Improved Data Confidentiality of Audit Trail Data in Multi-Tenant Cloud

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Abstract—Cloud computing is delivery of services rather than a product and among different cloud deployment models, the public cloud provides improved scalability and cost reduction when compared to others. Security and privacy of data is one of the key factors in transitioning to cloud. Typically the cloud providers have a demilitarized zone protecting the data center along with a reverse proxy setup. The reverse proxy gateway acts as initial access point and provides additional capabilities like load balancing, caching, security monitoring capturing events, syslogs related to hosts residing in the cloud. The audit-trail logs captured by reverse proxy server comprise important information related to all the tenants. While the PKI infrastructure works in cloud scenario it becomes cumbersome from manageability point of view and they lack flexibility in providing controlled access to data. In this paper we evaluate risks associated with security and privacy of audit logs produced by reverse proxy server. We provide a two-phase approach for sharing the audit-logs with users allowing fine-grained access. In this paper we evaluate certain Identity-Based and Attribute-Based Encryption schemes and provide detailed analysis on performance.

Keywords—Data confidentiality, multi-tenancy, audit-trail log, Attribute-based encryption, reverse proxy security

I. INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing as defined by NIST is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable resources that can be rapidly provisioned and releases with minimal management effort or interaction. While the private cloud gives organizations greater control over the infrastructure it may not be cost effective for small and medium businesses. Cloud services are offered in different service models and three well known models are Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) – Cloud user has greater control on infrastructure Vmware, Openstack, Azure offer such services. Platform as a Service (PaaS) – developer centric services Heroku, Google AppEngine are few providers, and Software as a Service(SaaS) – services include data analytics, online meetings such as Cisco WebEx, Gmail. Cost reduction and increased efficiency are primary motivations towards a public cloud and nevertheless security and privacy objectives play vital role for decisions about outsourcing IT services. The data collected by network devices such as firewalls, reverse proxy servers, hypervisor are very vital for monitoring health of cloud as well as for security forensics. This information is used for purposes like data analytics, monitoring, security forensic analysis by cloud provider as well as tenants.

The internet facing reverse proxy gateway provides protection from issues like intrusion detection, denial of service attacks etc. Data collected by reverse proxy includes system logs, alarms and it can capture HTTP/REST requests, remote-service calls pertaining to tenants if it is configured as SSL termination end-point.

1. These logs are very vital in event monitoring, data analytics, security forensic analysis and depending on deployment model these are managed by cloud provider. Existing techniques for preserving the audit logs largely relay on certificates. Considering cloud storage as untrusted, managing centralized repository for certificates of multitude of tenants necessitates frequent synchronization with key servers and the process is error-prone due to large number of interactions with PKI server.

2. The traditional PKI infrastructure either reveals all the data or restricts and does not provide easy way to allow fine-grained access to data considering organizational policy information. creates data confidentiality issues for sensitive data

The proposed model allows cloud providers to securely share data with tenants while disallowing unauthorized users.

II. KEY CONTRIBUTIONS

In this paper we outline challenges associated with audit-log preservation in multi-tenant cloud with reverse proxy architecture. We experiment with

Identity Based encryption techniques proposed in [] referred as BB scheme here by and committed blind anonymous identity-based encryption as proposed in [] referred as CKRS scheme here by.

Ciphertext Policy Attribute Based Encryption techniques proposed in [] referred as BSW scheme here by and efficient and secure realization of CPABE scheme proposed in [] referred as Waters scheme here by.

We provide a workflow for secure distribution of audit-trail logs captured by reverse proxy server among multiple tenants. We evaluate the performance of operations like setup, key-
III. PRELIMINARIES

A. Identity and Attribute Based encryption:

Shamir first proposed concept of Identity-Based public key cryptography [8] in 1985 and in 2001 the first practical and secure IBE scheme [9] was presented by Boneh and Franklin. Sahai and Waters [10] first introduced concept of Attribute-Based encryption in 2006, the user attributes were used to encrypt and decrypt data. In the same year Bethencourt et al. [11] presented first construction of Ciphertext-TextPolicy Attribute-Based encryption. Using CP-ABE it is possible to embed role based access control policies into the ciphertext. In 2008, distributed attribute-based encryption scheme was proposed by Muller et al. Wang et al. [14] proposed a hierarchical attribute-based encryption scheme (HABE) in 2010. It was extended to multi-authority scheme that uses multiple parties to distribute attributes to users. ABE systems now support many crucial functionality [15] required by security infrastructure.

