Succinct Adaptive Garbled RAM

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Abstract

We show how to garble a large persistent database and then garble, one by one, a sequence of adaptively and adversarially chosen RAM programs that query and modify the database in arbitrary ways. Still, it is guaranteed that the garbled database and programs reveal only the outputs of the programs when run in sequence on the database. The runtime, space requirements and description size of the garbled programs are proportional only to those of the plaintext programs and the security parameter. We assume indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits and poly-to-one collision-resistant hash functions. The latter can be constructed based on standard algebraic assumptions such as the hardness of discrete log or factoring. In contrast, all previous garbling schemes with persistent data were shown secure only in the static setting where all the programs are known in advance.

As an immediate application, our scheme is the first to provide a way to outsource large databases to untrusted servers, and later query and update the database over time in a private and verifiable way, with complexity and description size proportional to those of the unprotected queries.

Our scheme extends the non-adaptive RAM garbling scheme of Canetti and Holmgren [ITCS 2016]. We also define and use a new primitive, called adaptive accumulators, which is an adaptive alternative to the positional accumulators of Koppula et al [STOC 2015] and somewhere statistical binding hashing of Hubáček and Wichs [ITCS 2015]. This primitive might well be useful elsewhere.

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1 Introduction

**Database delegation.** Consider an owner of a large database that wishes to delegate the database to an untrusted remote server, and then update and query the database in arbitrary ways over time. We wish to hide both the database and the queries/updates from the server, and continue to do so even when the results of queries are exposed, say via using the results elsewhere. Furthermore, the correctness of responses to queries, taking into account all past updates, should be verifiable. Does there exist a delegation scheme that meets these security requirements? Can this be done with complexity and communication comparable to those of the unprotected mechanism, both for server and data owner? If so, then under what hardness assumptions?

This task is a practically motivated generalization of the basic delegation-of-computation task. It is also a natural generalization of the tasks of encrypted and verifiable databases. These are all well studied tasks with a variety of solutions that obtain a variety of partial verifiability and secrecy guarantees, under a variety of assumptions, both for general computations and database queries and for specific ones.

Still, the above general question has remained unresolved so far. Indeed, it poses strong requirements: First, since queries and updates may come over time, the solution must be able to guarantee security even in the face of adaptively chosen queries and updates. Furthermore, since the size and the complexity of database queries are typically much smaller than the size of the database, a solution must adhere to stringent efficiency and succinctness requirements. Out of the many partial solutions to this question let us mention only the recent work of Kalai and Paneth [KP15], which addresses the same problem, and provides a general solution assuming LWE. However, their solution guarantees only verifiability and no secrecy.

We provide the first general solution to this problem, guaranteeing both verifiability and strong secrecy, as well as asymptotically optimal efficiency and succinctness (up to polynomial factors in the security parameter.) We assume indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits and collision resistant hash functions that are at most poly-to-one. We also construct the latter from standard algebraic assumptions such as the hardness of discrete log, factoring, or finding shortest independent vectors of lattices.

The key element in our solution is an adaptively secure garbling scheme for RAM computations with persistent data. We thus provide some background on garbling schemes.

**Program garbling.** The concept of program garbling [Yao86, Rog91] is central in cryptography with a variety of applications. The goal of a program garbling scheme is to “encode” the functionality of a given program and input in such a way that one can evaluate the program on the input without learning anything beyond the output of the evaluation. A closely related notion is that of randomized encodings of functions [IK00].

The original Yao construction, set in the context of secure two-party computation, uses Boolean circuits for programs representation. This means that the size of the garbled program is proportional to both the runtime and space of the plaintext program. It can also be used securely for the evaluation of only a single garbled input. Many improvements have been made since, e.g., in optimizing the size of the garbled circuit [KS08, KMR14, ZRE15], in garbling arithmetic circuits [AIK11], in providing improved security guarantees against both malicious evaluator and garbler [LP11, MR13], in garbling Turing machines (TMs) [GKP+13] and in developing reusable garbling [GKP+13, GHRW14].

**Garbled RAM and persistent memory.** Most relevant to our setting is the notion of a garbled RAM (GRAM) [LO13], which allows the evaluator to do work that is only proportional to the random-access-machine (RAM) complexity of the plaintext program. Beyond the general complexity advantages of RAM computation over circuit or even TM computation, the notion of of GRAM naturally opens the door to the the concept of garbling with persistent memory. Here one garbles a sizable memory (database), and then garbles a sequence of programs, where the programs are meant to run on the same memory, in sequence. Persistence implies that any modifications made by some machine should be visible by all subsequent machines. Still, the complexity of the garbled programs should be comparable to that of the plaintext ones. This should hold even when this complexity is sub-polynomial in the size of the memory.

A central challenge in garbled RAM constructions, that does not exist in garbling of circuits or Turing machines, is the need to hide the access pattern to the random access memory. This is typically done by
incorporating an oblivious RAM (ORAM) mechanism [GO96] in the garbing scheme. The fact that ORAM schemes inherently make the computation randomized adds significant complication.

The GRAM scheme of Lu and Ostrovsky [LO13] needs one way functions (OWFs) with a strong circular security property. The need for such a property was removed by Gentry et al. [GHL+14], who present two GRAM constructions: In the first construction, which is based on identity-based encryption (IBE), the size of the garbled program is proportional to the running time of the plaintext program; the second construction uses only standard OWFs but incurs overhead for the garbled program of $O(n')$, where $n$ is the size of the memory used by the plaintext program. The additional complexity overhead is removed by Garg et al. [GLOS15] assuming only standard OWFs.

The constructions of garbled RAM mentioned above are inherently one-time, whereas in the work by Gentry et al. [GHRW14], the garbled RAM program is reusable. They construct reusable GRAM without persistent memory from indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits, and reusable GRAM with persistent memory from obfuscation with a stronger property called strong differing inputs obfuscation.

**Succinct GRAM.** In the above schemes the description size of the garbled machines is proportional to the runtime of the plaintext machines. Several works make progress towards reducing the description size of the garbled machines. Bitansky et al. [BGL+15] and Canetti et al. [CHJV14] construct GRAMs where the size of the garbled program is proportional only to the space complexity of the plaintext RAM program. Koppula et al. [KLW15] construct, using similar assumptions, a beautiful fully succinct garbling scheme for Turing machines. These constructions are based on indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits and injective one way functions.

Building on the techniques of [KLW15] and using similar assumptions, Canetti and Holmgren [CH16] and independently Chen et al. [CCC+15] present a fully succinct GRAM where the size of the garbled program is proportional only to the size of the plaintext RAM program. The main contribution here is in showing how to encapsulate and hide the randomness necessary for the oblivious RAM mechanism. Chen et al. also demonstrate how to preserve the Parallel RAM (PRAM) complexity of the plaintext program. Canetti and Holmgren show how to apply their scheme in the setting of persistent memory as described above.

**Adaptive Security for Garbled Programs.** The schemes mentioned so far only address the static setting where all inputs are chosen by the adversary in advance before it sees any garbled program. In contrast, adaptive security considers the case where new challenges may adversarially depend on the public information released so far. In the context of one-time garbling, this means that the the input may depend on the garbed program. This setting is considered in Goldwasser et al. [GKR08] and Bellare et al. [BHR12]. The latter work presents transformations from statically-secure one-time garbling schemes to adaptively-secure one-time garbling schemes that either incur overhead for the input garbling that is proportional to the size of the function circuit or that are instantiate in the random oracle model (ROM). Ananth et al. [ABSV15, AS15] and Waters [Wat15] construct adaptively secure functional encryption and program garbling for Turing machines in the plain model. In particular, both input and program in [AS15] are succinct. However, none of them is able to provide persistent memory.

Overall, while RAM garbling with persistent memory is a natural potential solution to the problem of outsourcing databases presented earlier, none of the existing solutions appears adequate. Indeed, an adaptive and succinct garbling scheme with persistent memory seems to be needed.

### 1.1 This work

We construct an adaptively secure succinct garbling scheme for RAM programs with persistent memory. That is, the scheme allows its user to garble an initial memory, and then garble RAM programs that arrive one by one in sequence. The machines can read from and update the memory, and have local output. It is guaranteed that:

1. Running the garbled programs one after the other in sequence on the garbled memory results in the same sequence of outputs as the result of running the plaintext machines one by one in sequence on the plaintext memory.
2. The view of any adversary that generates a database and programs and obtains their garbled versions is
simulatable by a machine that sees only the outputs of the plaintext programs when run in sequence on the plaintext database. This holds even when the adversary chooses new plaintext programs adaptively, based on the garbled memory and programs seen so far.

(3) The scheme is both efficient and succinct: The time to garble the memory is proportional to the plaintext memory, and the memory is garbled only once in the beginning. Up to polynomial factors in the security parameter, the garbling time and size of the garbled program are proportional only to the size of the plaintext RAM program. The runtime and space of the garbled machine are comparable to those of the plaintext machine.

Given such a scheme, constructing a database delegation scheme as specified above is straightforward: The database owner lets the server store a garbled version of the database. To delegate a query, garble the program that executes the query. To obtain verifiability use the technique from [CHJV15, BGL+15]: Each program will contain a signing key and will sign all its outputs. The verification key will be publicized by the client. To hide the query results from the server, encrypt the program’s output to the querying party, say using symmetric encryption. We provide a more complete definition and construction within.

1.2 Overview of the construction

Our starting point is the statically-secure garbling scheme of Canetti and Holmgren [CH16]. We briefly sketch their construction, and then explain where the issues with adaptivity come up and how we solve them.

Statically-secure garbling scheme for RAMs - an overview. The Canetti-Holmgren construction consists of three main steps. They first build a fixed-transcript garbling scheme, i.e. a garbling scheme which guarantees indistinguishability of the garbled machines and inputs as long as the entire transcripts of the communication with the external memory, as well as the local states kept between activations, are the same in the two computations. In other words, if the computation of machine \( M_1 \) on input \( x_1 \) has the same transcript as that of \( M_2 \) on input \( x_2 \), then \( M_1, \tilde{x}_1 \approx M_2, \tilde{x}_2 \). This step closely follows the scheme of Koppula, Lewko and Waters [KLW15] for garbling of Turing machines. The garbled program is essentially an obfuscated CPU-step circuit, which takes the previous state and a memory symbol as input and outputs the next state, the symbols to write into memory, and the next location to read from. The main challenge here is to guarantee the authenticity and freshness of the values read from the memory. This is done using a number of mechanisms, namely splittable signatures, iterators and positional accumulators.

The second step is to obtain a fixed-address garbling scheme, namely a scheme that guarantees indistinguishability of the garbled machines as long as only the sequence of addresses of memory accesses is the same in the two computations. This is achieved by encrypting the state and memory content in an obfuscation-friendly way. The third step is to use an obfuscation-friendly ORAM in order to hide the program’s memory access pattern. (Specifically, they use the ORAM of Chung and Pass [CP13].)

The challenge of adaptive security. We outline three issues which prevent this construction from being adaptively secure and explain how we deal with them.

The first (and main) issue has to do with the positional accumulator, which is an obfuscation-friendly variant of a Merkle-hash-tree built on top of the memory. That is, the contents of the memory is hashed down until a short root (called the accumulator value \( \text{ac} \)) is obtained. Then this value is signed together with the current step by the CPU and is kept (in memory) for subsequent verification of database accesses. Using the accumulator, the evaluator is later able to efficiently convince the CPU that the contents of a certain memory location \( L \) is \( v \). We call this operation “opening” accumulator value \( \text{ac} \) to contents \( v \) at location \( L \). Intuitively, the main security property is that it should be infeasible to open an accumulator value to two different contents values at the same location.

