on the value \( \text{PRF}_S(k) \); namely \( \text{PRF}_S(k) \) is pseudo-random, even given the program \( \text{PRF}_S(k) \). Such puncturable pseudo-random functions are known to exist based on any one-way function \([\text{GR13}], \text{KPTZ13}, \text{BGI14}\).

Now, note that \( \tilde{F}_{u,j} \) and \( \tilde{F}_{u,j+1} \) differ only on input \( x_{j+1} \): while the first returns \( x_{j+2} \), the second returns \( \perp \). In particular, the two circuits must hide \( x_{j+1} \) to guarantee indistinguishability. What enables hiding the value \( x_{j+1} \) is that both circuits never output \( \text{PRF}_S(j + 1) \), but rather, on input \( x_j \) both return \( \perp \). The value \( \text{PRF}_S(j + 1) \) is only used to test if an input \( (j + 1, \sigma) \) satisfies \( \sigma = \text{PRF}_S(j + 1) \). Relying on puncturing, this comparison can be performed in “encrypted form” while hiding \( \text{PRF}_S(j + 1) \).

Concretely, we first move from \( \tilde{F}_{u,j} \) to \( \tilde{F}_{u,j}^{(1)} \) that has a punctured \( \text{PRF}_S(j+1) \). The circuit has \( \sigma_{j+1} = \text{PRF}_S(j + 1) \) hardwired, and given \( (j + 1, \sigma) \) it directly compares \( \sigma \) to \( \sigma_{j+1} \). The circuit computes the same function, and indistinguishability holds by \( \text{iO} \). Then, relying on pseudo-randomness at the punctured point \( j + 1 \), we move to \( \tilde{F}_{u,j}^{(2)} \) where \( \sigma_{j+1} \) is replaced with a truly random value in \( \{0, 1\}^\lambda \). Next, we move to \( \tilde{F}_{u,j}^{(3)} \) where the comparison of \( \sigma_{j+1} \) and \( \sigma \) is not done in the clear, but rather under an injective (length-doubling) pseudo-random generator \( \text{PRG} : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda} \); in particular, \( \sigma_{j+1} \) is not stored in the clear, but rather \( \text{PRG}(\sigma_{j+1}) \) is stored. This does not change functionality and thus indistinguishability is again preserved.

Now, using pseudo-randomness of \( \text{PRG} \), we move to yet another circuit \( \tilde{F}_{u,j}^{(4)} \), where \( \text{PRG}(\sigma_{j+1}) \) is replaced by a truly random string \( v \in \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda} \). Finally, note that as in the proof of the first step, \( v \) is not in the image of \( \text{PRG} \) with overwhelming probability \( 1 - 2^{-\lambda} \). Thus we can indistinguishably change the circuit to return \( \perp \) when given the input \( x_{j+1} \). We can then reverse the above steps and go back to computing \( \sigma_{j+1} = \text{PRF}_S(j + 1) \), using the non-punctured \( \text{PRF}_S \).

To guarantee the required indistinguishability gap between the different hybrids, we should take care in choosing the parameters \( T \), the output length \( \lambda \) of \( \text{PRF}_S \), and the hardness of each of the cryptographic primitives. Choosing these parameters yields different hardness tradeoffs (further discussed in Section 4.4).

**How to publicly sample from the domain?** To allow sampling of elements in the domain we cannot simply provide a circuit that would compute \( \text{PRF}_S \) on any \( i \in \mathbb{Z}_T \), as this would result in an obvious attack — given \( x_i = (i, \text{PRF}_S(i)) \), one just has to compute \( \text{PRF}_S(i - 1) \). The idea, which is inspired by the public-key encryption of Sahai and Waters \([\text{SW14}], \text{is to provide instead an obfuscation} \( \tilde{X} \) of a sampler \( X_S \) that only computes \( \text{PRF}_S \) on a very sparse, but still pseudo-random, subset of the domain. Concretely, \( X_S \) takes as input a seed \( s \) for a length doubling pseudo-random generator \( \text{PRG} : \mathbb{Z}_\sqrt{T} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_T \), and outputs \( x_i = (i, \text{PRF}_S(i)) \) for \( i \equiv \text{PRG}(s) \).

First, note that, by pseudo-randomness inverting \( x_i = (i, \text{PRF}_S(i)) \) where \( i \equiv \text{PRG}(s) \) is pseudorandom is as hard as inverting \( x_i \) when \( i \) is chosen truly at random, which is in turn as hard as inverting \( x_{i+1} \) when \( i \) is random (or pseudo-random). Thus, to prove that one-wayness still holds even in the presence of the obfuscated sampler \( \tilde{X} \), it suffices to focus on showing that inversion of \( x_i \) is impossible for a truly random \( i \).

For such a random \( i \), we consider the interval \( [i - \sqrt{T}, i] \) and note that is randomly located in \( \mathbb{Z}_T \) and is not too large (it has negligible density \( T^{-3/4} \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_T \)). Since \( \text{PRG} \) has a sparse image, the latter implies that the interval does not contain any \( \text{PRG} \) images with overwhelming probability \( 1 - T^{-1/4} \). Noting also that the interval is still of super-polynomial size, we can invoke a similar argument to one in the simplified case considered above (without the presence of the sampler \( X \)), only restricted to the interval \( [i - \sqrt{T}, i] \). The fact that the interval has no clear of \( \text{PRG} \) images, allows arguing that the presence of the obfuscated sampler \( \tilde{X} \) does not interfere with the proof.

**Enhancements.** In certain applications of TDPs, it is required that the TDPs are *enhanced* or even *doubly enhanced* \([\text{GR13}] \). We briefly recall these properties and explain how they are obtained. In enhanced TDPs, we essentially ask that it is possible to *obliviously* sample domain elements, without knowing their pre-
images. Translating to our setting, we require that \((\text{PRG}(s), \text{PRF}_S(\text{PRG}(s))) \leftarrow X_S\) is hard to invert, even given the coins \(s\) used to sample it. In the construction above, this may not be true. Indeed, given the seed \(s\) for the pseudo-random generator, we can no longer argue that inversion is as hard as for a truly uniform element. In fact, the PRG may be such that given \(s\), it is easy to find \(s'\) such that \(\text{PRG}(s') = \text{PRG}(s) - 1\) and thus easily invert. We observe that this can be circumvented if we make sure that \(\text{PRG}\) is given the coins \(s\) used to sample it. In the construction above, this may not be true. Indeed, given the seed \(s\) for the pseudo-random generator, we can no longer argue that inversion is as hard as for a truly uniform element. In fact, the PRG may be such that given \(s\), it is easy to find \(s'\) such that \(\text{PRG}(s') = \text{PRG}(s) - 1\) and thus easily invert. We observe that this can be circumvented if we make sure that \(\text{PRG}\) has a discrete image where a random image \(\text{PRG}(s)\) is likely to be isolated away from any other image. We show how to construct appropriate PRGs from plain PRGs and pairwise-independent permutations.

In doubly enhanced TDPs, it is typically required that it is possible to sample an image-preimage pair \((x, y)\) together with random coins used to sample the preimage \(y\) by the usual sampler. In our concrete setting, we would like to sample an image \(y = (\text{PRG}(s), \text{PRF}_S(\text{PRG}(s))) \leftarrow X_S\) together with randomness \(s\) and preimage \(x = (\text{PRG}(s) - 1, \text{PRF}_S(\text{PRG}(s) - 1))\). We only achieve a relaxed form of this requirement, where \(s\) is pseudo-random rather than truly random, even given the trapdoor, or the coins used to sample the function. The idea is to slightly change the pseudo-random generator \(\text{PRG}\) in the previous constructions in a way that exploits the specific structure of our TDP. We only change \(\text{PRG}\) on a sparse set of seeds that has negligible density, and thus previous properties are preserved (see more details in Section 4.3).

Comparison with [BPR14]. The authenticated-chain construction and its analysis described above were suggested in [BPR14] in order to demonstrate a hard problem in the complexity class PPAD. To obtain trapdoor permutations, we show how to extend their construction to also allow sampling of (pseudo) random domain elements, as well as the other sampling algorithms required for doubly enhanced permutations. We also relax their assumption of injective one-way functions to plain one-way functions as described below.