B. Reverse Proxy Gateway

A reverse proxy is a server side software typically acts as entry point for HTTP requests. Typically reverse proxy resides in DMZ facing the internet. The HTTP request is scrutinized first and requested content is served if it is already in cache or statically referred.

As reverse proxy is entry point for all HTTP requests, this setup is compelling for cloud service providers with multi-tenancy architecture leveraging the distributed service oriented architecture. Having a single entry point with capability to route requests provides lots of benefits for CSPs. Other important use cases include B2B transactions, Supply chain integration.

Some of the key functionality provided by reverse proxy gateway architecture is described here. One can refer reverse proxy websites like Nginx, SkyHigh software architecture to know about features

1. Security – reverse proxy can provide single point of communication. It can decrypt the HTTPS based request and communicate with back end servers in HTTP only mode. Provides many advantages for cloud users like ease of configuration of SSL/TLS, saves CPU intensive security operations using specialized hardware.

2. Centralized Logging and Auditing – as all HTTP requests are routed through reverse proxy server, it captures all the important events related to hosts residing inside the cloud.

3. Load balancing – the RP can route the incoming HTTP requests among the available servers using strategies like round robin, sticky session in case of stateful sessions etc.

4. Caching and serving static content – For storage based cloud applications viz., youtube, vimeo the server responsiveness can be improved by hosting static content and using RP for routing.

C. Audit Trail Log Structure

Reverse proxy can be configured to generate logs like file, stderr or syslog. For example in Nginx server, the log format is specified using log_format directive

```http
http {
    log_format compression "$remote_addr - $remote_user [$time_local] " "$request" $status $body_bytes_sent " "$http_referer" "$http_user_agent"; }
```

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute Name</th>
<th>User Login Activity</th>
<th>Resource Access Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UserID</td>
<td>Supervisor/801</td>
<td>admin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EventType</td>
<td>User Logging</td>
<td>User Access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EventStatus</td>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClientAddress</td>
<td>https:64.103.23</td>
<td>64.103.237.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ResourceAccessed</td>
<td>AppAdmin</td>
<td>Channel Provider/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CompulsoryEvent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComponentID</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Configuration API</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AuditCategory</td>
<td>Authentication</td>
<td>channelProvider/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AppId</td>
<td>10023</td>
<td>1055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ClusterId</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NodeId</td>
<td>uccx-93-55</td>
<td>uccx-93-55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Audit Trail Log Security

IV. CHALLENGES IN PRESERVING AUDIT-TRAIL LOGS IN MULTI-TENANCY CLOUD

Besides many potential benefits the public cloud the data security is complex due to following challenges

- Shared Multi-tenant Environment – Public cloud achieves multi-tenancy by logical separation at multiple layers of software stack. The attacker can pose as a consumer and exploit vulnerabilities from cloud environment.

- Loss of Control – While the cloud users may perceive the services as traditional service model, transitioning of control to cloud provider amplifies the risks associated.

- System complexity – Complexity largely depends on infrastructure used and often the cloud providers use methods that are proprietary in nature. Typically complexity relates inversely to security, the complexity leads to increased risk for vulnerabilities [Avvo00, Sch00].

- Lack of standardization – the cloud computing environment poses new challenges from audit and monitoring perspective. The transactions involving operations within
the virtual machine or cloud user interaction should be properly recorded. Full audit trail within the cloud is still an unresolved issue and poses lots of challenges when organization security policy challenges does not meet the cloud provider practices.

- Weak Confidentiality and Integrity controls – Inadequate security controls in cloud provider’s platform affects the confidentiality or integrity of the system. Strong enforcement of security and privacy practices and assess the implementation of policies, standards, controls ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of cloud based resources.

V. METHODOLOGY

Consider public cloud provider hosting tenants having reverse proxy server installed which captures audit-trail logs of incoming traffic pertaining to clients. We consider role of reverse proxy server extended as SSL termination end-point so that it can intercept all HTTP/SSL traffic. The cloud provider has a Network Admin who has access to entire logs and cloud tenants with users having different roles like level-1, level-2, level-3 etc. While level-1 users are in the bottom of organizational hierarchy and they are monitored by level-2 and so on and so forth.