However, to be useful with indistinguishability obfuscation, the accumulator needs an additional property, called enforceability. In [KLW15], this property allows to generate, given memory location \( L^* \) and symbol \( v^* \), a “rigged” public key for the accumulator along with a “rigged” accumulator value \( \text{ac}^* \). The rigged public key and accumulator look indistinguishable from honestly generated public key and accumulator value, and also have the property that there does not exist a way to open \( \text{ac}^* \) to value other than \( v^* \) at location \( L^* \).
We build adaptive accumulators from a new primitive called Adaptively puncturable hash functions. The key that enforces the correct values, and obtain the same tight security reduction as in the static setting.

to use a different rigged verification key for each machine. Since the key is determined only when a machine is given a different, independently generated verification key. This allows us, at the proof of security, to use the garbled database and is used throughout the lifetime of the system. Now, each new garbled accumulators, construct from honest verification keys.

hash function ensembles. In this primitive a standard collision resistant hash function is used, and so indistinguishability holds. Due to the indistinguishability of rigged public accumulator keys from honest ones, indistinguishability holds even for the case of non-rigged accumulator keys.

However, the fact that the special values \( v^*, L^* \) and \( ac^* \) are encoded in the rigged public key forces these values to be known before the adversary sees the public key. This suffices for the case of static garbling, since the special values depend only on the underlying computation, and this computation is fixed in advance and does not depend on adversary’s view. However, in the adaptive setting, this is not the case. This is so since the adversary can choose new computations — and thus new special values \( v^*, L^* \) — depending on its view so far, which includes the public key of the accumulator.

A naive solution to this problem would be to generate a fresh accumulator instance for every execution. But this is not effective in the context of persistent memory, since it requires recomputing a new accumulator root (corresponding to the new parameters) before every execution and thus doing work proportional to the entire memory size at every execution.

A more viable potential solution is to replace the accumulator of [KLU15] with the somewhere statistically binding (SSB) hash of Hubáček and Wichs [HW15], assuming fully homomorphic encryption, or alternatively from DDH or the \( \phi \)-hiding assumption [OPWW15]. Similar to the enforcing mechanism in the accumulator of [KLU15], the SSB hash can also be set up with a hidden statistical binding location, with an additional feature that only the special location \( L^* \) needs to be known at the time of generation of the rigged public key. The guarantee is that, with the rigged public key, and for any accumulator value \( ac \), there exists at most a single value \( v \) such that \( ac \) can be opened to value \( v \) at location \( L^* \).

The fact that only the location needs to be fixed in advance is a significant, since it allows the proof of security to go through even in the case of an adaptive adversary — as long as the program uses only a polynomial number of potential memory locations. Indeed, in this case the reduction to the security of the SSB hash can guess the (adaptively chosen) special location \( L^* \) ahead of time and be correct with polynomial probability.

Adaptive Accumulators. We propose an alternative solution to SSB hashing. Our solution works regardless of the size of the potential address space, and obtains better parameters. Specifically, we define and construct adaptive accumulators, which are an adaptive alternative to SSB hashing and positional accumulators.

In our adaptive accumulators there are no “rigged” public keys. Instead, correctness of an opening of a hash value at some location is verified using a verification key which can be generated later. In addition to the usual computational binding guarantees, it should be possible to generate, given a special accumulator value \( ac^* \), value \( v^* \) and location \( L^* \), a “rigged” verification key \( v^* k \) that looks indistinguishable from an honestly generated one, and such that \( v^* k \) does not verify an opening of \( ac^* \) at location \( L^* \) to any value other than \( v^* \). Furthermore, it is possible to generate multiple verification keys, that are all rigged to enforce the same accumulator value \( ac^* \) to different values \( v^* \) at different locations \( L^* \), where all are indistinguishable from honest verification keys.

We then use adaptive accumulators as follows: There is a single set of public parameters that is posted together with the garbled database and is used throughout the lifetime of the system. Now, each new garbled machine is given a different, independently generated verification key. This allows us, at the proof of security, to use a different rigged verification key for each machine. Since the key is determined only when a machine is being garbled (and its computation and output values are already fixed), we can use a rigged verification key that enforces the correct values, and obtain the same tight security reduction as in the static setting.

Adaptively puncturable hash functions. We build adaptive accumulators from a new primitive called adaptively puncturable (AP) hash function ensembles. In this primitive a standard collision resistant hash function \( h(x) \) is augmented with three algorithms Verify, GenVK, GenBindingVK. GenVK generates a verifi-
cation key $vk$, which can be later used in $\text{Verify}(vk, x, y)$ to check that $h(x) = y$. $\text{GenBindingVK}(x^*)$ produces a binding key $vk^*$ such that $\text{Verify}(vk^*, x, y = h(x^*))$ accepts only if $x = x^*$. Finally, we require that real and binding verification keys should be indistinguishable even for the adversary which chooses $x^*$ adaptively after seeing $h$.

The construction of adaptive accumulators from AP hash functions proceeds as follows. The public key is an AP hash function $h$, and the initial accumulator value $ac_0$ is the root of a Merkle tree on the initial data store (which can be thought of as empty, or the all-0 string) using $h$. We maintain the invariant that at every moment the root value $ac$ is the result of hashing down the store. In order to write a new symbol $v$ to a position $L$ the evaluator recomputes all hashes on the path from the root to $L$. The “opening information” for $v$ at $L$ is all hashes of siblings on the path from the root to $L$.

The verification key is a sequence of $d = \log |S|$ (honest) verification keys for $h$ - one for each level of the tree. The “rigged” verification key for accumulator value $ac^*$ and value $v^*$ at location $L$ consists of a sequence of $d$ rigged keys for the AP hash - where each key forces the opening of a single value along the path from the root to leaf $L^*$. Security of the adaptive accumulator follows from the security of the AP hash via standard reduction.

**Constructing AP hash.** We construct adaptively puncturable hash function ensembles from indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits, plus collision-resistant hash functions with the property that any image has at most polynomially many preimages. (This implies that the CRHF shrinks at most logarithmically many bits). We say that a hash function is $c$-bounded if the number of preimages for any image is no more than $c$. To be able to “compose” functions in various ways we will also need that the hash functions have domain $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and range $\{0, 1\}^{\lambda'}$ for some $\lambda' < \lambda$. For simplicity we focus on the setting where $\lambda = \lambda' + 1$. We construct 4-bounded CRHFs assuming hardness of discrete log and 64-bounded CRHFs assuming hardness of factoring.

The construction of AP hash proceeds in two steps.

1. First we construct a $c$-bounded AP hash function ensemble from any $c$-bounded hash function ensemble $\{h_k\}$. This is done as follows: The public key is the description of the hash function $h_k$. A verification key $vk$ is $iO(V)$, where $V$ is the program that on input $x, y$ outputs 1 if $h_k(x) = y$. A “rigged” verification key $vk^*$ that is binding for input $x^*$ is $iO(V_{x^*})$ where $V_{x^*}$ is the program that on input $(x, y)$ does the following:
   - if $y = f_h(x^*)$, it accepts if and only if $x = x^*$;
   - otherwise it accepts if and only if $y = h_k(x)$.

   Since $h_k$ is $c$-bounded, the functionality of $V$ and $V_{x^*}$ differ only on polynomially many inputs. Therefore, the real and “rigged” verification keys are indistinguishable following the $diO$-$iO$ equivalence for circuits with polynomially many differing inputs [BCP14].

2. Next we construct AP hash functions which are, say, length halving (and are thus not polynomially bounded) from bounded AP hashing. This is done in the natural way by extending the hash function’s domain using Merkle-Damgård, and then obfuscating the resulting function. We show that if the underlying poly-bounded hash is adaptively puncturable, then so is the composed one.

**From Adaptive Accumulators to Adaptively Secure Garbling.** We return to the challenges encountered when trying to use the [CH16] construction in our adaptive setting. Now that we have adaptive accumulators, we are able to complete the first step in the [CH16] construction in the natural way, and prove its security in the adaptive setting. Here we generate fresh instances of an iterator and splittable signature scheme for each new garbled machine. This does not cause any problems since these primitives do not access the long-lived shared memory.

**Towards obtaining fixed-address garbling.** Recall that in this step the programs encrypt each memory cell with a “long lived key” that remains unchanged for all programs. Specifically, [CH16] replaces writing a symbol $s$ to location $\text{addr}$ at timestep $t$ with writing $(t, F_k(\text{addr}, t) \oplus s)$ instead, for some puncturable PRF $F_k$. The initial memory is encrypted as if it were written at time $t = 0$. 
This approach is problematic in the adaptive setting. The proof of fixed-access garbling involves puncturing \( F \) and changing its value to random at points which depend on the computation, so a straightforward adaptation of the proof (for \( F(i, \text{addr}, t) \), where \( i \) is execution number) for the static case does not work. Indeed, the points at which the memory needs to be punctured may depend on the garbled memory itself.

Our first observation is that there is no need to use \( \text{addr} \) as a PRF input; instead we can use \( F_{\lambda}(i, t) \), where \( i \) is the execution number. This is because at a single step the program only writes to one address (for the initial memory, we will now think of each address \( a \) as having been written at a distinct time, e.g. \(-a\), so there is no danger of reusing the pseudorandom padding. Next, note that each program \( M_i \) can only use PRF values \( F(i, \ldots) \) for \( \text{Write} \) and \( F(0, \ldots), \ldots, F(i, \ldots) \) for \( \text{Read} \).

Thus it is possible to puncture \( F \) at \((i^*, t^*)\) as follows:

- We hardwire a punctured key into programs \( M_1, \ldots, M_{i-1} \), without hardwiring the PRF value; this works since these programs never use \( F(i^*, \ldots) \). Note that \( i^* \) and \( t^* \) do not depend on the computation (we do puncturing for every \((i^*, t^*)\) one by one) and therefore these programs with a punctured key inside can be generated before \( i \)-th computation is known.

- We hardwire a punctured key together with a challenge value into programs \( M_i, \ldots, M_n \); this is possible since the challenge value becomes known upon receiving \( M_i \) from the adversary.

Note that we could also prove security if we left \( \text{addr} \) in the input of a PRF and still use it in our adaptive setting. For this one would need to use a special puncturable PRF (the GGM construction suffices) which allows one to generate subkeys \( K_i \) for computing only \( F(i, \text{addr}, t) \) for fixed \( i \) and arbitrary \( \text{addr}, t \).

**Issues with the full garbling step.** Recall that the full garbling in \([CH16]\) is achieved by applying an ORAM on top of the fixed-access garbling. The randomness for the real ORAM accesses and the simulated accesses is sampled using a PRF. This leads to a situation where a PRF key is first used inside a program \( M_i \) for some execution \( i \) and later needs to be punctured.

We get around this issue by noticing that the Chung-Pass ORAM has a special property which allows us to guess which points to puncture with only polynomial security loss. This property, which we call strong localized randomness, is sketched as follows. Let \( R \) be the randomness used by the ORAM. Let \( \vec{A}_i = \vec{a}_i^1, \ldots, \vec{a}_i^m \) be a set of locations accessed by the ORAM during emulation of access \( i \). The strong localized randomness property guarantees that there exists a set of intervals \( I_{i1}, \ldots, I_{im}, I_{ij} \subset [1, |R|] \), such that:

1. Each \( a_{ij}^* \) depends only on \( R_{I_{ij}} \), i.e., the part of the randomness \( R \) indexed with \( I_{ij} \); furthermore, \( a_{ij}^* \) is efficiently computable from \( I_{ij} \);
2. All \( I_{ij} \) are mutually disjoint;
3. All \( I_{ij} \) are efficiently computable given the sequence of memory operations.