1.2.2 Injective One-Way Functions from iO

We now describe the main ideas behind constructing injective one-way function from iO and plain one-way functions. We rely on two-message statistically-binding commitment schemes [Nao91] and puncturable PRFs (both known from any one-way function). In the constructed family, every function \(\text{OWF}_{M_1, S}\) is associated with a first message \(M_1\) for the commitment scheme and a pseudo-random function \(\text{PRF}_S\). The public description of the function contains an obfuscated circuit \(\tilde{C}\) that on input \(x\) outputs a commitment \(\text{COM}_{M_1}(x; \text{PRF}_S(x))\) with respect to the first commitment message \(M_1\), plaintext \(x\) and randomness \(\text{PRF}_S(x)\). The fact that the function is injective (with overwhelming probability over \(M_1\)) follows directly from the statistical binding of the commitment. We focus on arguing one-wayness.

Our goal is to show that it is hard to recover a random \(x\) given \(\tilde{C}\) and \(\tilde{C}(x)\). We start by considering a hybrid circuit defined similarly to \(\tilde{C}\) except that it contains the punctured key \(S\{x\}\) and given input \(x\), it outputs a hardcoded commitment; since we did not change the functionality of the circuit indistinguishability follows by iO. Using pseudo-randomness at the punctured point \(x\) and the hiding of the commitment we can now argue that the hardcoded commitment hides \(x\), replacing it with a commitment to some arbitrary plaintext, using true randomness. The problem is that now, even if we unpuncture \(S\{x\}\), \(x\) itself still needs to appear in the clear as part of the code of the circuit in order to trigger the output of the hardcoded commitment.

Nevertheless, we may try to apply a similar strategy to the one previously used for our TDPs. Concretely, we note that \(x\) is only used to test if an input \(x'\) satisfies \(x' = x\), and this comparison can be performed in an “encrypted form” — instead of hardcoding \(x\) in the clear we can hardcode \(g(x)\) for some one-way function \(g\) and compare images instead of preimages. Unfortunately, to argue that this does not change functionality the function \(g\) must itself be injective which seems to bring us back to square one.

The key observation is that we may gain by using a function \(g\) that is only sometimes injective; namely,
it is enough that \( g \) is simultaneously injective and hard to invert only on some noticeable subset of its domain. We show that such functions can be constructed from any one-way function. Now, leveraging the \( \text{iO} \) requirement only on the corresponding injective sub-domain, we can show that the above construction results in a \emph{weak} one-way function that is \emph{fully injective}; indeed, we only invoke sometimes-injective of \( g \) in the proof of one-wayness. Then, to obtain a (strong) injective one-way function, we can apply standard direct-product amplification \cite{Yao82}.

\textbf{Constructing sometimes injective one-way functions.} We outline the main idea behind constructing a sometimes-injective one-way function \( g \), as above, based on any one way function \( f \). First, consider for simplicity the case that the function \( f \) is \( r \)-regular. Roughly, the idea is extract the \( \log(r) \) bits of randomness that remain in \( x \) conditioned on \( f(x) \) and append them to the function output as in \cite{HILL99}. However, due to their inherent entropy loss, standard randomness extractors cannot extract enough random bits to guarantee any meaningful injectiveness. Nevertheless, for our purpose, the extracted bits need not be statistically-close to uniform, they only need to preserve one-wayness. Accordingly, we use the \emph{unpredictability extractors} of \cite{DPW14}, which allow extracting more bits so to guarantee injectiveness, while still preserving meaningful one-wayness.

To deal with \( f \) that is not regular, we may set \( r \) to be the most frequent regularity of \( f \). This only shrinks the portion of the domain where \( f \) is both injective and hard to invert by some polynomial factor. A uniform construction is obtained by choosing \( r \) at random.

\section{Preliminaries}

The cryptographic definitions in the paper follow the convention of modeling security against non-uniform adversaries. An efficient adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) is modeled as a sequence of circuits \( \mathcal{A} = \{ A_{\lambda} \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \), such that each circuit \( A_{\lambda} \) is of polynomial size \( \lambda^{O(1)} \) with \( \lambda^{O(1)} \) input and output bits; we shall also consider adversaries of some super polynomial size \( t(\lambda) = \lambda^{\omega(1)} \). We often omit the subscript \( \lambda \) when it is clear from the context. The resulting hardness will accordingly be against non-uniform algorithms. The result can be cast into the uniform setting, with some adjustments to the analysis.

\subsection{Indistinguishability Obfuscation}

We define indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) with respect to a give class of circuits. The definition is formulated as in \cite{BGI+01}.

\textbf{Definition 2.1 (Indistinguishability obfuscation \cite{BGI+01}).} A PPT algorithm \( iO \) is said to be an indistinguishability obfuscator for a class of circuits \( C \), if it satisfies:

1. \textbf{Functionality:} for any \( C \in C \),
   \[
   \Pr_{iO}[\forall x : iO(C)(x) = C(x)] = 1 .
   \]

2. \textbf{Indistinguishability:} for any poly-size distinguisher \( D \) there exists a negligible function \( \mu(\cdot) \), such that for any two circuits \( C_0, C_1 \in C \) that compute the same function and are of the same size \( \lambda \):
   \[
   \left| \Pr[D(iO(C_0)) = 1] - \Pr[D(iO(C_1)) = 1] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda) ,
   \]
   where the probability is over the coins of \( D \) and \( iO \).

   We further say that \( iO \) is \((t, \delta)\)-secure, for some function \( t(\cdot) \) and concrete negligible function \( \delta(\cdot) \), if for all \( t(\lambda)^{O(1)} \) distinguishers the above indistinguishability gap \( \mu(\lambda) \) is smaller than \( \delta(\lambda)^{\Omega(1)} \).
2.2 Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions

We consider a simple case of the puncturable pseudo-random functions (PRFs) where any PRF may be punctured at a single point. The definition is formulated as in [SW14], and is satisfied by the GGM [GGM86] PRF [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14].

Definition 2.2 (Puncturable PRFs). Let $n, k$ be polynomially bounded length functions. An efficiently computable family of functions

$$\mathcal{PRF} = \left\{ \text{PRF}_S : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda : S \in \{0, 1\}^k, \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \right\},$$

associated with an efficient (probabilistic) key sampler $K_{\mathcal{PRF}}$, is a puncturable PRF if there exists a poly-time puncturing algorithm $\text{Punc}$ that takes as input a key $S$, and a point $x^*$, and outputs a punctured key $S\{x^*\}$, so that the following conditions are satisfied:

1. **Functionality is preserved under puncturing:** For every $x^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$,

   $$\Pr_{S \leftarrow K_{\mathcal{PRF}}(1^\lambda)} [\forall x \neq x^* : \text{PRF}_S(x) = \text{PRF}_{S\{x^*\}}(x) : S\{x^*\} = \text{Punc}(S, x^*)] = 1.$$

2. **Indistinguishability at punctured points:** for any polysize distinguisher $\mathcal{D}$ there exists a negligible function $\mu(\cdot)$, such that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, and any $x^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$,

   $$|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(x^*, S\{x^*\}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(x^*, S\{x^*\}, u) = 1]| \leq \mu(\lambda),$$

   where $S \leftarrow K_{\mathcal{PRF}}(1^\lambda), S\{x^*\} = \text{Punc}(S, x^*)$, and $u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$.

   We further say that $\mathcal{PRF}$ is $(t, \delta)$-secure, for some function $t(\cdot)$ and concrete negligible function $\delta(\cdot)$, if for all $t(\lambda)^{O(1)}$ distinguishers the above indistinguishability gap $\mu(\lambda)$ is smaller than $\delta(\lambda)^{\Omega(1)}$.

2.3 Injective One-Way Functions

We shall also rely on (possibly keyed) injective one-way functions.

Definition 2.3 (Injective OWF). Let $k$ be polynomially bounded length function. An efficiently computable family of functions

$$\mathcal{OWF} = \left\{ \text{OWF}_K : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^* : K \in \{0, 1\}^k, \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \right\},$$

associated with an efficient (probabilistic) key sampler $K_{\mathcal{OWF}}$, is an injective OWF if it satisfies

1. **Injectiveness:** With overwhelming probability over the choice of $K \leftarrow K_{\mathcal{OWF}}(1^\lambda)$, the function $\text{OWF}_K$ is injective.