A. Privacy and Security of Audit logs - Objectives

We divide the problem into two sub-domains – 1. Cloud Network Admin has access control on entire logs and can do operations like search, encryption, decryption, 2. Tenant users like Network Admin can access all tenant specific logs and users of Level-1, Level-2 etc. has controlled access to data. Users at higher level can oversee data pertaining to lower level that they are administering. It implies that user’s access to audit log contents is controlled using role-based access control policies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant Role</th>
<th>Accessible content in audit-trail log</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employee [Tenant]</td>
<td>Time, UserID, EventLog</td>
<td>Type-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager [Tenant]</td>
<td>Time, UserID, EventType, EventStatus, ClientAddress, ResourceAccessed, AccessExpiryTime, ClusterId, NodeId</td>
<td>Type-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Admin [Tenant]</td>
<td>Time, UserID, EventType, EventStatus, ClientAddress, ResourceAccessed, CompulsoryEvent, ComponentID, AuditCategory, AppId, ClusterId, NodeId</td>
<td>Type-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloud Network Admin</td>
<td>Time, UserID, EventType, EventStatus, ClientAddress, ResourceAccessed, CompulsoryEvent, ComponentID, AuditCategory, AppId, ClusterId, NodeId</td>
<td>Type-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Design

For audit-trail log security we choose 2-phase protection. The unique challenge here is that the security mechanisms should ensure that cloud providers have complete control on the data and has ability to share with tenants and while restricting access according to organizational hierarchy. We solve this problem using blend of identity and attribute-based encryption schemes. The problem is solved in 2-phase approach

1. Type-1 data security

Type-1 data protection mechanism involves security mechanism like Identity-based encryption [][]. The Cloud Network Admin has access to all the data but individual tenants should have access to their data only. We use identity-based encryption scheme for access control. Each encrypted log entry is associated with public identifiers like or tags like TenantId, AccessExpiryTime and user keys are associated with access policy is in user’s private key. Although entire logs are kept in shared location in cloud, the individual tenants can access only their data. The reason for choosing identity-based encryption scheme is that it is possible to share data without requiring exchange of certificates. We evaluated two identity-based encryption schemes [][] for performance with large datasets.

2. Type-II data security

Type-II data security involves allowing fine-grained access control on data to tenant users. The user can decrypt data only if the attributes in secret key satisfies the access structure of encrypted data. For example Level-1 user can see only her own activity while the Level-2 can see activity of all his employees and soon. We use ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption schemes [][] with ciphertext having policy information of participants and user keys having descriptive attributes about participant. The reason for choosing CP-ABE scheme here is that it is perfectly suited for environment where user privileges (role-based access control) determine the access to data and it allows fine-grained access control on the data. We experiment with BSW [] and Waters scheme [] for performance.

TABLE II. CLOUD USERS ACCESS TO CONTENTS OF AUDIT LOGS CATEGORIZED INTO TYPE-1, TYPE-2 SECURITY
Depending on the log sharing mechanism two possible approaches exist.

- Cloud provider use Type-1 security mechanism for logs encryption and Cloud tenants access their data and decrypt and re-encrypt using Type-2 security mechanism
- Cloud provider applies Type-2 security mechanism which internally uses policy tree for log encryption and then re-encrypt using Type-1 security mechanism. The tenants access the data by using Type-1 secret keys and then use Type-2 secret keys to decode the data.

In this paper we provide experimental results of Type-1 and Type-2 security mechanisms separately and results are applicable in both the cases outlined.

C. Setup and Key Generation

We have used elliptic curve with bilinear maps (or pairings) like SS512 which is a symmetric curve. We used Type-A curve such as $y^2 = x^3 + x$ to compute the pairings. The secret key is communicated to interested parties using a secure channel like TLS/SSL.

- Type-1: The algorithm initialization depends on bilinear pairing and elliptic curve used. The master secret $MK$ and public key $PK$ are generated using system parameters $P$.
- Type-2: This can be done by cloud provider or tenant itself depending on use case. The CP-ABE $\text{Setup}(k)$ is run with security parameter and it results in public parameters $(PK)$ and master key $(MK)$. The CP-ABE $\text{KeyGen}(MK, PK, T)$ with possible tenant-id values which outputs decryption keys associated with attributes.

D. Encryption:

Type-1: Each log entry, the data $<\text{ApplicationId, ClusterId, NodeId}>$ is encrypted using a symmetric key algorithm and using individual tenant-id $t_i$ as public key the server computes ciphertext $c_i$ as the string $(\text{flag}|K)$ and $P$ as public parameters. Here $P$ may be equal to $t_i$ if cloud provider wishes to annotate with tenant-id only.