To see that the Chung-Pass ORAM has strong localized randomness, observe that in its non-recursive form, each virtual access of \( \text{addr} \) touches two paths: one is the path used for the eviction, which is purely random, and the other is determined by the randomness chosen in the previous virtual access of \( \text{addr} \). Therefore, the set of accessed locations is determined by two randomness intervals. When the ORAM is applied recursively, the sequence of accesses is determined by \( O(\log S) \) intervals. Since the number of intervals in the range \([1, \ldots, |R|]\) is only polynomial in the security parameter, the reduction can guess the interval (and therefore the points to puncture at) with only polynomial security loss.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Function families

A function ensemble \( \mathcal{F} \) has a key generation function \( g : S_{\lambda} \rightarrow K_{\lambda} \); on seeds \( s \) of length \( \lambda \), \( g \) produces a key \( k \) for a function \( f_k \) with domain \( D_{\lambda} \) and range \( R_{\lambda} \):

\[
\mathcal{F} = \{ f_k : D_{\lambda} \rightarrow R_{\lambda}, k = g(s), s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}
\]
2.2 Collision resistant hash function

A hash function ensemble \( H = \{ h_k : D_\lambda \rightarrow R_\lambda \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) is collision resistant if for all p.p.t. adversary \( A \), there is a negligible function \( \text{negl}(\cdot) \) such that

\[
\Pr_{A,k}[A(1^\lambda, h_k) \rightarrow x_1, x_2 \in D_\lambda : h_k(x_1) = h_k(x_2) \land x_1 \neq x_2] < \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

2.3 Obfuscation

For a circuit family \( F = \{ f : D_\lambda \rightarrow R_\lambda \}_{f \in \mathcal{F}} \), a probabilistic algorithm \( \text{Obf} \) is an obfuscator, if

1. The circuit \( \text{Obf}(f) \) has the exact same functionality as \( f \);
2. There is a polynomial \( B(\cdot) \) such that \( |\text{Obf}(f)| \leq B(|f|) \).

The security properties are defined as follows:

**Definition 2.1** (Indistinguishability Obfuscation [BGI+12, GGH+13]). \( \text{Obf} \) is an Indistinguishability Obfuscator (iO) for \( \mathcal{F} \) if for any p.p.t. distinguisher \( D \), there is a negligible function \( \text{negl}(\cdot) \) such that for all circuits \( f_0 \) and \( f_1 \) that have identical functionalities, and are of the same size, it holds that

\[
|\Pr[D(\text{Obf}(\lambda, f_0))] = 1 - \Pr[D(\text{Obf}(\lambda, f_1))]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

**Definition 2.2** (Differing-inputs Obfuscation [BGI+12, ABG+13, BCP14]). A function family \( \mathcal{F} \) associated with a p.p.t. sampler \( \text{Sam} \) is a differing-inputs obfuscator if for all p.p.t. adversary \( A \), there exists a negligible function \( \text{negl}(\cdot) \) such that:

\[
\text{Pr}[f_0(x) \neq f_1(x) : (f_0, f_1, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Sam}(1^\lambda), x \leftarrow A(1^\lambda, f_0, f_1, \text{aux})] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

\( \text{Obf} \) is a Differing-inputs Obfuscator for a differing-inputs function family \( \mathcal{F} \) if for any p.p.t. distinguisher \( D \), there exists a negligible function \( \text{negl}(\cdot) \) such that for \((f_0, f_1, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Sam}(1^\lambda)\), we have that

\[
\Pr[D(\text{diO}(\lambda, f_0, \text{aux})) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{diO}(\lambda, f_1, \text{aux})) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

Boyle, Chung and Pass show that an indistinguishability obfuscator is also a differing-input obfuscator for functions with only polynomially many differing-inputs [BCP14].

**Lemma 2.1** ([BCP14]). For every polynomial \( p(\cdot) \), for all differing-input sampler \( \text{Sam}'(1^\lambda) \) that outputs functions with differing-inputs less than \( p(\lambda) \):

\[
\Pr[(f_0, f_1, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Sam}'(1^\lambda) : |\{ x \in D_\lambda | f_0(x) \neq f_1(x) \}| < p(\lambda)] = 1
\]

an indistinguishability obfuscators is also a differing-input obfuscator for \( \text{Sam}' \).

2.4 Puncturable pseudorandom functions

**Definition 2.3** (Puncturable PRF [KPTZ13, BW13, BGI14, SW14]). Let \( \ell(\lambda) \) and \( m(\lambda) \) be the input and output lengths. A family of puncturable pseudorandom functions \( \mathcal{F} \) is given by a triple of efficient functions \( (\text{Gen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Puncture}) \), where \( \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \) generates the key \( F \), such that \( F \) maps from \( \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)} \) to \( \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)} \); \( \text{Eval}(F, x) \) takes a PRF \( F \), an input \( x \), outputs \( F(x) \); \( \text{Puncture}(F, x^*) \) takes a key and an input \( x^* \), outputs a punctured key \( F\{x^*\} \).

It satisfies the following conditions:

- Functionality preserved over unpunctured points: Let \( F\{x^*\} = \text{Puncture}(F, x^*) \), then for all \( x \neq x^* \), \( \text{Eval}(F, x) = \text{Eval}(F\{x^*\}, x) \).
- Pseudorandom on the punctured points: For every p.p.t distinguisher \( D \) who chooses an input \( x^* \), the following two distributions are indistinguishable: \( (x^*, F\{x^*\}, F(x^*)) \) and \( (x^*, F\{x^*\}, r^*) \), where \( r^* \) is uniform in \( \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)} \).

**Theorem 2.2** ([GGM86, KPTZ13, BW13, BGI14, SW14]). If one-way function exists, then for all length parameters \( \ell(\lambda), m(\lambda) \), there is a puncturable PRF family that maps from \( \ell(\lambda) \) bits to \( m(\lambda) \) bits.
2.5 The RAM Model

2.5.1 RAM Machines

In this work, a RAM machine $M$ is defined as a tuple $(\Sigma, Q, Y, C)$, where:

- $\Sigma$ is a finite set, which is the possible contents of a memory cell. For example, $\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$.
- $Q$ is the set of all possible “local states” of $M$, containing some initial state $q_0$. (We think of $Q$ as a set that grows polynomially as a function of the security parameter. That is, a state $q \in Q$ can encode cryptographic keys, as well as “local memory” of size that is bounded by some fixed polynomial in the security parameter.)
- $Y$ is the output space of $M$.
- $C$ is a circuit implementing a transition function which maps $Q \times (\Sigma \cup \{\epsilon\}) \to (Q \times O_\Sigma) \cup Y$. Here $O_\Sigma$ denotes the set of memory operations with $\Sigma$ as the alphabet of possible memory symbols. Precisely, $O_\Sigma = (N \times \Sigma)$. That is, $C$ takes the current state and the value returned by the memory access function, and returns a new state, a memory address, a read/write instruction, and a value to be written in case of a write.

We write $|M|$ to denote the tuple $(\ell_\Sigma, \ell_Q, \ell_Y, |C|)$, where $\ell_\Sigma$ is the length of a binary encoding of $\Sigma$, and similarly for $\ell_Q$ and $\ell_Y$.

2.5.2 Memory Configurations

A memory configuration on alphabet $\Sigma$ is a function $s : \mathbb{N} \to \Sigma \cup \{\epsilon\}$. Let $||s||_0$ denote $|\{a : s(a) \neq \epsilon\}|$ and, in an abuse of notation, let $||s||_{\infty}$ denote $\max(\{a : s(a) \neq \epsilon\})$, which we will call the length of the memory configuration. A memory configuration $s$ can be implemented (say with a balanced binary tree) by a data structure of size $O(||s||_0)$, supporting updates to any index in $O(\log ||s||_{\infty})$ time.

We can naturally identify a string $x = x_1 \ldots x_n \in \Sigma^*$ with the memory configuration $s_x$, defined by

$$s_x(i) = \begin{cases} x_i & \text{if } i \leq |x| \\ \epsilon & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Looking ahead, efficient representations of sparse memory configurations (in which $||s||_0 < ||s||_{\infty}$) are convenient for succinctly garbling computations where the space usage is larger than the input length.

2.5.3 Execution

We now define what it means to execute a RAM machine $M = (\Sigma, Q, Y, C)$ on an initial memory configuration $s_0 \in \Sigma^\mathbb{N}$ to obtain $M(s_0)$.

Define $a_0 = 0$. For $i > 0$, iteratively define $(q_i, a_i, v_i) = C(q_{i-1}, s_{i-1}(a_{i-1}))$ and define the $i^{th}$ memory configuration $s_i$ as

$$s_i(a) = \begin{cases} v_i & \text{if } a = a_i \\ s_{i-1}(a) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

If $C(q_{t-1}, s_{t-1}(a_{t-1})) = y \in Y$ for some $t$, then we say that $M(s_0) = y$. If there is no such $t$, we say that $M(s_0) = \bot$. When $M(s_0) \neq \bot$, it is convenient to define the following functions:

- Define the running time of $M$ on $s_0$ as the above $t$, and denote it $\text{Time}(M, s_0)$.
- Define the space usage of $M$ on $s_0$ as $\max_{i=0}^{t-1} ||s_i||_{\infty}$, and denote it $\text{Space}(M, s_0)$.
- Define the execution transcript of $M$ on $s_0$ as $((q_0, a_0, v_0), \ldots, (q_{t-1}, a_{t-1}, v_{t-1}), y)$, and denote it $\mathcal{T}(M, s_0)$. 

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• Define the *addresses accessed* by $M$ on $s_0$ as $(a_0, \ldots, a_{t-1})$, and denote this $\text{Addr}(M, s_0)$.

• Define the *resultant memory configuration* of $M$ on $s_0$ as $s_t$, and denote it $\text{NextMem}(M, s_0)$.

### 2.5.4 Probabilistic RAM Machines

We will also consider RAM machines with randomized transition functions. We define a probabilistic RAM machine as a tuple $(\Sigma, Q, Y, C)$. As in deterministic RAM machines, $\Sigma$ is the alphabet of symbols that can be stored in memory, $Q$ is the set of local states, and $Y$ is the set of possible machine outputs.

The transition function $C$ now maps

$$C : Q \times (\Sigma \cup \{\epsilon\}) \times \{0, 1\} \rightarrow (Q \times O_{\Sigma}) \cup Y$$

For any function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, and any probabilistic RAM machine $M = (\Sigma, Q, Y, C)$, we define a deterministic RAM machine $M^f = (\Sigma, Q', Y, C')$, where

$$Q' = \mathbb{N} \times Q.$$ and

$$C'((t, q), \sigma) = ((t + 1, q'), \text{op})$$

where $(q', \text{op}) \leftarrow C(q, \sigma, f(t))$

### 2.5.5 RAM Machine Concatenation

For RAM machines $M_1, \ldots, M_t$, we let $M_1; \ldots; M_t$ denote the RAM machine which sequentially executes $M_1$ through $M_t$ on the same initial memory $s_0$, and then outputs whatever $M_t$ outputs.

### 2.6 Garbled RAM

**Syntax.** A garbling scheme for RAM programs is a tuple of p.p.t. algorithms $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{GbPrg}, \text{GbMem}, \text{Exec})$.

- **Key Generation:** $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, S)$ takes the security parameter $\lambda$ in unary and a space bound $S$, and outputs a secret key $SK$.

- **Memory Garbling:** $\text{GbMem}(SK, s)$ takes as input a secret key $SK$ and a memory configuration $s$, and then outputs a memory configuration $\tilde{s}$.

- **Machine Garbling:** $\text{GbPrg}(SK, M_i, T_i, i)$ takes as input a secret key $SK$, a RAM machine $M_i$, a running time bound $T_i$, and a sequence number $i$, and outputs a RAM machine $\tilde{M}_i$.

We are interested in garbling schemes which are *correct*, *efficient*, and *secure*.