2. **One-wayness:** For any polysize inverter $A$ there exists a negligible function $\mu(\cdot)$, such that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,

   $$\Pr[ A(K, \text{OWF}_K(x)) = x : K \leftarrow K_{\mathcal{OWF}}(1^\lambda), x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda ] \leq \mu(\lambda).$$

   We further say that $\mathcal{OWF}$ is $(t, \delta)$-secure, for some function $t(\cdot)$ and concrete negligible function $\delta(\cdot)$, if for all $t(\lambda)^{O(1)}$ inverters the above inversion probability $\mu(\lambda)$ is smaller than $\delta(\lambda)^{\Omega(1)}$. 
3 Injective One-Way Functions from iO

In this section, we construct injective one-way functions from iO and plain injective one-way functions. We start by defining and constructing sometimes injective one-way functions.

3.1 Sometimes Injective One-Way Functions

For a function $f : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ and any input $x \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, we denote by

$$H_f(x) := \log |\{x' : f(x') = f(x)\}| = H_\infty (x' \leftarrow f^{-1}(f(x)))$$

$$\text{Inj}(f) := \{x : H_f(x) = 0\}$$

the min-entropy of a random preimage of $f(x)$, and the subset of inputs on which $f$ is injective, respectively.

We next define sometimes-injective OWFs (SIOWFs). Roughly speaking, such functions are injective and hard to invert over a noticeable fraction of their domain.

**Definition 3.1 (Sometimes-Injective OWF).** Let $k$ be polynomially bounded length function. An efficiently computable family of functions

$$\text{SIOWF} = \{\text{SIOWF}_K : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^* : K \in \{0, 1\}^{k(\lambda)}, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}\}$$

associated with an efficient (probabilistic) key sampler $K_{\text{SIOWF}}$, is a sometimes injective OWF if for every key $K \in \{0, 1\}^{k(\lambda)}$ there exists an injective subset $I_K \subseteq \text{Inj}(\text{SIOWF}_K)$, satisfying the following conditions:

1. **Sometimes injectiveness:** There exists a polynomial $p(\cdot)$ such that for any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$:

   $$\Pr [x \in I_K : K \leftarrow K_{\text{SIOWF}}(1^\lambda) \mid x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda] \geq 1/p(\lambda) .$$

2. **One-wayness over injective subdomain:** for any polysize inverter $A$ there is a negligible function $\mu(\cdot)$ such that for any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$:

   $$\Pr [A(K, \text{SIOWF}_K(x)) = x : K \leftarrow K_{\text{SIOWF}}(1^\lambda) \mid x \leftarrow I_K] \leq \mu(\lambda) .$$

We further say that $\text{SIOWF}$ is $t$-secure, for some super-polynomial function $t(\cdot)$, if the one-wayness requirement holds for all $t(\lambda)^{O(1)}$ inverters.

**The construction.** Let $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ be any one-way function. We construct an SIOWF

$$\text{SIOWF} = \{\text{SIOWF}_K : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^* : K \in \{0, 1\}^{k(\lambda)}, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}\}$$

with a corresponding key sampler $K_{\text{SIOWF}}$ as follows:

- A random key $K := (S, e) \leftarrow K_{\text{SIOWF}}(1^\lambda)$ consists of a random $e \leftarrow [\lambda]$ and a random seed $S$ for a hash function $h_S : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{e+1}$ drawn from a $q$-wise independent family, where we set $q = \lambda$ to be the security parameter.

- For $x \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, the function is defined by $\text{SIOWF}_K(x) := (f(x), h_S(x))$. 

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Proposition 3.1. SIOWF is a sometimes injective one-way function.

Proof. Throughout, we denote by $E_e \subseteq \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ the subset of values $x$ such that $H_f(x) \in [e - 1, e)$. For $K = (S, e)$, we define $I_{S,e} = E_e \cap \text{Inj}(\text{SIOWF}_{S,e}) \subseteq \text{Inj}(\text{SIOWF}_{S,e})$. We start by proving the following preliminary claim saying that the function is injective with high-probability over the set $E_e$. 

Claim 3.1. For any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, e \in [\lambda], x \in E_e$

$$\Pr_S [x \in \text{Inj}(\text{SIOWF}_{S,e})] \geq \frac{1}{2}.$$ 

Proof of Claim 3.1. Fix any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, e \in [\lambda], x \in E_e$, and let $y = f(x)$. Since the output of $\text{SIOWF}_{S,e}(x)$ includes $y$, it suffices to show that $x$ does not collide with any other $x' \in f^{-1}(y)$. By $q$-wise independence (in fact, pairwise is sufficient here), for any such $x'$,

$$\Pr_S [h_S(x) = h_S(x')] \leq 2^{-e-1}.$$ 

Thus, the expected number of such $x'$ that collide with $x$ is:

$$2^{e-1}(|f^{-1}(y)| - 1) \leq 2^{e-1} \cdot 2^{H_f(x)} \leq 1/2,$$

and the claim now follows by Markov’s inequality. 

Sometimes injectiveness follows directly:

$$\Pr \left[ x \in I_{S,e} : (S, e) \leftarrow K_{\text{SIOWF}}(1^\lambda) \right] \geq \Pr_{e,x} [x \in E_e] \cdot \min_{e,x \in E_e} \Pr_S [x \in \text{Inj}(\text{SIOWF}_{S,e})] \geq \frac{1}{2\lambda}.$$

where $\Pr_{e,x} [x \in E_e] = 1/\lambda$ since for any fixed $x$ there is a unique $e \in [\lambda]$ such that $x \in E_e$, and $\min_{e,x \in E_e} \Pr_S [x \in \text{Inj}(\text{SIOWF}_{S,e})] \geq 1/2$ by the previous claim.

Next, we prove one-wayness over the injective subdomain. Fix any polysize inverter $A$ and security parameter $\lambda$. Firstly, we notice that

$$\Pr_{S,e,x} [A(S,e,f(x),h_S(x)) = x] \leq \Pr_{S,e,x} [A(S,e,f(x),h_S(x)) = x] / \Pr_{S,e,x} [x \in I_{S,e}] \leq 2 \Pr_{S,e,x} [A(S,e,f(x),h_S(x)) = x],$$

where we can bound the denominator in equation (1) by at least $\frac{1}{2}$ by Claim 3.1. Therefore, it remains to show that $\Pr_{S,e} [A(S,e,f(x),h_S(x)) = x]$ is negligible. To prove this, we rely on a theorem from [DPW14] showing that any $q$-wise independent family essentially preserves uninvertability.

Theorem 3.1 ([DPW14] Theorem 4.1] (restated). Let $\{h_S : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m : S \in \{0, 1\}^d\}$ be a $q$-wise independent hashing family. For any $D : \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^d \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ and any random variable $X \in \{0, 1\}^n$ with min-entropy $H_{\infty}(X) \geq k$, if $\Pr[D(U,S) = 1] = \delta$, then $\Pr[D(h_S(X),S) = 1] \leq O(q^{2m-k}) \max\{\delta, 2^{-q}\}$. 

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Using the above theorem, we have:

\[
\Pr_{x \leftarrow E_e} \left[ \mathcal{A}(S, e, f(x), h_S(x)) = x \right] \\
\leq \Pr_{x \leftarrow E_e} \left[ \mathcal{A}(S, e, f(x), h_S(x)) \in f^{-1}(f(x)) \right] \\
= \Pr_{x \leftarrow E_e} \left[ \mathcal{A}(S, e, f(x), h_S(x')) \in f^{-1}(f(x)) \right] \\
= \mathbb{E}_{e} \Pr_{x \leftarrow E_e} \left[ \mathcal{A}(S, e, f(x), h_S(x')) \in f^{-1}(f(x)) \right] \\
\leq \mathbb{E}_{e} \Pr_{x \leftarrow E_e} \left[ \mathcal{A}(S, e, f(x), U) \in f^{-1}(f(x)) \right], 2^{-\lambda} \\
\leq \mathbb{E}_{e, x \leftarrow E_e} O(\lambda) \left( \Pr_{S} \left[ \mathcal{A}(S, e, f(x), U) \in f^{-1}(f(x)) \right] + 2^{-\lambda} \right) \\
\leq O(\lambda)2^{-\lambda} + O(\lambda) \Pr_{S, e, x} \left[ \mathcal{A}(S, e, f(x), U) \in f^{-1}(f(x)) \right] \\
\leq O(\lambda)2^{-\lambda} + O(\lambda) \frac{\Pr_{S, e, x} \left[ \mathcal{A}(S, e, f(x), U) \in f^{-1}(f(x)) \right]}{\Pr_{e, x} \left[ x \in E_e \right]} \leq \mu(\lambda) .
\]

