Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/1177

On the CCA (in)security of MTProto

Jakob Jakobsen and Claudio Orlandi

Abstract: Telegram is a popular messaging app which supports end-to-end encrypted communication. In Spring 2015 we performed an audit of Telegram's source code. This short paper summarizes our findings.

Our main discovery is that the symmetric encryption scheme used in Telegram -- known as MTProto -- is not IND-CCA secure, since it is possible to turn any ciphertext into a different ciphertext that decrypts to the same message.

We stress that this is a theoretical attack on the definition of security and we do not see any way of turning the attack into a full plaintext-recovery attack. At the same time, we see no reason why one should use a less secure encryption scheme when more secure (and at least as efficient) solutions exist.

The take-home message (once again) is that well-studied, provably secure encryption schemes that achieve strong definitions of security (e.g., authenticated-encryption) are to be preferred to home-brewed encryption schemes.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography /

Date: received 8 Dec 2015, last revised 31 Mar 2016

Contact author: orlandi at cs au dk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20160331:084923 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/1177

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