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Paper 2015/1083

Implementation Attacks on Post-Quantum Cryptographic Schemes

Mostafa Taha and Thomas Eisenbarth

Abstract

Post-quantum cryptographic schemes have been developed in the last decade in response to the rise of quantum computers. Fortunately, several schemes have been developed with quantum resistance. However, there is very little effort in evaluating and comparing these schemes in the embedded settings. Low cost embedded devices represents a highly-constraint environment that challenges all post-quantum cryptographic schemes. Moreover, there are even fewer efforts in evaluating the security of these schemes against implementation attacks including side-channel and fault attacks. It is commonly accepted that, any embedded cryptographic module that is built without a sound countermeasure, can be easily broken. Therefore, we investigate the question: Are we ready to implement post-quantum cryptographic schemes on embedded systems? We present an exhaustive survey of research efforts in designing embedded modules of post-quantum cryptographic schemes and the efforts in securing these modules against implementation attacks. Unfortunately, the study shows that: we are not ready yet to implement any post-quantum cryptographic scheme in practical embedded systems. There is still a considerable amount of research that needs to be conducted before reaching a satisfactory level of security.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. IEEE International Conference on Anti-Cybercrime (ICACC-2015)
Keywords
Attacks
Contact author(s)
mtaha @ vt edu
History
2015-11-09: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/1083
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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