Equation (2) follows since we can think of sampling the pair \(x, f(x)\) as equivalent to sampling \(x', f(x)\) where \(x \leftarrow E_e, x' \leftarrow f^{-1}(f(x))\). Equation (3) follows by applying Theorem 3.1 with the variable \(x' \leftarrow f^{-1}(f(x))\) having entropy \(k = H_f(x) \geq e + 1\) and with hash output-length \(m = e + 1\) and independence \(q = \lambda\). To apply the theorem, we think of a distinguisher \(D_{A, e, f(x)}\) that given \((z, S)\) tests whether \(A(S, e, f(x), z)\) inverts \(f(x)\). In the equation, the random variable \(U\) is uniformly random \(e + 1\) bit string. In equation (4) we can bound the numerator \(\Pr_{S, e, x} \left[ \mathcal{A}(S, e, f(x), U) \in f^{-1}(f(x)) \right]\) by some negligible by the one-wayness of \(f\) and we can bound the denominator \(\Pr_{e, x} \left[ x \in E_e \right] \geq 1/\lambda\) by the same argument we used previously. Therefore \(\mu(\lambda)\) is negligible as we wanted to show.

\[\square\]

Remark 3.1 (super-polynomial security). In the above construction, starting from a one-way function \(f\) that is \(t\)-secure directly yields \(t\)-security of \(\mathcal{SIOWF}\).

### 3.2 Injective OWFs from iO and SIOWFs

We now construct a family of injective one-way functions based on iO and one-way functions. We first construct a weak but (fully) injective one-way function, and then use standard direct product amplification.

**Ingredients.** Let \(iO\) be an indistinguishability obfuscator for \(\mathcal{P}_{\text{poly}}\), and let \(P\mathcal{R}\mathcal{F}\) be a family of puncturable pseudo-random functions, where for \(S \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{P\mathcal{R}\mathcal{F}}(1^\lambda)\), \(PRF^S\) maps \(\{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda\). Let \((\text{COM}_1, \text{COM}_2)\) be two two message statistically-binding commitment scheme, where \(\text{COM}_1(1^\lambda)\) samples a first message \(M_1\), and \(\text{COM}_2(x, M_1; r)\) computes a commitment \(M_2\) to plaintext \(x \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda\), with respect to the first message \(M_1\) and random coins \(r \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda\).

**The function family.** For \(M_1 \leftarrow \text{COM}_1(1^\lambda), S \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{P\mathcal{R}\mathcal{F}}(1^\lambda)\), consider the circuit \(C_{M_1, S} : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*\) defined by

\[C_{M_1, S}(x) := \text{COM}_2(x, M_1; PRF^S(x)) .\]
The constructed family of one-way functions $OWF$ consists of all obfuscations of such circuits:

1. A random key $OWF_K \leftarrow K_{OWF}(\lambda)$ consists of an obfuscation $\tilde{C} \leftarrow iO(C_{M_1,S})$, for a first commitment message $M_1 \leftarrow \text{COM}_1(\lambda)$ and PRF seed $S \leftarrow K_{PRF}(\lambda)$.

2. The function is given by $OWF_K(x) = \tilde{C}(x)$.

The fact that the construction gives an injective family follows directly from the statistical binding of the commitment. We next show that it is also weakly one-way.

**Proposition 3.2.** Assume there exists a family $SIOWF$ of sometimes-injective one-way functions. Then the above construction is a weak one-way function.

**Proof sketch.** Let $I_K$ and $p(\cdot)$ be as in Definition 3.1 such that $SIOWF$ has an injective sub-domain $I_K$ of density $1/p(\lambda)$. We show that any poly-size adversary $A$ fails to invert the constructed $OWF$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{p(\lambda)} - \mu(\lambda)$ for some negligible $\mu(\cdot)$. For this purpose we consider a sequence of hybrids.

Hyb$_1$: The real experiment. Here $A$ is given as input $\tilde{C}, \tilde{C}(x)$ for a random input $x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and random key $\tilde{C} \leftarrow K_{OWF}(\lambda)$ and tries to obtain $x$.

Hyb$_2$: Here $\tilde{C}$ is an obfuscation of an augmented circuit. In the new circuit, the PRF seed $S$ is replaced with $S \{x\}$, which is punctured at $x$. In addition, $M_2 = \text{COM}_2(x, M_1; \text{PRF}_S(x))$ is hardwired as the output on input $x$ (the input $x$ itself is also hardwired). This circuit computes the same function as the previous $C_{M_1,S}$, thus by the iO guarantee, $A$ inverts the function with the same probability up to a negligible difference.

Hyb$_3$: Here $M_2 = \text{COM}_2(x, M_1; r)$ is generated with truly uniform randomness $r$, rather than $\text{PRF}_S(x)$. (This includes both the hardwired $M_2$ as well as the output of the function $\tilde{C}(x) = M_2$ given to $A$.) By pseudorandomness at punctured points, the inversion probability is again maintained up to a negligible difference.

Hyb$_4$: Here $M_2 = \text{COM}_2(0^\lambda, M_1; r)$ is a commitment to $0^\lambda$, rather than to $x$. By the computational hiding of the commitment, the inversion probability is again maintained up to a negligible difference.

Hyb$_5$: Here we unpuncture $S$. The point $x$ itself is still hardwired into the circuit in the clear. This does not change functionality, and thus the inversion probability is maintained, up to a negligible difference, by iO.

Hyb$_6$: In this hybrid, we also sample a random key $K \leftarrow K_{SIOWF}(\lambda)$ for a sometimes-injective OWF, and instead of sampling $x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$ uniformly at random, we sample it from the injective sub-domain $x \leftarrow I_K$. Since the density of $I_K$ is at least $1/p(\lambda)$,

$$\Pr[A \text{ fails to obtain } x \text{ in Hyb}_5] \geq \frac{1}{p} \cdot \Pr[A \text{ fails to obtain } x \text{ in Hyb}_6]$$

Hyb$_7$: In this hybrid, instead of storing $x$ in the clear and comparing it to the input (in order to decide whether to return $M_2$), we store its image $SIOWF_K(x)$. Comparison of $x$ with an input $x'$ is now done by first computing $SIOWF(x')$ and then comparing the images. Since $x \in I_K \subseteq \text{Inj}(SIOWF_K)$ this does not change functionality and the inversion probability is preserved by iO.

Finally, we note that in Hyb$_7$ the view of $A$ can be efficiently simulated from $K, SIOWF_K(x)$. Thus, from one-wayness $SIOWF$ over $I_K$, it follows that $A$ fails to obtain $x$ in this hybrid with except with negligible
probability. Therefore, overall, we deduce that \( A \) fails to obtain \( x \) in the original experiment with probability at least \( \frac{1}{\mu(\lambda)} - \mu(\lambda) \), for some negligible \( \mu(\lambda) \), as required.

The padding parameter. \( \ell(\lambda) \) is chosen to be the maximum size among all circuits we went through in the analysis, so that iO can always be applied.

## 4 Trapdoor Permutations from iO

In this section we define Trapdoor Permutations (TDPs) and their enhancements, and construct them from sub-exponentially-secure iO. At large the definitions follow \cite{GR13}, with some exceptions discussed below.

### 4.1 Standard TDPs

We start by defining standard (non-enhanced) TDPs.

**Definition 4.1 (TDP).** Let \( k \) be polynomially bounded length function. An efficiently computable family of functions

\[
\mathcal{TDP} = \left\{ \text{TDP}_{PK} : D_{PK} \rightarrow D_{PK} : PK \in \{0, 1\}^{k(\lambda)}, \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \right\}
\]

associated with efficient (probabilistic) key and domain samplers \((K, S)\), is a (standard) TDP if it satisfies

1. **Trapdoor invertibility:** For any \((PK, SK)\) in the support of \( K(1^\lambda) \), the function \( \text{TDP}_{PK} \) is a permutation of a corresponding domain \( D_{PK} \). The inverse \( \text{TDP}_{PK}^{-1}(y) \) can be efficiently computed for any \( y \in D_{PK} \), using the trapdoor \( SK \).