**Correctness.** A garbling scheme is said to be correct if for all p.p.t. adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ and every $t = \text{poly}(\lambda)$

$$\Pr \left[ \tilde{M}_i(\tilde{s}_{t-1}) = M_i(s_{t-1}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where

- $\sum T_i \leq \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $|s_0| \leq S \leq \text{poly}(\lambda)$;
- Space(M_i, s_{i-1}) \leq S and Time(M_i, s_{i-1}) \leq T_i for each i.

**Efficiency.** A garbling scheme is said to be efficient if:

1. KeyGen, GbPrg, and GbMem are probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. Furthermore, GbMem runs in time linear in \(||s_0||\). We require succinctness for the garbled programs, which means that the size of a garbled program \(\tilde{M}\) is linear in the description length of the plaintext program \(M\). The bounds \(T_i\) and \(S\) are encoded in binary, so the time to garble does not significantly depend on either of these quantities.

2. With \(\tilde{M}_i\) and \(\hat{s}_i\) defined as above, it holds that Time(\(\tilde{M}_i, \hat{s}_{i-1}\)) = \(\tilde{O}(\text{Time}(M_i, s_{i-1}))\) and Space(\(\tilde{M}_i, \hat{s}_{i-1}\)) = \(\tilde{O}(S)\) (hiding polylogarithmic factors in \(S\)).

**Security.** We define the security property of GRAM as follows.

**Definition 2.4.** Let \(\text{GRAM} = (\text{Setup}, \text{GbMem}, \text{GbPrg})\) be a garbling scheme. We define the following two experiments, where each \(M_i\) is a program with time and space complexity \(T_i\) and \(S\) that is evaluated with memory \(s_{i-1}\) and \(y_i = M_i(s_{i-1})\), \(s_i = \text{NextMem}(M_i, s_{i-1})\), and \(T_i = \text{Time}(M_i, s_{i-1})\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiment ((A_1(1^\lambda)))</th>
<th>Experiment ((A_2(1^\lambda)))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>((s_0, S) \leftarrow A(1^\lambda))</td>
<td>((s_0, S) \leftarrow A(1^\lambda))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, S), \hat{s}_0 \leftarrow \text{GbMem}(SK, s_0))</td>
<td>(\hat{s} \leftarrow \text{Sim}(1^\lambda, \ell))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((M_1, T_1) \leftarrow A(\hat{s}_0))</td>
<td>((M_1, T_1) \leftarrow A(\hat{s}_0))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\tilde{M}_i \leftarrow \text{GbPrg}(SK, M_i, T_1, 1))</td>
<td>(\tilde{M}_i \leftarrow \text{Sim}(y_1, T_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for (i = 1) to (\ell = \text{poly}(\lambda))</td>
<td>for (i = 1) to (\ell = \text{poly}(\lambda))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>((M_{i+1}, T_{i+1}) \leftarrow A(\tilde{M}_i))</td>
<td>((M_{i+1}, T_{i+1}) \leftarrow A(\tilde{M}_i))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\hat{M}<em>{i+1} \leftarrow \text{GbPrg}(SK, M</em>{i+1}, T_{i+1}, i + 1))</td>
<td>(\hat{M}<em>{i+1} \leftarrow \text{Sim}(y</em>{i+1}, t_{i+1}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output: (b \leftarrow A(\hat{M}_{n+1}))</td>
<td>Output: (b' \leftarrow A(\hat{M}_{n+1}))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The garbling scheme \(\text{GRAM}\) is \(\epsilon\)-adaptively secure if

\[
|\Pr[1 \leftarrow \text{REAL}_{A}(1^\lambda)] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \text{IDEAL}_{A}(1^\lambda)]| < \epsilon.
\]

### 2.7 Splittable Signatures

A splittable signature scheme for a message space \(M\) is a signature scheme whose keys are constrainable to certain subsets of \(M\) — namely point sets, the complements of point sets, and the empty set. These punctured keys are required to satisfy indistinguishability and correctness properties similar to the asymmetrical constrained encapsulation of [CHJV15]. Additionally, they must satisfy a “splitting indistinguishability” property.

More formally, a splittable signature scheme syntactically consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms. Setup and Split are randomized algorithms, and Sign and Verify are deterministic.

\[
\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \to sk_M, vk_M
\]

Setup takes the security parameter \(\lambda\) in unary, and outputs a secret key \(sk_M\) and a verification key \(vk_M\) for the whole message space. We will sometimes write the unconstrained keys \(sk_M\) and \(vk_M\) as just \(sk\) and \(vk\), respectively.
\text{Split}(sk_M, m) \rightarrow sk_{\{m\}}, sk_{M\setminus\{m\}}, vk_\emptyset, vk_{\{m\}}, vk_{M\setminus\{m\}}

\text{Split} takes as input an unconstrained secret key \( sk_M \) and a message \( m \), and outputs secret keys and verification keys which are constrained on the set \( \{m\} \) and its complement \( M \setminus \{m\} \). We note that \( sk_{\{m\}} \) can just be \( \text{Sign}(sk, m) \)

\text{Sign}(sk_S, m) \rightarrow \sigma

\text{Sign} takes a possibly constrained secret key \( sk_S \) and a message \( m \in S \), and outputs a signature \( \sigma \).

\text{Verify}(vk, m, \sigma) \rightarrow 0 \text{ or } 1

\text{Verify} takes a possibly constrained verification key \( vk \), a message \( m \), and a signature \( \sigma \). \text{Verify} outputs 0 or 1. If \( \text{Verify} \) outputs 1, we say that \( vk \) accepts \( \sigma \) as a signature of \( m \); otherwise, we say that \( vk \) rejects \( \sigma \).

A splittable signature scheme must satisfy the following properties.

**Correctness**

For any message \( m^* \), sample \( sk_{\{m^*\}}, sk_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}, sk_M, vk_\emptyset, vk_{\{m^*\}}, vk_{M\setminus\{m^*\}} \), and \( vk_M \) as

\[(sk_M, vk_M) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)\]

and

\[(sk_{\{m^*\}}, sk_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}, vk_\emptyset, vk_{\{m^*\}}, vk_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}) \leftarrow \text{Split}(sk_M, m^*)\]

Correctness requires that with probability 1 over the above sampling:

1. For all \( m \in M \), \( \text{Verify}(vk_M, m, \text{Sign}(sk_M, m)) = 1 \)
2. For all sets \( S \in \{\{m^*\}, M \setminus \{m^*\}\} \), for all \( m \in S \), \( \text{Sign}(sk_S, m) = \text{Sign}(sk_M, m) \). Furthermore, \( \text{Verify}(vk_S, m, \cdot) \) is the same function as \( \text{Verify}(vk_M, m, \cdot) \).
3. For all sets \( S \in \{\emptyset, \{m^*\}, M \setminus \{m^*\}, M\} \), for all \( m \in M \setminus S \), and for all \( \sigma \), \( \text{Verify}(vk_S, m, \sigma) = 0 \).

**Verification Key Indistinguishability**

Sample \( sk_{\{m^*\}}, sk_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}, sk_M, vk_\emptyset, vk_{\{m^*\}}, vk_{M\setminus\{m^*\}} \), and \( vk_M \) as in the above definition of correctness.

Verification Key Indistinguishability requires that the following indistinguishabilities hold:

1. \( \text{vk}_\emptyset \approx \text{vk}_M \)
2. \( sk_{\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}_{\{m^*\}} \approx sk_{\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}_M \)
3. \( sk_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}_{M\setminus\{m^*\}} \approx sk_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}_M \)

**Splitting Indistinguishability**

Sample \( sk_{\{m^*\}}, sk_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}_{\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}_{M\setminus\{m^*\}} \) as in the above definition of correctness. Repeat this sampling, obtaining \( sk'_{\{m^*\}}, sk'_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}'_{\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}'_{M\setminus\{m^*\}} \)

Splitting indistinguishability requires that

\[sk_{\{m^*\}}, sk_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}_{\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}_{M\setminus\{m^*\}} \approx sk'_{\{m^*\}}, sk'_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}'_{\{m^*\}}, \text{vk}'_{M\setminus\{m^*\}}\]
2.8 Cryptographic Iterators

Roughly speaking, a cryptographic iterator is a family of collision-resistant hash functions which is iO-friendly when used to authenticate a chain of values. In particular, we think of using a hash function $H$ to hash a chain of values $m_1, \ldots, m_k$ as $H(m_k \| H(m_{k-1}) \| \cdots \| H(m_1)\|0^\lambda)$, which we shall denote as $H^k(m_k, \ldots, m_1)$. A cryptographic iterator provides two indistinguishable ways of sampling the hash function $H$. In addition to “honest” sampling, one can also sample $H$ so that for a specific sequence of messages $(m_1, \ldots, m_k)$, $H^k(m_k, \ldots, m_1)$ has exactly one pre-image under $H$.

Below, we give the exact same definition of cryptographic iterators as in [KLW15], only renaming $\text{Setup-Itr-Enforce}$ to $\text{Setup}$ and renaming $\text{Setup-Itr-Enforce}$ to $\text{SetupEnforce}$. Formally, a cryptographic iterator for the message space $M = \{0,1\}^n$ consists of the following probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. $\text{Setup}$ and $\text{SetupEnforce}$ are randomized algorithms, but $\text{Iterate}$ is deterministic, corresponding to our above discussion of a hash function.

We recall that [KLW15] construct iterators from IO for circuits and puncturable PRFs.

\begin{align*}
\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, T) \rightarrow PP, itr_0 \\
\text{Setup} \text{ takes as input the security parameter } \lambda \text{ in unary and a binary bound } T \text{ on the number of iterations. } \text{Setup} \text{ then outputs public parameters } PP \text{ and an initial iterator value } itr_0.
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{SetupEnforce}(1^\lambda, T, (m_1, \ldots, m_k)) \rightarrow PP, itr_0 \\
\text{SetupEnforce} \text{ takes as input the security parameter } \lambda \text{ in unary, a binary bound } T \text{ on the number of iterations, and an arbitrary sequence of messages } m_1, \ldots, m_k, \text{ each in } \{0,1\}^n \text{ for } k < T. \text{ SetupEnforce then outputs public parameters } PP \text{ and an initial iterator value } itr_0.
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\text{Iterate}(PP, itr_{in}, m) \rightarrow itr_{out} \\
\text{Iterate} \text{ takes as input public parameters } PP, \text{ an iterator } itr_{in}, \text{ and a message } m \in \{0,1\}^n. \text{ Iterate then outputs a new iterator value } itr_{out}. \text{ It is stressed that Iterate is a deterministic operation; that is, given } PP, \text{ each sequence of messages results in a unique iterator value.}
\end{align*}

We will recursively define the notation $\text{Iterate}^0(PP, \ldots) = itr_0$, and

\begin{align*}
\text{Iterate}^k(PP, itr, (m_1, \ldots, m_k)) = \text{Iterate}(PP, \text{Iterate}^{k-1}(PP, itr, (m_1, \ldots, m_{k-1})), m_k).
\end{align*}

A cryptographic iterator must satisfy the following properties.

Indistinguishability of Setup

For any time bound $T$ and any sequence of messages $m_1, \ldots, m_k$ with $k < T$, it must be the case that

\begin{align*}
\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, T) \approx \text{SetupEnforce}(1^\lambda, T, (m_1, \ldots, m_k)).
\end{align*}

Enforcing

Sample $(PP, itr_0) \leftarrow \text{SetupEnforce}(1^\lambda, T, (m_1, \ldots, m_k))$.

The enforcement property requires that when $(PP, itr_0)$ are sampled as above, $\text{Iterate}(PP, a, b) = \text{Iterate}^k(PP, itr_0, (m_1, \ldots, m_k))$ if and only if $a = \text{Iterate}^{k-1}(PP, itr_0, (m_1, \ldots, m_{k-1}))$ and $b = m_k$.