Type-2: For each log record, the data pertaining to tenants, the $\text{Enc}(\text{Record, T, PK})$ where $T$ relates to access structure $T$ for public parameters $PK$

E. Decryption:

Type-1: Data is decrypted using $(PK, sk, \text{ciphertext})$

Type-2: The CP-ABE $\text{Dec}(CT, SK, PK)$ is run using user secret keys $SK$ and public parameters $PK$.

F. Match and Selective Decryption

- As part of match routine the data record is decrypted using $(PK, sk, \text{ciphertext})$ and the decrypted text is if it has FLAG has prefix.
- The match returns true then decrypt the ciphertext $c$ using previously generated secret-key $sk$ and public key $PK$. The symmetric encryption key is extracted from decrypted text and one more round of decryption happens but this time it is done using symmetric key.
- If match is false then the record is not processed further.

VI. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION

We use a hypothetical example of public cloud provider hosting 3 tenants

A. System Details

We have used CHARM crypto-library v0.43 for prototyping. At a very high-level the library provides a protocol engine for many cryptographic operations and an adapter architecture which bridges gaps necessary for building a complete crypto system. In addition we used other open source libraries including OpenSSL 1.0.1, GMP 6.0.0a and Pairing-Based Cryptography library version 0.14 of Stanford. The experiments were carried on X86 based platform using Ubuntu 12.04.4 LTS (precise) 32-bit server with 8 GB RAM and Intel Core i5-3470 CPU with 3.2 GHz 4 core processor.

B. Test Data

The sample audit-trail logs used in experiments is sampled from a reverse proxy server. The dataset is split into chunks of approximately 20000 records carefully having activity of cloud tenants with possible operations. We analyze performance of cryptographic schemes with these chunks.

C. Type-1 Data Security – Results
TABLE II. SETUP TIME FOR TYPE-2 SECURITY (CPABE SCHEMES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Time (milliseconds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Setup</td>
<td>lbe-bb&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lbe-ckrs&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>52.361</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> For pairings symmetric curve with 512 bit is used

TABLE III. KEY GENERATION TIME FOR TYPE-2 SECURITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Time (milliseconds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level-2 key generation</td>
<td>lbe-bb</td>
<td>3.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lbe-ckrs</td>
<td>22.689</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Type-2 Data Security – Results

TABLE-4: SETUP TIME FOR TYPE-2 SECURITY (CPABE SCHEMES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Time (milliseconds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Setup</td>
<td>cpabe-bsw&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>38.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cpabe-waters&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>b</sup> For pairings symmetric curve with 512 bit is used

TABLE-5: KEY GENERATION TIME FOR TYPE-2 SECURITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Level-2 key</th>
<th>Level-1 key</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cpabe-bsw</td>
<td>23.339</td>
<td>23.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cpabe-waters</td>
<td>24.569</td>
<td>24.404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Fig. 6. Encryption using Type-2](image)

![Fig. 7. Decryption by Level-2 tenant user using Type-2](image)

![Fig. 8. Decryption by Level-1 tenant user using Type-2](image)

VII. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The proposed scheme provides security of sensitive data so that unauthorized parties cannot know the information about the encrypted data. The cloud provider can define fine-grained access control on that tailored to the organizational policies of the tenants. It is easy for cloud provider to do user revocation in case tenant contract expires and the scheme is collision resistant due to inherent nature of ciphertext-policy attribute based encryption.
The public keys required for communication can be calculated by anyone who has the necessary public parameters. This eliminates the need for the sender and receiver interaction prior to sending secure messages.

A unique characteristic of IBE systems that differentiates from existing PKI schemes is that the encryption is possible without any need for communicating with server during validity period of the public parameters. This reduces network communication significantly.

1. The IBE private keys should not be created using timestamp of longer duration. Due to this the problem of key compromise would be more.

2. Use ID-PKC system based on bilinear pairings such as Boneh-Franklin and Boneh-Boyen. The system is devised on family of supersingular elliptic curves over finite fields of large prime characteristic (also called as type-1 curves). For practical applications using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) keys it is sufficient to use 128-bit levels and higher such as 192 bits or 256 bits as shown in Table 1.

3. Runtime Costs – The computational overheads of IBE extend beyond the admission control process. Each control message needs to be signed by the sender and verified by the recipient

1. Key Escrow
2. Key revocation

VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

Audit log preservation taking care of access control mechanisms is challenging considering the dynamicity of cloud requirements. Complex operations on encrypted data for analytics, forensics is still not fully solved. The proposed scheme is flexible to encrypt data based on cloud user identifiers but it almost requires 2-step process. Alternative is to use ABE techniques in conjunction while this requires careful consideration in choosing the key generation mechanism.

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