2. **Domain sampling:** \( S(PK) \) samples a pseudo-uniform element in the domain \( D_{PK} \); that is, for any polysize distinguisher \( D \), there exists a negligible \( \mu(\cdot) \) such that for all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[
\left| \Pr \left[ D(r_K, x) = 1 : (PK, SK) \leftarrow K(1^\lambda; r_K) \quad x \leftarrow S(PK) \right] \right| - \Pr \left[ D(r_K, x) = 1 : (PK, SK) \leftarrow K(1^\lambda; r_K) \quad x \leftarrow D_{PK} \right] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda).
\]

3. **One-wayness:** For any polysize inverter \( A \) there exists a negligible function \( \mu(\cdot) \), such that for all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[
\Pr \left[ A(PK, \text{TDP}_{PK}(x)) = x : (PK, SK) \leftarrow K(1^\lambda) \quad x \leftarrow S(PK) \right] \leq \mu(\lambda).
\]

The above definition is similar to the one in \cite{GR13} with the exception that \( S(PK) \) in \cite{GR13} is required to sample a domain element that is statistically close to a uniform domain element, whereas we only require computational indistinguishability. Importantly, we require that computational-indistinguishability holds even given the random coins used to generate \((PK, SK)\). This property is required in applications (e.g., the EGL oblivious transfer protocol) and follows automatically (and thus not required explicitly) in the case of statistical-indistinguishability.

Also, we note that like in trapdoor permutations with statistical (rather than computational) domain sampling, the one-wayness requirement can be restated in any of the following equivalent forms:
3.a. The pre-image $x$ is sampled uniformly from the domain:

$$\Pr \left[ A(PK, \text{TDP}^x_{PK}(x)) = x : \begin{array}{l} (PK, SK) \leftarrow K(1^\lambda) \\ x \leftarrow D_{PK} \end{array} \right] \leq \mu(\lambda) .$$

3.b. The adversary inverts a random domain element $x$:

$$\Pr \left[ A(PK, x) = \text{TDP}^{-1}_{PK}(x) : \begin{array}{l} (PK, SK) \leftarrow K(1^\lambda) \\ x \leftarrow D_{PK} \end{array} \right] \leq \mu(\lambda) .$$

3.c. The adversary inverts a domain element sampled by $S(PK)$:

$$\Pr \left[ A(PK, x) = \text{TDP}^{-1}_{PK}(x) : \begin{array}{l} (PK, SK) \leftarrow K(1^\lambda) \\ x \leftarrow S(PK) \end{array} \right] \leq \mu(\lambda) .$$

4.1.1 The construction.

We now proceed to describe the construction of a TDP. The construction relies on super-polynomial hardness assumptions; for a convenient setting of parameters we assume that the underlying cryptographic primitives are sub-exponentially hard. In Section 4.4, we discuss relaxations to more mild (but still super-polynomial) hardness.

**Ingredients.** Fix any constant $\varepsilon < 1$, and let $T = T(\lambda) = 2^{\lambda^{1/2}}$. We require the following primitives:

- $iO$ is a $(\lambda, 2^{-\lambda^\varepsilon})$-secure indistinguishability obfuscator for P/poly.
- $\mathcal{PRF}$ is a $(\lambda, 2^{-\lambda^\varepsilon})$-secure family of puncturable pseudo-random functions, which for $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ maps $\mathbb{Z}_T$ to $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$.
- $\mathcal{OWF}$ is a $(2^{\lambda^\varepsilon}, 2^{-\lambda^\varepsilon})$-secure family of injective one-way functions, which for $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ maps $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$ to $\{0, 1\}^\ast$. (Will only come up in the analysis, and not in the construction itself.)
- $\mathcal{PRG}$ is a (polynomially-secure) length-doubling pseudo-random generator.

**The function family.** The core of the construction will be obfuscations of circuits $(F_S, X_S)$ for computing the function forward and sampling domain elements, respectively. These obfuscations will be embedded in the function key $PK$ and their corresponding secret $S$ will be the trapdoor. The circuits are defined next. For $S \leftarrow K_{\mathcal{PRF}}(1^\lambda)$:

1. $F_S(i, \sigma)$: takes as input $i \in \mathbb{Z}_T$ and $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and checks whether $\sigma = \mathcal{PRF}_S(i)$. If so it returns $i + 1, \mathcal{PRF}_S(i + 1)$, where $i + 1$ is computed modulo $T$. Otherwise it returns $\perp$.

2. $X_S(s)$: takes as input a seed $s \in \{0, 1\}^{\log \sqrt{T}}$ and outputs $(i, \sigma) = (\mathcal{PRG}(s), \mathcal{PRF}_S(\mathcal{PRG}(s)))$, where $i$ is interpreted as a residue in $\mathbb{Z}_T$.

Both circuits are padded so that their total size is $\ell(\lambda)$, for a fixed polynomial $\ell(\cdot)$ specified later. The constructed family $\mathcal{TDP}$ is now defined as follows.

1. A random key $PK$ consists of obfuscations $\bar{F} \leftarrow iO(F_S)$ and $\bar{X} \leftarrow iO(X_S)$, for $S \leftarrow K_{\mathcal{PRF}}(1^\lambda)$. The corresponding trapdoor $SK$ is $S$. 

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2. The domain $D_{PK}$ is $\{(i, \sigma) : i \in \mathbb{Z}_T, \sigma = \text{PRF}_S(i)\}$.

3. To compute $\text{TDP}_{PK}(i, \sigma)$, return $\overline{F}(i, \sigma)$.

4. To compute $\text{TDP}^{-1}_{PK}(i, \sigma)$ given $SK$, return $(i - 1, \text{PRF}_S(i - 1))$, where $i - 1$ is computed modulo $T$.

5. The domain sampler $S(PK; s)$ takes as input $PK$ and randomness $s \in \{0, 1\}^{\log \sqrt{T}}$ and outputs $\overline{X}(s)$.

**Proposition 4.1.** The above construction of $\text{TDP}$ is a trapdoor permutation.

**Proof.** The fact that $\text{TDP}$ is trapdoor-invertible follows readily from the construction. The fact that the domain sampler $S(PK)$ samples domain elements that are computationally-indistinguishable from uniform domain elements, even given the coins of $K$ used to generate $(PK, SK)$, follows directly from the pseudo-randomness guarantee of PRG.

From hereon, we focus on showing one-wayness. It would be simplest to work with the formulation (3.b) of the one-wayness requirement. Concretely, fix any polysize $A$, we show that there exists a negligible $\mu(\cdot)$ such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$
\Pr \left[ \text{PRF}_S(i - 1) \leftarrow A(\overline{F}, \overline{X}, i, \text{PRF}_S(i)) : \begin{array}{c} S \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{PRF}}(1^\lambda) \\
\overline{F} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(F_S) \\
\overline{X} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(X_S) \\
i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_T \end{array} \right] \leq \mu(\lambda) .
$$

We show that except with sub-exponentially-small probability $A(\overline{F}, \overline{X}, i, \text{PRF}_S(i))$ cannot output $\sigma^*$ such that $\overline{F}(i - 1, \sigma^*) \neq \perp$, which is equivalent to showing that $\sigma^* \neq \text{PRF}_S(i - 1)$. We prove this via a sequence of indistinguishable hybrid experiments where the obfuscated $\overline{F}$ is gradually augmented to return $\perp$ on an increasing interval, until it eventually returns $\perp$ on some interval $[i - u, i - 1]$ (for every possible signature), meaning in particular that $A(\overline{F}, \overline{X}, i, \text{PRF}_S(i))$ cannot find an accepting signature $\sigma^*$ for $i - 1$. Throughout the hybrids we change the obfuscated circuits and assume that they are always padded so that their total size is $\ell(\lambda)$, for a fixed polynomial $\ell(\cdot)$ specified later.

**Hyb$_1$:** The original experiment.

**Hyb$_2$:** Here $\overline{F}$ is an obfuscation of a circuit $F^{(2)}_{i,v,S,K'}$. The circuit has hardwired a key $K' \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{OWF}}(1^{\lambda'})$ for and injective OWF defined on inputs of length $\lambda' = \log \sqrt{T}$, and a random image $v = \text{OWF}_{K'}(u)$, for $u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda'} \cong \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}}$. The circuit behaves like $F$, with the exception that given any input $(k, \sigma)$ such that $k \in [i - \sqrt{T}, i - 1]$ and $\text{OWF}_{K'}(i - k) = v$, the circuit returns $\perp$.