3 $c$-Bounded Collision-Resistant Hash Functions

We say that a hash function ensemble $\mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ with $\mathcal{H} = \{h_\lambda : D_\lambda \rightarrow R_\lambda\}_{k \in \mathbb{K}_\lambda}$ is $c$-bounded if

\begin{align*}
\Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_\lambda} [\forall y \in R_\lambda, \#\{x : h(x) = y\} \leq c] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)
\end{align*}

That is, with high probability, every element in the codomain of $h$ has at most $c$ pre-images. In this paper we focus on the case where $D_\lambda = \{0,1\}^{\lambda+1}$, $R_\lambda = \{0,1\}\lambda$, and hope to get $c$ as a polynomial $\text{poly}(\lambda)$. For both of the constructions presented in this section, the bounds are constant.
Our constructions use claw-free pairs of permutations \((\pi_0, \pi_1)\) on a domain \(D\). Our starting point is the construction of [Dam88], in which for some fixed \(y_0\), the hash \(h(x)\) is defined as \((\pi_{x_0} \circ \cdots \circ \pi_{x_n})(y_0)\). Unfortunately, this construction does not give any non-trivial bound.

However, we observe that the same techniques allow us to take an injective function \(\iota : \{0, 1\}^n \to D\) and turn it into a \(2^{k}\)-bounded collision-resistant function mapping \(\{0, 1\}^{n+k} \to D\). As long there is such an injection \(\iota\) for large enough \(n\) (within \(\log(\lambda)\) of the bit-length \(m\) of elements of \(D\)), then we obtain a \(poly(\lambda)\)-bounded collision-resistant hash function.

**Theorem 3.1.** If for a random \(\lambda\)-bit prime \(p\), it is hard to solve the discrete log problem in \(\mathbb{Z}_p^*\), then there exists a \(4\)-bounded CRHF ensemble \(H = \{H_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}\) where \(H_\lambda\) consists of functions mapping \(\{0, 1\}^{\lambda+1} \to \{0, 1\}^\lambda\).

**Proof.** Let \(g\) and \(h\) be randomly chosen generators of \(\mathbb{Z}_p^*\). Then the permutations \(\pi_0(x) = g^x\) and \(\pi_1(x) = g^x\) are a claw-free pair of permutations. It is easy to see there is an injection \(\iota_{in} : \{0, 1\}^{\lambda-1} \to \mathbb{Z}_p^*\) and an injection \(\iota_{out} : \mathbb{Z}_p^* \to \{0, 1\}^\lambda\). Define a hash function

\[
f : \{0, 1\}^{\lambda-1} \times \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\} \to \{0, 1\}^\lambda
\]

\[
a, b, c \mapsto \iota_{out}(\pi_c(\pi_b(\iota_{in}(a))))
\]

Clearly given \(x \neq x'\) such that \(f(x) = f(x')\), one can find a claw (and therefore find \(\log_q h\)), so \(f\) is collision-resistant. Also for any given image, there is at most one corresponding pre-image per choice of \(b, c\), so \(f\) is \(4\)-bounded.

**Theorem 3.2.** If for random \(\lambda\)-bit primes \(p\) and \(q\), with \(p \equiv 3 \pmod{8}\) and \(q \equiv 7 \pmod{8}\), it is hard to factor \(N = pq\), then there exists a \(64\)-bounded CRHF ensemble.

**Proof.** First, we construct injections \(\iota_0 : \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda-4} \to [N/6]\) and \(\iota_1 : [N/6] \to \mathbb{Z}_N^* \cap [N/2]\), using the fact that for sufficiently large \(p\) and \(q\), for any integer \(x \in [N/6]\), at least one of \(3x, 3x+1, \text{ and } 3x+2\) is relatively prime to \(N\). Let \(\iota_{in} : \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda-4} \to \mathbb{Z}_N^* \cap [N/2]\) denote \(\iota_1 \circ \iota_0\). Let \(\iota_{out}\) denote an injection from \(\mathbb{Z}_p^* \to \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}\).

Next, following [GMR88], we define the claw-free pair of permutations \(\pi_0(x) = x^2 \pmod{N}\) and \(\pi_1(x) = 4x^2 \pmod{N}\), where the domain of \(\pi_0\) and \(\pi_1\) is the set of quadratic residues \(\pmod{N}\).

Now we define the hash function

\[
f : \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda-4} \times \{0, 1\}^5 \to \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}
\]

\[
f(x, y) = (\iota_{out} \circ \pi_{y_5} \circ \cdots \circ \pi_{y_1})(\iota_{in}(x)^2 \pmod{N})
\]

This is \(64\)-bounded because for any given image, there is at most one pre-image under \(\iota_{out} \circ \pi_{y_5} \circ \cdots \circ \pi_{y_1}\). This accounts for a factor of 32. The remaining factor of 2 comes from the fact that every quadratic residue has four square roots, two of which are in \([N/2]\) (the image of \(\iota_{in}\)). The collision resistance of \(x \mapsto \iota_{in}(x)^2\) follows from the fact that the two square roots are nontrivially related, i.e., neither is the negative of the other.

**Notation.** For a function \(h : \{0, 1\}^{\lambda+1} \to \{0, 1\}^\lambda\), we let \(h^0\) denote the identity function and for \(k > 0\) inductively define

\[
h^k : \{0, 1\}^{\lambda+k} \to \{0, 1\}^\lambda
\]

\[
h^k(x) = h(x_1 \parallel h^{k-1}(x_2 \parallel \cdots \parallel x_{\lambda+k}))
\]

### 4 Adaptively Puncturable Hash Functions

We say that an ensemble \(H\) is **adaptively puncturable** if there are algorithms \(\text{Verify}, \text{GenVK}, \text{and ForceGenVK}\) such that:
Correctness
For all \( x, y \),
\[
Pr \left[ \text{Verify}(vk, x, y) = 1 \iff y = h(x) \bigg| \begin{array}{l}
vk \leftarrow \text{GenVK}(1^\lambda, h) \\
h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_\lambda
\end{array} \right] = 1
\]

Forced Verification
For all \( x, x^* \),
\[
Pr \left[ \text{Verify}(vk, x, h(x^*)) = 1 \iff x = x^* \bigg| \begin{array}{l}
vk \leftarrow \text{ForceGenVK}(1^\lambda, h, x^*) \\
h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_\lambda
\end{array} \right] = 1
\]

Indistinguishability
For all p.p.t. \( A_1, A_2 \)
\[
Pr \left[ A_2(s, vk_0) = b \bigg| \begin{array}{l}
h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_\lambda \\
x^*, s \leftarrow A_1(1^\lambda, h) \\
vk_0 \leftarrow \text{GenVK}(1^\lambda, h) \\
vk_1 \leftarrow \text{ForceGenVK}(1^\lambda, h, x^*) \\
b \leftarrow \{0,1\}
\end{array} \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

**Theorem 4.1.** If there is a poly(\( \lambda \))-bounded CRHF ensemble mapping \( \{0,1\}^{\lambda+1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \) and if \( iO \) exists, then there is an adaptively puncturable hash function ensemble mapping \( \{0,1\}^{2\lambda} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \).

Let \( \mathcal{H} = \{\mathcal{H}_\lambda\} \) be a poly(\( \lambda \))-bounded CRHF ensemble, where \( \mathcal{H}_\lambda \) is a family of functions mapping \( \{0,1\}^{\lambda+1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \). We define an adaptively puncturable hash function ensemble \( \mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\} \), where \( \mathcal{F}_\lambda \) is a family of functions mapping \( \{0,1\}^{2\lambda} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \).

**Setup**
The key space for \( \mathcal{F}_\lambda \) is the same as the key space for \( \mathcal{H}_\lambda \).

**Evaluation**
For a key \( h \in \mathcal{H}_\lambda \) and a string \( x \in \{0,1\}^{2\lambda} \), we define
\[
f_h(x) = h^\lambda(x)
\]

**Verification**
\( \text{GenVK}(1^\lambda, f_h) \) outputs an iO-obfuscation of a circuit which directly computes
\[
x, y \mapsto \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } f_h(x) = y \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

\( \text{ForceGenVK}(1^\lambda, f_h, x^*) \) outputs an iO-obfuscation of a circuit which directly computes
\[
x, y \mapsto \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } y \neq f_h(x^*) \land y = f_h(x) \\
1 & \text{if } (x, y) = (x^*, f_h(x^*)) \\
0 & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

\( \text{Verify}(vk, x, y) \) simply evaluates and outputs \( vk(x, y) \).

**Claim 4.1.1.** No p.p.t. adversary which adaptively chooses \( x^* \) after seeing \( h \) can distinguish between \( \text{GenVK}(1^\lambda, h) \) and \( \text{ForceGenVK}(1^\lambda, h, x^*) \).
Proof. We present $\lambda+1$ hybrid games $H_0, \ldots , H_\lambda$. In each game $h$ is sampled from $H_\lambda$, but the circuit given by the challenger to the adversary depends on the game and on $x^*$. In hybrid $H_i$, the challenger computes $y^* = h^\lambda(x^*)$ and $y_{\lambda-i} = h^{\lambda-i}(x_{i+1}^* \parallel \cdots \parallel x_{2\lambda}^*)$. The challenger then sends $iO(C_i)$ to the adversary, where $C_i$ has $y^*$, $y_{\lambda-i}$, and $x_1^*, \ldots , x_i^*$ hard-coded and is defined as

$$C_i(x,y) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y = y^* \wedge x_1 = x_1^* \wedge \cdots \wedge x_i = x_i^* \wedge h^{\lambda-i}(x_{i+1}^* \parallel \cdots \parallel x_{2\lambda}^*) = y_{\lambda-i} \\ 1 & \text{if } y \neq y^* \wedge y = h^\lambda(x) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The challenger sends $iO(C_i)$ to the adversary.

It is easy to see that $C_0$ is functionally equivalent to the circuit produced by $\text{GenVK}$, and $C_\lambda$ is functionally equivalent to the circuit produced by $\text{ForceGenVK}$. So we only need to show that $H_i \approx H_{i+1}$ for $0 \leq i < \lambda$. We give a sequence of indistinguishable changes to the challenger, by which we transform the circuit given to the adversary from $C_i$ to $C_{i+1}$.

1. We first modify $C$ so that if $y \neq y^*$, it does the same as before. If $y = y^*$, it computes $y' = h^{\lambda-i-1}(x_{i+2}^* \parallel \cdots \parallel x_{2\lambda}^*)$ and outputs 1 if:

   - $h(x_{i+1}^* \parallel y') = y_{\lambda-i}$
   - For all $1 \leq j \leq i$, $x_j = x_j^*$.

   This change preserves functionality and hence is indistinguishable by $iO$.

2. Now we change $C$ so that instead of directly checking whether $h(x_{i+1}^* \parallel y') = y_{\lambda-i}$, it uses a hard-coded helper circuit $V = iO(V')$, where

$$V : \{0,1\} \times \{0,1\}^\lambda \times \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}$$

$$V(a,b,c) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } c = h(a\parallel b) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

This is functionally equivalent and hence indistinguishable by $iO$.

3. Now we change $V$. We first compute $y_{\lambda-i-1} = h^{\lambda-i-1}(x_{i+2}^* \parallel \cdots \parallel x_{2\lambda}^*)$ and $y_{\lambda-i} = h(x_{i+1}^* \parallel y_{\lambda-i-1})$, and define

$$V(a,b,c) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } c \neq y_{\lambda-i} \wedge c = h(a\parallel b) \\ 1 & \text{if } (a,b,c) = (x_{i+1}^*, y_{\lambda-i-1}, y_{\lambda-i}) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

with $y_{\lambda-i}$, $y_{\lambda-i-1}$, and $x_{i+1}^*$ hard-coded. The old and new $V$’s are indistinguishable because:

   - By the collision-resistance of $h$, it is difficult to find an input on which they differ.
   - By the property of poly($\lambda$)-bounded, they differ on only polynomially many points.
   - $iO$ is equivalent to $diO$ for circuits which differ on polynomially many points.

