Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/1204
Constructing secret, verifiable auction schemes from election schemes
Elizabeth A. Quaglia and Ben Smyth
Abstract: Auctions and elections are seemingly
disjoint research fields.
Nevertheless, we observe that similar cryptographic primitives are used
in both fields. For instance, mixnets, homomorphic encryption, and trapdoor
bit-commitments, have been used by state-of-the-art schemes in both fields.
These developments have appeared independently. For example, the adoption of
mixnets in elections preceded a similar adoption in auctions by over two decades.
In this paper, we demonstrate a relation between auctions and elections:
we present a generic construction for auctions from election schemes. Moreover,
we show that the construction guarantees secrecy and verifiability,
assuming the underlying election scheme satisfies secrecy and verifiability.
We demonstrate the applicability of our work by deriving an auction
scheme from the Helios election scheme.
Our results inaugurate the unification of auctions and elections, thereby facilitating the advancement of both fields.
Category / Keywords: Auctions, elections, privacy, secrecy, verifiability.
Date: received 16 Dec 2015, last revised 24 May 2016
Contact author: lizquaglia at gmail com
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: This is the full version (i.e., with all the proofs).
Version: 20160524:130412 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2015/1204
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