**Hyb$_{3,j}, j \in [0, \sqrt{T} - 1]:$** Here $\overline{F}$ is an obfuscation of a circuit $F^{(3,j)}_{i,u,S}$. The circuit has a random index $u \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}}$. On any input $(k, \sigma)$, it returns $\perp$ if $k \in [i - u, i - u + j]$, where we truncate $j$ so that $j = \min\{j, i - u\}$. On any other input it behaves just like $F_S$.

**Hyb$_{4,j}, j \in [0, \sqrt{T} - 1]:$** Here $\overline{F}$ is an obfuscation of a circuit $F^{(4,j)}_{i,u,S(i - u + j),\sigma_{i - u + j}}$. The circuit is the same as $F^{(3,j)}_{i,u,S}$, only that it has a punctured PRF key $S\{i - u + j\}$, and the value $\sigma_{i - u + j} = \text{PRF}_S(i - u + j)$ is hardwired. In addition, $\overline{X}$ is an obfuscation of a circuit $X^{(4,j)}_{S(i - u + j)}$. The circuit is the same as $X_S$, only that it has the punctured $S\{i - u + j\}$, and whenever $\text{PRF}_S(i - u + j)$ is required the circuit returns $\perp$ (no value is hardwired instead).
Hyb_{5,j}, j \in [0, \sqrt{T} - 1]: Here \( \tilde{F} \) is an obfuscation of a circuit \( F_{i,u,S(i-u+j),\sigma_{i-u+j}}^{(5,j)} \). The circuit is the same as \( F_{i,u,S(i-u+j),\sigma_{i-u+j}}^{(4,j)} \), only that the hardwired \( \sigma_{i-u+j} \) is not set to PRF_{S}(i - u + j), but sampled uniformly at random from \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}.

Hyb_{6,j}, j \in [0, \sqrt{T} - 1]: Here \( \tilde{F} \) is an obfuscation of a circuit \( F_{i,u,S(i-u+j),\sigma_{i-u+j}}^{(6,j)} \). The circuit is the same as \( F_{i,u,S(i-u+j),\sigma_{i-u+j}}^{(5,j)} \), only that instead of storing \( \sigma_{i-u+j} \) in the clear \( v = \text{OWF}_{K}(\sigma_{i-u+j}) \) is stored, and comparison of \( \sigma \) and \( \sigma_{i-u+j} \) is done by comparing \( \text{OWF}_{K}(\sigma) \) and \( \text{OWF}_{K}(\sigma_{i-u+j}) \). Here \( K \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{OWF}}(1^\lambda) \) is a key for an injective OWF from the family \( \text{OWF} \). Also, the PRF seed \( S \) is no longer punctured. In addition, \( \tilde{X} \) is again an obfuscation of \( X_{S} \) (where \( S \) is no longer punctured).

We prove the following:

**Claim 4.1.** For any polysize distinguisher \( \mathcal{D} \), all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), and all \( j \in [0, \sqrt{T} - 1] \):

1. \[ |\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{1}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{2}) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^2)}, \]
2. \[ |\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{2}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{3,0}) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^3)}, \]
3. \[ |\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{3,j}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{4,j}) = 1]| \leq T^{-1/2} + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^3)}, \]
4. \[ |\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{4,j}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{5,j}) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^2)}, \]
5. \[ |\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{5,j}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{6,j}) = 1]| \leq T^{-1/2} + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^3)}, \]
6. \[ |\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{6,j}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{3,j+1}) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^3)}, \]

where the view of \( \mathcal{D} \) in each hybrid consists of the corresponding obfuscated \( \tilde{F}, \tilde{X} \) and \( (i, \text{PRF}_{S}(i)) \).

Proving the above claim will conclude the proof of Proposition 4.1 since it implies that

\[
\begin{align*}
\Pr & \left[ \sigma \leftarrow A(\tilde{F}, \tilde{X}, i, \text{PRF}_{S}(i)) \land F(i - 1, \sigma) \neq \perp \right] \quad S \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{\text{PRF}}(1^\lambda) \\
& \tilde{F} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(F_{S}) \\
& \tilde{X} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(X_{S})
\end{align*} \leq \lambda^{-\omega(1)} + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^2)} + \sqrt{T} \cdot (T^{-1/2} + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^3)}) = 0 + \lambda^{-\omega(1)} + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^2)} + 2\lambda^2/4 \cdot (2^{-\lambda^2/2} + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^3)}) = \lambda^{-\omega(1)},
\]

where the first to last equality follows from the fact that \( F_{S,u}^{(3,\sqrt{T})}(i - 1, \sigma) = \perp \) for any \( \sigma \).

**Proof of Claim 4.1** We prove each of the items in the claim. The proof is at most part similar to the one in [BPR14], with several exceptions.

**Proof of 1 and 6.** Recall that here we need to show that
1. \(|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_1) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_2) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^2)}\).

6. \(|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{6,j}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{3,j+1}) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^5)}\).

In both cases, one obfuscated program differs from the other on exactly a single point, which is the unique (random) preimage of the corresponding image \(v\) (in the first case \(v = \text{OWF}_{K'}(u)\), and in the second \(v = \text{OWF}_{K'}(\sigma_{i-u+j})\)).

To prove the claim, we rely on a lemma proven in [BCP14] that roughly shows that, for circuits that only differ on a single input, iO implies what is known as differing input obfuscation [BGI+01], where it is possible to efficiently extract from any iO distinguisher an input on which the underlying circuits differ.

**Lemma 4.1** (special case of [BCP14]). Let iO be a \((t, \delta)\)-secure indistinguishability obfuscator for P/poly. There exists a PPT oracle-aided extractor \(\mathcal{E}\), such that for any \(t^{O(1)}\)-size distinguisher \(\mathcal{D}\), and two equal size circuits \(C_0, C_1\) differing on exactly one input \(x^*\), the following holds. Let \(C'_0, C'_1\) be padded versions of \(C_0, C_1\) of size \(s \geq 3 \cdot |C_0|\).

If \(|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(i\text{O}(C'_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(i\text{O}(C'_1) = 1]| = \eta \geq \delta(s)^{O(1)}\),

then \(\Pr\left[ x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{E}^{O(1)}(1/\eta, C'_0, C'_1) \right] \geq 1 - 2^{-\Omega(s)}\).

Using the lemma, we show that if either item 2 or 7 do not hold, we can invoke the distinguisher \(\mathcal{D}\) to invert the underlying one-way function. The argument is similar in both cases up to different parameters; for concreteness, we focus on the first.

Assume that for infinitely many \(\lambda \in \mathbb{N}\), \(\mathcal{D}\) distinguishes \(\text{Hyb}_0\) from \(\text{Hyb}_1\) with gap \(\eta(\lambda) = 2^{-o(\lambda^2)}\). Then, by averaging, with probability \(\eta(\lambda)/2\) over the choice of \((u, K')\), \(\mathcal{D}\) distinguishes the two distributions conditioned on these choices with gap \(\eta(\lambda)/2\). Thus, we can invoke the extractor \(\mathcal{E}\) given by Lemma 4.1 to invert the one-way function family \(\text{OWF}\) with probability \(2(\lambda)/2\) \cdot (1 - 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}) \geq 2^{-o(\lambda^2)}\) in time \(t_D(\lambda) \cdot t_D(\lambda) \leq \eta(\lambda)^{-O(1)} \cdot \lambda^{O(1)} = 2^O(\lambda^2)\). Note that, indeed, given the image and the one-way function key, the inverter can construct the corresponding circuits efficiently. Recall that \(\text{OWF}_{K'}\) is defined on inputs of size \(\lambda' = \log \sqrt{T} = \lambda^{1/2}/4\), and is \((2^{-\lambda^x}, 2^{\lambda^x})\)-secure. Thus we get a contradiction to its one-wayness.

**Proof of 2.** Recall that here we need to show that

2. \(|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_2) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{3,0}) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^5)}\).