4. $C$ is now functionally equivalent to $C_{i+1}$ and hence is indistinguishable by $iO$.

$\square$
5 Adaptively Secure Positional Accumulators

Formally, an adaptive positional accumulator consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms. SetupAcc, SetupVerify, and SetupEnforceVerify are randomized, while Update and Verify are deterministic.

\[ \text{SetupAcc}(1^\lambda, S) \rightarrow \text{PP}, \text{ac}_0, \text{store}_0 \]

The setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter \( \lambda \) in unary and a bound \( S \) (in binary) on the memory addresses accessed. SetupAcc produces as output public parameters \( \text{PP} \), an initial accumulator value \( \text{ac}_0 \), and an initial data store \( \text{store}_0 \).

\[ \text{Update}(\text{PP}, \text{store}, \text{op}) \rightarrow \text{store}', \text{ac}', v, \pi \]

The update algorithm takes as input the public parameters \( \text{PP} \), a data store \( \text{store} \), and a memory operation \( \text{op} \). Update then outputs a new store \( \text{store}' \), a memory value \( v \), a succinct accumulator \( \text{ac}' \), and a succinct proof \( \pi \).

In our garbling scheme, the evaluator runs Update to process the memory operations made by garbled programs. The proof \( \pi \) is verified with respect to an accumulator \( \text{ac} \) which is a binding image to the memory configuration \( s \) represented by \( \text{store} \). \( \pi \) proves (in a computationally sound way) that \( v \) is the result of executing \( \text{op} \) on \( s \), and \( \text{ac}' \) is a commitment of the resulting memory configuration.

\[ \text{Verify}(\text{vk}, \text{ac}_i, \text{op}_i, \text{ac}_{i+1}, v_i, \pi_i) \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \]

The local update algorithm takes as inputs a verification key \( \text{vk} \), an initial accumulator value \( \text{ac}_i \), a memory operation \( \text{op}_i \), a resulting accumulator \( \text{ac}_{i+1} \), a memory value \( v_i \), and a proof \( \pi_i \). Verify then outputs 0 or 1. Intuitively, Verify checks the following statement:

\[ \pi \text{ is a proof that the operation } \text{op}_i \text{, when applied to the memory configuration corresponding to } \text{ac}_i \text{, yields a value } v_i \text{ and results in a memory configuration corresponding to } \text{ac}_{i+1}. \]

Verify is run by a garbled program to authenticate the memory values that the evaluator gives it.

\[ \text{SetupVerify}(\text{PP}) \rightarrow \text{vk} \]

SetupVerify generates a regular verification key for checking Update’s proofs. This is the verification key that is used in the “real world” garbled programs.

\[ \text{SetupEnforceVerify}(\text{PP}, (\text{op}_1, \ldots, \text{op}_k)) \rightarrow \text{vk} \]

SetupEnforceVerify takes a sequence of memory operations and a particular address, and generates a verification key which is perfectly sound when verifying the action of \( \text{op}_k \) in the sequence \((\text{op}_1, \ldots, \text{op}_k)\).

This type of verification key is used in the hybrid garbled programs in our security proof.

An adaptive positional accumulator must satisfy the following properties.

Correctness

Let \( \text{op}_0, \ldots, \text{op}_k \) be any arbitrary sequence of memory operations.

Let \( v^*_i \) denote the result of the \( i^{th} \) memory operation when \((\text{op}_0, \ldots, \text{op}_{k-1})\) are sequentially executed on an initially empty memory.

Correctness requires that for all \( j \in \{0, \ldots, k\} \)

\[
\Pr \left[ v_j = v^*_j \land b_j = 1 \right] = 1
\]

For \( i = 0, \ldots, k; \)

\[
\text{PP}, \text{ac}_0, \text{store}_0 \leftarrow \text{SetupAcc}(1^\lambda, S) \\
\text{vk} \leftarrow \text{SetupVerify}(\text{PP}) \\
\text{store}_{i+1}, \text{ac}_{i+1}, v_i, \pi_i \leftarrow \text{Update}(\text{PP}, \text{store}_i, \text{op}_i) \\
b_i \leftarrow \text{Verify}(\text{vk}, \text{ac}_i, \text{op}_i, \text{ac}_{i+1}, v_i, \pi_i)
\]

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Enforcing

Enforcing requires that for all space bounds \( S \), all sequences of operations \( \text{op}_0, \ldots, \text{op}_{k-1} \), all accumulators \( \hat{a}c \), all values \( \hat{v} \), and all proofs \( \hat{\pi} \), we have

\[
\Pr \left[ b = 1 \implies (\hat{v}, \hat{a}c) = (v_{k-1}, ac_k) \right] = 1
\]

Indistinguishability of Enforcing Verify

Now we require that the output of \( \text{SetupVerify}(PP) \) is indistinguishable from the output of \( \text{SetupEnforceVerify}(PP, (\text{op}_0, \ldots, \text{op}_{k-1})) \) even when \( (\text{op}_1, \ldots, \text{op}_k) \) are chosen adaptively as a function of \( PP \).

More formally, for all p.p.t. \( A_1 \) and \( A_2 \),

\[
\Pr \left[ A_2(s, \text{vk}_b) = b \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

Efficiency

In addition to all the algorithms being polynomial-time, we require that:
- The size of an accumulator is \( \text{poly}(\lambda) \).
- The size of proofs is \( \text{poly}(\lambda, \log S) \).
- The size of a store is \( O(S) \)

Theorem 5.1. If there is an adaptively puncturable hash function ensemble \( H = \{ H_\lambda \}_{\lambda \in N} \) with \( H_\lambda = \{ H_\lambda \}^{2^\lambda} \rightarrow \{ 0, 1 \}^\lambda \), then there exists an adaptive positional accumulator.

Proof: We construct an adaptive positional accumulator in which stores are low-depth binary trees, each node of which contains a \( \lambda \)-bit value. The accumulator corresponding to a given store is the value held by the root node. The public parameters for the accumulator consist of an adaptively puncturable hash \( h : \{ 0, 1 \}^{2^\lambda} \rightarrow \{ 0, 1 \}^\lambda \), and we preserve the invariant that the value in any internal node is equal to the hash \( h \) applied to its children’s values. It will be convenient for us to assume the existence of a \( \bot \), which is represented as a \( \lambda \)-bit string not in the image of \( h \). Without loss of generality, \( h \) can be chosen to have such a value.

\[
\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, S) \rightarrow PP, ac_0, store_0
\]

Setup samples \( h \leftarrow H_\lambda \), and sets \( PP = h \), \( ac_0 = h(\bot \| \bot) \), and \( store_0 \) to be a root node with value \( h(\bot \| \bot) \).

\[
\text{Update}(h, store, \text{op}) \rightarrow store', ac', v, \pi
\]

Suppose \( \text{op} \) is \text{ReadWrite}(\text{addr} \rightarrow v') \). There is a unique leaf node in \( \text{store} \) which is indexed by a prefix of \( \text{addr} \). Let \( v \) be the value of that leaf, and let \( \pi \) be the values of all siblings on the path from the root to that leaf.

\text{Update} adds a leaf node indexed by the entirety of \( \text{addr} \) to \( \text{store} \) if no such node already exists, and sets the value of the leaf to \( v' \). Then \text{Update} updates the value of ancestor of that leaf to preserve the invariant.
SetupVerify(h) \rightarrow vk

For i = 1, \ldots, \log S, SetupVerify samples

\[ vk_i \leftarrow \text{GenVK}(1^\lambda, h) \]

and sets \( vk = (vk_1, \ldots, vk_{\log S}) \).

Verify((vk_1, \ldots, vk_{\log S}), ac, \op, ac', v, (w_1, \ldots, w_d)) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}

Define \( z_d := v \). Let \( b_1 \cdots b_d \) denote the bit representation of the address on which \( \op \) acts. For \( 0 \leq i < d \), Verify computes

\[ z_i = \begin{cases} 
  h(w_{i+1} || z_{i+1}) & \text{if } b_{i+1} = 1 \\
  h(z_{i+1} || w_{i+1}) & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases} \]

For all \( i \) such that \( b_i = 1 \), Verify checks that \( vk_i(w_{i+1} || z_{i+1}, z_i) = 1 \). For all \( i \) such that \( b_i = 0 \), Verify checks that \( vk_i(z_{i+1} || w_{i+1}, z_i) = 1 \). If all these checks pass, then Verify outputs 1; otherwise, Verify outputs 0.

SetupEnforceVerify(h, (\op_1, \ldots, \op_d)) \rightarrow vk

Computes the \( \text{store}_{k-1} \) which would result from processing \( \op_1, \ldots, \op_{k-1} \). Suppose \( \op_k \) accesses address \( \text{addr}_k \in \{0, 1\}^{\log S} \). Then there is a unique leaf node in \( \text{store}_{k-1} \) which is indexed by a prefix of \( \text{addr}_k \); write this prefix as \( b_1 \cdots b_d \).

For each \( i \in \{1, \ldots, d\} \), define \( z_i \) as the value of the node indexed by \( b_1 \cdots b_i \), and let \( w_i \) denote the value of that node’s sibling. If \( b_i = 0 \), sample

\[ vk_i \leftarrow \text{ForceGenVK}(1^\lambda, h, z_i || w_i). \]

Otherwise, sample

\[ vk_i \leftarrow \text{ForceGenVK}(1^\lambda, h, w_i || z_i). \]

For \( i \in \{d + 1, \ldots, \log S\} \), just sample \( vk_i \leftarrow \text{GenVK}(1^\lambda, h) \).

Finally we define the total verification key to be \( (vk_1, \ldots, vk_{\log S}) \).

All the requisite properties of this construction are easy to check. \( \square \)

6 Fixed-Transcript Garbling

We define fixed-transcript security via the following game.

1. The challenger samples \( SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, S) \) and \( b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \).

2. The adversary sends a memory configuration \( s \) to the challenger. The challenger sends back \( \text{GbMem}(SK, s) \).

3. The adversary repeatedly sends pairs of RAM programs \( (M_0^i, M_1^i) \) to the challenger, along with a time bound \( T_i \), and the challenger sends back \( M_b^i \leftarrow \text{GbPrg}(SK, M_b^i, T_i, i) \). Each pair \( (M_0^i, M_1^i) \) is chosen adaptively after seeing \( M_b^{i-1} \).

4. The adversary outputs a guess \( b' \).

Let \( ((M_0^1, M_1^1), \ldots, (M_0^d, M_1^d)) \) denote the sequence of pairs of machines output by the adversary. The adversary is said to win if \( b' = b \) and:

- Sequentially executing \( M_0^1, \ldots, M_0^d \) on initial memory configuration \( s \) yields the same transcript as executing \( M_1^1, \ldots, M_1^d \).
- Each \( M_b^i \) runs in time at most \( T_i \) and space at most \( S \).
**Definition 6.1.** A garbling scheme is *fixed-transcript secure* if for all p.p.t. algorithms $\mathcal{A}$, there is a negligible function negl so that $\mathcal{A}$’s probability of winning the game is at most $\frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

**Theorem 6.1.** Assuming the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and an adaptive positional accumulator, there is a fixed-transcript secure garbling scheme.

**Proof.** We give a construction and prove its security. As in [CH16], our construction follows that of [KLW15]. In addition to our adaptive positional accumulator, we use [KLW15]’s splittable signatures and cryptographic iterators, defined in Section 2.7 and 2.8.