Here the obfuscated \(\tilde{F}\) computes the exact same function in both hybrids. Specifically, for any input \((k, \sigma)\), a comparison in the clear of \(i - k\) and \(u\) is replaced by comparison of their corresponding values \(\text{OWF}_{K'}(i - k)\) and \(\text{OWF}_{K'}(u)\) under an injective one-way function. Thus, the required indistinguishability follows from the \((\lambda, 2^{-\lambda^x})\)-security of \(i\text{O}\).

**Proof of 3.** Recall that here we need to show that

3. \(|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{3,j}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{4,j}) = 1]| \leq T^{-1/2} + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^5)}\).

Here also, the obfuscated \(\tilde{F}\) computes the exact same function in both hybrids. Specifically, rather than computing \(\sigma_{i-u+j} = \text{PRF}_S(i - u + j)\) using the PRF key \(S\), the value \(\sigma_{i-u+j}\) is hardwired and directly compared to \(\sigma\). For any other index, the punctured key \(S\{i - u + j\}\) is used.

We now claim that the obfuscated \(\tilde{X}\) also computes the same function in both hybrids with overwhelming probability \(1 - T^{-1/2}\). Indeed, since \(X_S\) only computes \(\text{PRF}_S\) on values in the image of \(\text{PRG}\), the probability
that $X_S$ and $X_{S^{(i−u+j)}}$ do not compute the same function can be bounded by the probability that $i − u + j$ is not in the image of $\text{PRG}$. Recall that $i$ is sampled uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_T$; thus, $i − u + j$ is also uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_T$, and we can bound the probability that it is in the image of $\text{PRG} : \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \to \mathbb{Z}_T$ by $\sqrt{T} \cdot T^{-1} = T^{-1/2}$.

The required indistinguishability now follows from iO security.

**Proof of 4.** Recall that here we need to show that

4. $|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{4,j}) = 1] − \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{5,j}) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^c)}$.

The only difference between the two obfuscated circuit distributions is that in the first the hardwired value $\sigma_{i−u+j}$ in $\tilde{F}$ is $\text{PRF}_S(i − u + j)$, whereas in the second it is sampled independently uniformly at random. Indistinguishability follows from the $(2^{\lambda^c}, 2^{−\lambda^c})$-pseudo-randomness at the punctured point guarantee. Note that, indeed, given punctured key $S \{i − u + j\}$ and $\sigma_{i−u+j}$, a distinguisher can construct the corresponding circuits $\tilde{F}, \tilde{X}$ efficiently.

**Proof of 5.** Recall that here we need to show that

5. $|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{5,j}) = 1] − \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\text{Hyb}_{6,j}) = 1]| \leq T^{-1/2} + 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^c)}$.

Here also, the two obfuscated $\tilde{F}$ in both hybrids compute the exact same function. First, the comparison of $\sigma$ and $\sigma_{i−u+j}$ is replaced by comparison of their corresponding values under an injective one-way function. In addition, the punctured key $S \{i − u + j\}$ is replaced with a non-punctured key $S$. This does not affect functionality as the two keys compute the same function on all points except $i − u + j$, and the circuit in the two hybrids treats any input $i − u + j, \sigma$, independently of the PRF key.

Also, $\tilde{X}$ now obfuscates the unpunctured version $X_S$ instead of $X_{S^{(i−u+j)}}$. As before this does not change functionality with overwhelming probability $1 − T^{-1/2}$.

Overall, the required indistinguishability follows from iO.

This concludes the proof of the Claim 4.1 and Proposition 4.1.

**The padding parameter $\ell(\lambda)$.** We choose $\ell(\lambda)$ so that each of the circuits $\tilde{F}^{i,j}$ considered above can be implemented by a circuit of size at most $\ell(\lambda)/3$. (The extra $1/3$ slack is taken to satisfy Lemma 4.1 in the analysis below.)

4.2 Enhanced TDPs

We next define enhanced TDPs. These are basically (standard) TDPs where it is possible to obliviously sample hard-to-invert images; concretely, given $x \leftarrow S(PK; r_S)$, it is hard to find $\text{TDP}^{-1}_{PK}(x)$, even given the coins $r_S$ of $S$.

**Definition 4.2** (Enhanced TDP). A TDP family $\mathcal{TDP}$ is said to be enhanced if for any polysize inverter $A$ there exists a negligible function $\mu(\cdot)$, such that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$\Pr \left[ A(PK, r_S) = \text{TDP}^{-1}_{PK}(x) : \begin{array}{l} (PK, SK) \leftarrow K(1^\lambda) \\ r_S \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)} \\ x \leftarrow S(PK; r_S) \end{array} \right] \leq \mu(\lambda).$$
4.2.1 Enhancing the previous construction.

We now describe how to enhance the construction presented in the previous section.

Is the previous TDP already enhanced? We start by noting that the family TDP constructed in the previous section may not be enhanced. Specifically, recall that the randomness \( r_S \) used by \( S \) in the construction is a seed \( s \) for PRG which is extended to an index \( i \), and the corresponding domain element is \( (i, \text{PRF}_S(i)) \). Note that it may very well be that given the seed \( s \) such that \( i = \text{PRG}(s) \), it is not hard to find another seed \( s' \) such that \( \text{PRG}(s') = i - 1 \). In this case, the inverter may invoke the sampler \( S \) with this randomness and invert \( (i, \text{PRF}_S(i)) \).

Looking more closely into the analysis, in the previous section, we could replace \( i \) with a truly random index, meaning that with overwhelming probability over the choice of the seed \( s \), it has no other image \( \text{PRG}(s') \) in its close surrounding. This no longer works, as given the seed \( s \), we can no longer replace it with a truly random index.

Discrete-image PRGs. To circumvent the above, we rely on a pseudo-random generator with discrete image, meaning that with overwhelming probability over the choice of the seed \( s \), the corresponding image \( \text{PRG}(s) \) has no other image \( \text{PRG}(s') \) in its close surrounding. We show how to construct such pseudo-random generators from plain pseudo-random generators. More accurately, we construct a family of pseudo-random generators indexed by some public seed \( h \), where the discrete image requirement holds with overwhelming probability for a random seed \( h \).

**Definition 4.3** (Discrete-image PRG). Let \( k \) and \( \ell \) be polynomially bounded length functions. An efficiently computable family of functions

\[
\mathcal{PRG} = \left\{ \text{PRG}_h : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)} : h \in \{0,1\}^k(\lambda), \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \right\},
\]

associated with an efficient (probabilistic) key sampler \( K_{\mathcal{PRG}} \), is a discrete-image PRG if it satisfies:

1. **Pseudo-randomness:** For any polysize distinguisher \( D \) there is a negligible \( \mu \) such that for any \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \):

\[
\left| \Pr \left[ D(h, \text{PRG}_h(s)) = 1 : h \leftarrow K_{\mathcal{PRG}}(1^\lambda), s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \right] - \Pr \left[ D(h, u) = 1 : h \leftarrow K_{\mathcal{PRG}}(1^\lambda), u \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)} \right] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda).
\]

2. **Discrete image:** for any \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \) and any \( t \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^{\ell(\lambda)}} \setminus \{0\} \):

\[
\Pr \left[ \exists s' \neq s : \text{PRG}_h(s) - \text{PRG}_h(s') = t \mod 2^{\ell(\lambda)} : h \leftarrow K_{\mathcal{PRG}}(1^\lambda), s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \right] \leq 2^{-\ell(\lambda)+\lambda}.
\]

An construction of discrete-image PRGs. Let \( \text{PRG} : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)} \) be a (plain) pseudo-random generator, and let \( \mathcal{H}_\lambda = \{ h : \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)} \to \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)} : \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \} \) be a family of pair-wise independent permutations. We construct a discrete-image family \( \mathcal{PRG} = \{ \text{PRG}_h : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)} \} \), as follows.

- The public seed \( h \) is a random hash in the family \( \mathcal{H}_\lambda \).
- The generator is given by

\[
\text{PRG}_h(s) := h(\text{PRG}(s)).
\]

**Claim 4.2.** \( \mathcal{PRG} \) is a discrete-image pseudo-random generator.
Proof. The pseudo-randomness property follows directly from the fact that \( PRG \) is a pseudo-random generator and \( h \) is an efficiently computable permutation.

To prove discrete-image, it suffices to show that for any fixed \( s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda \) and any \( t \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^f(\lambda)} \setminus \{0\} \),

\[
\Pr \left[ \exists s' \neq s : PRG_h(s) - PRG_h(s') = t \mod 2^f(\lambda) : h \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_{PRG}(1^\lambda) \right] \leq 2^{-f(\lambda)+\lambda}. 
\]

Indeed, by pairwise-independence, conditioning on the value of \( PRG_h(s) \), the augmented construction.