Setup$(1^\lambda, S)$ samples $\text{Acc.PP} \leftarrow \text{Acc.Setup}(1^\lambda, S)$ and samples a PPRF $F$.

GbMem$(SK, s) \rightarrow \hat{s}$ computes an accumulator $\text{ac}_s$ corresponding to $s$, generates $(\text{sk}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{Spl.Setup}(1^\lambda; F(0, 0))$ and computes $\sigma_s \leftarrow \text{Spl.Sign}(\text{sk}, (\perp, \perp, \text{ac}_s, \text{ReadWrite}(0 \mapsto 0)))$. $\hat{s}$ is then defined as a memory configuration which contains both $(\text{ac}_s, \sigma_s)$ and $\text{store}_0$.

GbPrg$(SK, M_i, T_i, i) \rightarrow \hat{M}_i$ first transforms $M_i$ so that its initial state is $\perp$. Note this can be done without loss of generality by hard-coding the “real” initial state in the transition function. GbPrg then computes $\hat{C}_i \leftarrow \text{iO}(C_i)$, where $C_i$ is described in Algorithm 1. Finally, we define $\hat{M}_i$ not by its transition function, but by pseudocode, as the RAM machine which:

1. Reads $(\text{ac}_0, \sigma_0)$ from memory (recall these were inserted under the names $(\text{ac}_s, \sigma_s)$). Define $\sigma_0 = \text{ReadWrite}(0 \mapsto 0), q_0 = \perp$, and $\text{itr}_0 = \perp$.
2. For $i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$:
   a. Compute $\text{store}_{i+1}, \text{ac}_{i+1}, v_i, \pi_i \leftarrow \text{Acc.Update}(\text{Acc.PP, store}_i, \text{op}_i)$.
   b. Compute $\text{out}_i \leftarrow \hat{C}_i(i, q_i, \text{itr}_i, \text{ac}_i, \text{op}_i, \sigma_i, v_i, \text{ac}_{i+1}, \pi_i)$.
   c. If $\text{out}_i$ parses as $(y, \sigma)$, then write $(\text{ac}_{i+1}, \sigma)$ to memory, output $y$, and terminate.
   d. Otherwise, $\text{out}_i$ must parse as $(q_{i+1}, \text{itr}_{i+1}, \text{ac}_{i+1}, \text{op}_{i+1}), \sigma_{i+1}$.

We note that $\hat{M}_i$ can be compiled from $\hat{C}_i$ and $\text{Acc.PP}$. This means that later, when we prove security, it will suffice to analyze a game in which the adversary receives $\hat{C}_i$ instead of $M_i$. This also justifies our relatively informal description of $\hat{M}_i$.

| **Input:** | Time $t$, state $q$, iterator $\text{itr}$, accumulator $\text{ac}$, operation $\text{op}$, signature $\sigma$, memory value $v$, new accumulator $\text{ac}'$, proof $\pi$ |
| **Data:** | Puncturable PRF $F$, RAM machine $M_i$ with transition function $\delta_i$, Accumulator verification key $\text{vk}_\text{Acc}$, index $i$, iterator public parameters $\text{itr}.\text{PP}$, time bound $T_i$ |
| 1 | $(\text{sk}, \text{vk}) \leftarrow \text{Spl.Setup}(1^\lambda; F(i, t));$ |
| 2 | if $t > T_i$ or $\text{Spl.Verify}(\text{vk}, (q, \text{itr}, \text{ac}, \text{op}), \sigma) = 0$ or $\text{Acc.Verify}(\text{vk}_\text{Acc}, \text{ac}, \text{op}, \text{ac}', v, \pi) = 0$ then return $\perp$; |
| 3 | $\text{out} \leftarrow \delta_i(q, v);$ |
| 4 | if $\text{out} \in Y$ then |
| 5 | $(\text{sk}', \text{vk}') \leftarrow \text{Spl.Setup}(1^\lambda; F(i + 1, 0));$ |
| 6 | return out, $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}', (\perp, \perp, \text{ac}', \text{ReadWrite}(0 \mapsto 0))$ | |
| 7 | else |
| 8 | Parse out as $(q', \text{op}')$; |
| 9 | $\text{itr}' \leftarrow \text{itr}.\text{Iterate}(\text{itr}.\text{PP}, (q, \text{itr}, \text{ac}, \text{op}));$ |
| 10 | $(\text{sk}', \text{vk}') \leftarrow \text{Spl.Setup}(1^\lambda; F(i, t + 1));$ |
| 11 | return $(q', \text{itr}', \text{ac}', \text{op}'), \text{Sign}(\text{sk}', (q', \text{itr}', \text{ac}', \text{op}'))$ |

**Algorithm 1:** Transition function for $\hat{M}_i$, with memory verified by a signed accumulator.
Correctness and efficiency are easy to verify.

We show that the challenger in the real security game is indistinguishable from one for which the adversary’s view is independent of $b$. We present a sequence of hybrid games $H_0, \ldots, H_{t+1}$, and show that all p.p.t. algorithms $A$ have negligibly different advantages in adjacent games. In each hybrid, the memory query is answered as in the real game.

**Hybrid $H_0$** In hybrid $H_0$, we add a “B”-track for execution to $C_i$. Instead of just checking that $((q, \text{op}, \text{ac}, \text{itr}), \sigma)$ is accepted under $\text{vk}_i^A$, we also allow it to be accepted under $\text{vk}_i^B$, which is derived from a different puncturable PRF $F_B$. In this second case, we proceed as before except that we compute with $\delta^0_i$ instead of $s_i$, and we sign the eventual outputs using $\text{sk}_j^B$, instead of $\text{sk}_j^A$.

The indistinguishability of this change follows by $O(t)$ applications of the indistinguishability of punctured keys, together with the security of $i\text{O}$. In particular, we can add any functionality we want (by IO) under an always-rejecting $\text{vk}_{i,j,\emptyset}$ verification key, and then indistinguishably replace $\text{vk}_{i,j,\emptyset}$ with $\text{vk}_B$. We start by modifying the last time step, and work backwards because under $\text{vk}_{i,j}$, we use the signing key $\text{sk}_{j+1}^B$. By working backwards, we avoid the issue that $\text{vk}_{i,j,\emptyset}$ is not indistinguishable from $\text{vk}_{i,j}$ if also given $\text{sk}_{i,j}^B$.

**Hybrids $H_t$** In hybrid $H_t$ for $1 \leq i \leq \ell + 1$, the first $i-1$ program queries are answered differently. For $1 \leq j \leq i-1$, the circuits $C_j$ have hard-coded the transition function for $M_j^q$ instead of $M_j^\ell$. The challenger computes $s_j = \text{NextMem}(M_j^q(s_{j-1}))$, and hard-codes the corresponding accumulator $\text{ac}_{s_j}$ into the circuit $C_j$. The resulting circuit is illustrated in Algorithm 3.

It remains to show that $H_i \approx H_{i+1}$. This is shown using the techniques of [KLW15]. The main difference is that in our setting the positional accumulator needs to be adaptively secure.

1. We hard-code $\text{vk}_{i,0}^A$ and $\text{vk}_{i,0}^B$, and puncture $F_A$ and $F_B$ at $\{(i,0)\}$. This change preserves functionality and is hence indistinguishable by $i\text{O}$.

2. We replace $\text{vk}_{i,0}^A$ and $\text{vk}_{i,0}^B$ by keys punctured on the sets $M \setminus \{(q_i,0,\text{itr}_i,0,\text{ac}_i,0,\text{op}_i,0)\}$ and $\{(q_i,0,\text{itr}_i,0,\text{ac}_i,0,\text{op}_i,0)\}$ respectively. These changes are indistinguishable by the (selective) indistinguishability of punctured keys.

3. The verification key for the accumulator $\text{vk}_{\text{acc}}$ is generated by $\text{SetupEnforceVerify}(\text{PP}, (\text{op}_i,0))$ instead of $\text{SetupVerify}(\text{PP})$. This is again indistinguishable by the positional accumulator’s indistinguishability of enforcing setup. We note this holds even though $\text{op}_i,0$ and $\text{ac}_i,0$ may be chosen adversarially after observing the positional accumulator’s public parameters.

4. At time 0, we use $\delta^0_i$ instead of $\delta^1_i$ (on both tracks $A$ and $B$). By the hypothesis that $M_i^q$ and $M_i^\ell$ have the same transcripts, we know that $\delta^0_i(q_i,0,v_i,0) = \delta^1_i(q_i,0,v_i,0)$. Because in steps 2 and 3 we have already made our verification keys perfectly binding, this change is indistinguishable by $i\text{O}$.

5. The verification key for the accumulator $\text{vk}_{\text{acc}}$ is generated normally as $\text{SetupVerify}(\text{PP})$ instead of $\text{SetupEnforceVerify}(\text{PP}, (\text{op}_i,0))$. This is again indistinguishable by the positional accumulator’s adaptively enforcing setup.

6. We modify $C_i$ so that at time 0, instead of deciding to sign with $\text{sk}_{i,1}^A$ or $\text{sk}_{i,1}^B$ based on which branch we are in, we decide by looking at $(q, \text{itr}, \text{ac}, \text{op})$. Namely, we use $\text{sk}_{i,1}^A$ if and only if $(q, \text{itr}, \text{ac}, \text{op}) = (q_i,0,\text{itr}_i,0,\text{ac}_i,0,\text{op}_i,0)$. This is functionally equivalent because of how we have punctured the verification keys $\text{vk}_{i,0}^A$ and $\text{vk}_{i,0}^B$, and hence is indistinguishable by $i\text{O}$. Note the ‘A’ branch and ‘B’ branch are now identical.

7. We generate $\text{itr}.\text{PP}$ using $\text{SetupEnforce}$ so that $\text{itr}' = \text{itr}_{i,1}$ if and only if $(q,\text{itr},\text{ac},\text{op})$ is equal to $(q_i,0,\text{itr}_i,0,\text{ac}_i,0,\text{op}_i,0)$. This change is indistinguishable by the iterator’s (selective) setup indistinguishability.
8. Instead of choosing whether to use $sk_A^i$ or $sk_B^i$ based on the value of $(q, itr, ac, op)$, we choose based on the value of $(q', itr', ac', op')$. This is functionally equivalent because $itr'$ is equal to $itr_{i,1}$ (and in fact $(q', ac', op')$ is equal to $(q_{i,1}, ac_{i,1}, op_{i,1})$) if and only if $(q, itr, ac, op)$ is equal to $(q_{i,0}, itr_{i,0}, ac_{i,0}, op_{i,0})$, and therefore this change is indistinguishable by the security of $iO$.

9. We generate $itr_PP$ normally, which is indistinguishable by the iterator’s (selective) indistinguishability of setup.

10. Instead of checking whether the signature $\sigma$ on $(q, ac, itr)$ verifies under one of $vk_A^0$ (which is punctured at $M \setminus \{(q_{i,0}, itr_{i,0}, ac_{i,0}, op_{i,0})\}$) and $vk_B^0$ (which is punctured at $\{q_{i,0}, itr_{i,0}, ac_{i,0}, op_{i,0}\}$), we only check that it verifies under the unpunctured $vk_A^i$. This is indistinguishable by the splittable signature’s splitting indistinguishability property.

11. We unpuncture $F_A$ and $F_B$ at $(i, 0)$ and un-hardcode $vk_A^i$ and $vk_B^i$. This is functionally equivalent and hence indistinguishable by $iO$.

12. We repeat steps 1 through 11 for timestamps 1 through the worst-case running time bound $T$ instead of just for timestamp 0 as was described above. In this way, we progressively change the computation from using $\delta_i^0$ ($M_i^0$’s transition function) to $\delta_i$ ($M_i^1$’s transition function), starting at the beginning of the computation.