The proof is identical to that of Proposition 4.1 with two exceptions to the proof of one-wayness.

Proposition 4.2. The augmented construction is an enhanced trapdoor permutation.

Proof sketch. The proof is identical to that of Proposition 4.1 except that we augment the obfuscated domain sampling circuit \( X_S \) to a circuit \( X_{S,h} \) that also has hardwired a random public seed \( h \) for a discrete-image PRG. The new sampling circuit is now defined as the previous ones, except that instead of using a plain PRG : \( \mathbb{Z}_T \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_T \) we use the discrete image \( PRG_h : \mathbb{Z}_T \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_T \).

4.3 Doubly Enhanced TDPs

We now define doubly-enhanced TDPs. These are enhanced TDPs where given the key \( PK \), it is possible to sample coins \( r_S \) together with a preimage \( x \) of \( y = S(PK, r_S) \). In [GR13], it is required that \( r_S \) is distributed as uniformly random coins for \( S \). We relax this requiring that \( r_S \) is only pseudo-random even given the randomness used to sample \( (PK, SK) \). Indeed, this relaxation suffices for applications of doubly-enhanced TDPs such as non-interactive zero-knowledge.

Definition 4.4 (Doubly-enhanced TDP). An enhanced TDP family \( \mathcal{TDP} \) is said to be doubly-enhanced there exists a sampler \( \mathcal{R} \) satisfying the following two requirements.

1. Correlated preimage sampling. For any \( PK \) in the support of \( \mathcal{K}(1^\lambda) \):

\[
(x, r_S) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(PK) \text{ such that } \mathcal{TDP}_{PK}(x) = S(PK, r_S).
\]

2. Pseudorandomness. For any polysize distinguisher \( \mathcal{D} \) there is a negligible \( \mu \) such that for any \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \):

\[
\Pr \left[ \mathcal{D}(x, r_S, r_K) = 1 : PK \leftarrow \mathcal{K}(1^\lambda, r_K) \right] - \Pr \left[ \mathcal{D}(x, r_S, r_K) = 1 : PK \leftarrow \mathcal{K}(1^\lambda; r_K) \right] \leq \mu(\lambda). 
\]
4.3.1 Doubly enhancing the previous construction.

To make the previous construction doubly enhanced we show how to slightly augment the discrete-image PRG used in the construction on some sparse subset of seeds (thus not hurting previous properties), while taking advantage of the particular structure of our TDP.

Concretely, we augment the code of \( \text{PRG}_h \) to compute a new \( \text{PRG}^*_h \) as follows. Let \( \text{PRG}' : \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \) be a length doubling pseudorandom generator that expands small seeds \( s' \in \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \) to longer seeds \( s \in \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \) for \( \text{PRG}_h \). \( \text{PRG}^*_h \) acts as follows:

Given a (private) seed \( s \in \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \) as input, parse it as \( (s', r') \in \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \times \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \).

1. If \( r' = 0 \), compute \( \text{PRG}'(s') \), and output \( \text{PRG}^*_h(s', r') := \text{PRG}_h(\text{PRG}'(s')) - 1 \mod T \).
2. Otherwise, output as before \( \text{PRG}^*_h(s', r') = \text{PRG}_h(s', r') \).

**The augmented construction.** The construction of doubly-enhanced TDPs is now identical to the one of enhanced TDPs, except that we instantiate the pseudo-random generator with the new \( \mathcal{PRG}^* = \{ \text{PRG}^*_h \} \).

**Proposition 4.3.** The augmented construction is a doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutation.

**Proof sketch.** First notice that we did not harm the pseudo-randomness and discrete-image properties of the original family \( \mathcal{PRG} \). Indeed, the augmented \( \text{PRG}^*_h \) only behaves differently from \( \text{PRG}_h \) on the set \( \{ s = (s', r') : r' = 0 \} \), which has negligible density \( T^{-1/4} \). The pseudo-randomness and discrete-image properties, however, are defined for a uniformly random \( (s', r') \in \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \times \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \), and thus remain unaffected.

We can now define the sampler \( \mathcal{R}(PK) \):

1. Pick a random (short) seed \( s' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \).
2. Compute \( r_S = \text{PRG}'(s') \in \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \times \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \) and \( r_S^e = (s', 0) \in \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \times \mathbb{Z}_{\sqrt{T}} \).
3. Return \((x, r_S)\) where \( x = S(PK; r_S^e) \).

The pseudorandomness of \( r_S \), conditioned on \((r_K, x)\), follows directly from the pseudo-randomness guarantee of \( \text{PRG}' \). We now note that \( x \) is the preimage of \( y = S(PK, r_S) \). We shall assume for simplicity that \( \text{PRG}'(s') \) never outputs \( s = (s''; r'') \) such that \( r'' = 0 \) (\( \text{PRG}' \) can always be augmented to satisfy this property). Then, by construction \( x = (i - 1, \text{PRF}_S(i - 1)) \) where \( i = \text{PRG}_h(\text{PRG}'(s')) \) and \( y = (i, \text{PRF}_S(i)) \).

This completes the proof. \( \square \)

4.4 Relaxing Subexponential Security

In all constructions above, we assumed all cryptographic primitives are sub-exponentially hard. We now explain how this can be relaxed, and what are the tradeoffs between the hardness of the different primitives. Let \( f(\cdot), g(\cdot), h(\cdot) \) be sub-linear functions and assume that \( \mathcal{OWF} \) is \((2^{|\lambda|}, 2^{f(|\lambda|)})\)-secure, \( \mathcal{PRF} \) is \((\lambda, 2^{-g(|\lambda|)})\)-secure, and \( i \mathcal{O} \) is \((\lambda, 2^{-h(|\lambda|)})\)-secure. We can restate Claim 4.1 as follows.

**Claim 4.3 (Claim 4.1 generalized).** For any polysize distinguisher \( D \), all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), and all \( j \in [0, \sqrt{T}] \):

1. \( |\Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_1) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_2) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(f(\log \sqrt{T}))} + 2^{-\Omega(h(|\lambda|))} \),
2. \( |\Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_2) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_{3,0}) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(h(|\lambda|))} \),
3. \(|\Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_{3,j}) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_{4,j}) = 1]| \leq T^{-1/2} + 2^{-\Omega(h(\lambda))}\),

4. \(|\Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_{4,j}) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_{5,j}) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(g(\lambda))}\),

5. \(|\Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_{5,j}) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_{6,j}) = 1]| \leq T^{-1/2} + 2^{-\Omega(h(\lambda))}\),

6. \(|\Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_{6,j}) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{Hyb}_{3,j+1}) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\Omega(f(\lambda))} + 2^{-\Omega(h(\lambda))}\).

The overall inversion probability can be bounded by
\[
2^{-\Omega(f(\log \sqrt{T}))} + \sqrt{T} \cdot \left(T^{-1/2} + 2^{-\Omega(f(\lambda))} + 2^{-\Omega(g(\lambda))} + 2^{-\Omega(h(\lambda))}\right).
\]

In particular, letting \(m(\lambda) = \min \{f(\lambda), g(\lambda), h(\lambda)\}\), we can guarantee hardness of the resulting TDP as long as

1. \(T(\lambda) = \lambda^{-\omega(1)}\).
2. \(m(\lambda) = \omega(\log(T))\).
3. \(f(\log \sqrt{T}) = \omega(\log \lambda)\).

For instance, for any constant \(\varepsilon < 1\), we can set

- \(T = 2^{(\log \lambda)^{2/\varepsilon}}\),
- \(f(\lambda) = \lambda^\varepsilon\) (\(\mathcal{OWF}\) is still sub-exponential),
- \(g(\lambda) = h(\lambda) = (\log \lambda)^{2+2/\varepsilon}\) (\(\mathcal{PRF}\) and \(i\mathcal{O}\) are quasi-polynomial).

Alternatively, we can set

- \(T = 2^{(\log \lambda)^{\varepsilon}}\),
- \(f(\lambda) = g(\lambda) = h(\lambda) = 2^{(\log \lambda)^{1+\varepsilon}}\) (all primitives are only \(2^{\lambda^{\omega(1)}}\)-secure).

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References