---

| Input: Time $t$, state $q$, iterator $itr$, accumulator $ac$, operation $op$, signature $\sigma$, memory value $v$, new accumulator $ac'$, proof $\pi$ |
| Data: Puncturable PRFs $F_A$ and $F_B$, RAM machine $M_i$ with transition function $\delta_i$, Accumulator verification key $vk_{Acc}$, index $i$, iterator public parameters $itr_PP$, time bound $T_i$ |
| 1  $(sk_A, vk_A) \leftarrow$ Spl.Setup($1^k; F_A(i, t))$; |
| 2  $(sk_B, vk_B) \leftarrow$ Spl.Setup($1^k; F_B(i, t))$; |
| 3  if $t > T_i$ or Acc. Verify($vk_{Acc}, ac, op, ac', v, \pi) = 0$ then return ⊥; |
| 4  if Spl. Verify($vk_A, (q, itr, ac, op), \sigma) = 1$ then track := ’A’; |
| 5  else if Spl. Verify($vk_B, (q, itr, ac, op), \sigma) = 1$ then track := ’B’; |
| 6  else return ⊥; |
| 7  out $\leftarrow$ $\delta_i(q, v)$; |
| 8  if out $\in Y$ then |
| 9     $(sk', vk') \leftarrow$ Spl.Setup($1^k; F_{track}(i + 1, 0))$; |
| 10     return out, Sign$(sk', (\bot, \bot, ac', ReadWrite(0 \mapsto 0))$; |
| 11  else |
| 12     Parse out as $(q', op')$; |
| 13     $itr' \leftarrow itr._iterate(itr_PP, (q, itr, ac, op))$; |
| 14     $(sk', vk') \leftarrow$ Spl.Setup($1^k; F_{track}(i, t + 1))$; |
| 15     return $(q', itr', ac', op'),$ Sign$(sk', (q', itr', ac', op'))$ |

Algorithm 2: Transition function for hybrid $M_i$, with memory verified by an accumulator.

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7 Fixed-Access Garbling

Fixed-access security is defined in the same way as fixed-transcript security, but the left and right machines produced by $A$ do not have to have the same transcripts for $A$ to win - they may not have the same intermediate states, but only need to perform the same memory operations.

**Definition 7.1** (Fixed-access security). We define fixed-access security via the following game.

---
\textbf{Input}: Time $t$, state $q$, iterator $itr$, accumulator $ac$, operation $op$, signature $\sigma$, memory value $v$, new accumulator $ac'$, proof $\pi$

\textbf{Data}: Puncturable PRFs $F_A$ and $F_B$, RAM machine $M^0_i$ with transition function $\delta^0_i$, Accumulator verification key $vk_{\text{Acc}}$, index $i$, iterator public parameters $\text{Itr}$, operation $ac$, accumulator $ac_{s_j}$, time bound $T_i$. 

1. $(sk_A, vk_A) \leftarrow \text{Spl.Setup}(1^\lambda; F_A(i, t))$;
2. $(sk_B, vk_B) \leftarrow \text{Spl.Setup}(1^\lambda; F_B(i, t))$;
3. if $t > T_i$ or Acc.Verify($vk_{\text{Acc}}, ac, op, ac', v, \pi) = 0$ then return $\perp$;
4. if Spl.Verify($vk_A, (q, itr, ac, op), \sigma) = 1$ then track $=: A'$;
5. else if Spl.Verify($vk_B, (q, itr, ac, op), \sigma) = 1$ then track $=: B'$;
6. else return $\perp$;
7. out $\leftarrow \delta^0_i(q, v)$;
8. if out $\in Y$ then
9. \hspace{1em} $(sk', vk') \leftarrow \text{Spl.Setup}(1^\lambda; F_{\text{track}}(i + 1, 0))$;
10. \hspace{1em} return out, Sign$(sk', (\perp, \perp, ac_{s_j}, \text{ReadWrite}(0 \mapsto 0))$;
11. else
12. \hspace{1em} $itr' \leftarrow \text{Itr.Iterate(Itr PP, (q, itr, ac, op));}
13. \hspace{1em} (sk', vk') \leftarrow \text{Spl.Setup}(1^\lambda; F_{\text{track}}(i, t + 1))$;
14. \hspace{1em} return $(q', itr', ac', op'), \text{Sign}(sk'(q', itr', ac', op'))$)

**Algorithm 3**: Response to $j^{th}$ program query, with hard-coded final accumulator value.

1. The challenger samples $SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, S)$ and $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.
2. The adversary sends a memory configuration $s$ to the challenger. The challenger sends back $\text{GbMem}(SK, s)$.
3. The adversary repeatedly sends pairs of RAM programs $(M^0_i, M^1_i)$ to the challenger, together with a time bound $1^{T_i}$, and the challenger sends back $M^b_i \leftarrow \text{GbPrg}(SK, M^b_i, T_i, i)$. Each pair $(M^0_i, M^1_i)$ is chosen adaptively after seeing $M^b_{i-1}$.
4. The adversary outputs a guess $b'$.

Let $((M^0_1, M^1_1), \ldots, (M^0_l, M^1_l))$ denote the sequence of pairs of machines output by the adversary. The adversary is said to win if $b' = b$ and:

- Sequentially executing $M^0_1, \ldots, M^0_l$ on initial memory configuration $s$ yields the same transcript as executing $M^1_1, \ldots, M^1_l$, except that the local states can be different.
- Each $M^b_i$ runs in time at most $T_i$ and space at most $S$.

A garbling scheme is said to have fixed-access security if all p.p.t. adversaries $A$ win in the game above with probability less than $1/2 + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

To achieve fixed-access security, we adapt the exact same technique from [CH16]: xoring the state with a pseudorandom function applied on the local time $t$. The PRF keys used in different machines are sampled independently.

**Theorem 7.1.** If there is a fixed-transcript garbling scheme, then there is a fixed-access garbling scheme.

**Proof.** Suppose $(\text{Setup'}, \text{GbMem'}, \text{GbPrg'})$ is a fixed-transcript garbling scheme. We define and prove the security of a fixed-access garbling scheme $(\text{Setup}, \text{GbMem}, \text{GbPrg})$.

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, S)$ samples $SK' \leftarrow \text{Setup'}(1^\lambda, S)$, sets it as $SK$. 

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Proof. This follows from the underlying fixed-transcript garbling.

Claim 7.1.1. $H_i \approx H_{i,0}$ and $H_{i-1} \approx H_{i,T_i}$.

Proof. This follows from the underlying fixed-transcript garbling.

Claim 7.1.2. For every $j \in \{0, \ldots, T_i - 1\}$, $H_{i,j} \approx H_{i,j+1}$.

Proof. We introduce another intermediate hybrid $H_{i,j,0}$, in which $c^* = q_{i,T_i-j} \oplus F_i(T_i - j)$. The indistinguishability of $H_{i,j}$ and $H_{i,j,0}$ follows from the pseudorandomness of the (selectively) puncturable PRF $F_i$ on $T_i - j$. The indistinguishability of $H_{i,j,0}$ and $H_{i,j+1}$ follows from the underlying fixed-transcript garbling. So we have shown that $H_{i,j} \approx H_{i,j,0} \approx H_{i,j+1}$.

The proof completes by combining the claims above.
8 Fixed-Address Garbling

Fixed-address security is defined in the same way as fixed-access security, but the left and right machines produced by $A$ do not need to make the same memory operations for $A$ to win - their memory operations only need to access the same addresses. Additionally, the adversary $A$ now provides not only a single memory configuration $s_0$, but two memory configurations $s_0^0$ and $s_0^1$. The challenger returns $\text{GbMem}(SK, s_0^t)$. In keeping with the spirit of fixed-address garbling, we require $s_0^0$ and $s_0^1$ to have the same set of addresses storing non-$\epsilon$ values.

**Definition 8.1 (Fixed-address security).** We define fixed-address security via the following game.

1. The challenger samples $SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, S)$ and $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.
2. The adversary sends the initial memory configurations $s_0^0, s_0^1$ to the challenger. The challenger sends back $s_0^t \leftarrow \text{GbMem}(SK, s_0^t)$.
3. The adversary repeatedly sends pairs of RAM programs $(M_0^i, M_1^i)$ to the challenger, together with a time bound $1^{T_i}$, and the challenger sends back $M_b^i \leftarrow \text{GbPrg}(SK, M_b^i, T_i, i)$. Each pair $(M_0^i, M_1^i)$ is chosen adaptively after seeing $M_b^{i-1}$.
4. The adversary outputs a guess $b'$.

Let $((s_0^0, s_0^1), (M_0^1, M_1^1), \ldots, (M_0^0, M_1^0))$ denote the sequence of pairs of memory configurations and machines output by the adversary. The adversary is said to win if $b' = b$ and:

- $\{a : s_0^0(a) \neq \epsilon\} = \{a : s_0^1(a) \neq \epsilon\}$.
- The sequence of addresses accessed and the outputs during the sequential execution of $M_0^1, \ldots, M_0^\ell$ on initial memory configuration $s_0^0$ is the same as from executing $M_1^1, \ldots, M_1^\ell$ on $s_0^1$.
- Each $M_b^i$ runs in time at most $T_i$ and space at most $S$.
- $|M_0^i| = |M_1^i|, i = 1, \ldots, \ell$.

A garbling scheme is said to have fixed-address security if all p.p.t. adversaries $A$ win in the game above with probability less than $1/2 + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Our construction of fixed-address garbling is almost the same with the two-track solution in [CH16], with a slight modification at the way to “encrypt” the memory configuration. In [CH16], the memory configurations are xored with different puncturable PRF values in the two tracks, where the PRFs are applied on the time $t$ and address $a$. In this work, the PRFs are applied on the execution index $i$ and time $t$, not on the address $a$. This is enough for our purpose, because in each execution index $i$ and step $t$, the machine only writes on a single address (for the initial memory configuration, the index is assigned as 0, and different timestamps will be assigned on different addresses). By this modification, we are able to prove adaptive security based on selective secure puncturable PRF, and adaptively secure fixed-access garbling.

We note that, even if the address $a$ is included in the domain of PRF, as in [CH16], the construction is still adaptively secure if the underlying PRF is based on GGM’s tree construction. Here we choose to present the simplified version which suffices for our purpose.

**Construction 8.1.** Given a fixed-access garbling scheme $(\text{Setup}', G\text{bMem}', G\text{bPrg}')$, we define a fixed-address garbling scheme $(\text{Setup}, G\text{bMem}, G\text{bPrg})$:

1. $(\text{Setup}(1^\lambda))$ samples $SK' \leftarrow \text{Setup}'(1^\lambda)$ and puncturable PRFs $F_A$ and $F_B$.
2. $\text{GbMem}(SK, s)$ outputs $\text{GbMem}'(SK', s_0^t)$, where
   
   $s_0^t(a) = \begin{cases} 
   (0, -a, F_A(0, -a) \oplus s_0(a), F_B(0, -a) \oplus s_0(a)) & \text{if } s_0(a) \neq \epsilon \\
   \epsilon & \text{otherwise}
   \end{cases}$
Recall that in our construction, if the adversary’s view is independent of $b$.

We give a sequence of hybrid games, starting with the real game $\text{GbPrg}(SK, M_i, T_i, i)$ and using a fixed-address garbling scheme. This will imply that in the real security game, all adversaries have advantage at most $1/2 + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

If $(\text{Setup}, \text{GbMem}, \text{GbPrg})$ is a fixed-access garbling scheme, then Construction 8.1 is a fixed-address garbling scheme.

**Theorem 8.2.**

**Proof.**

We give a sequence of hybrid games, starting with the real game $H^b$, and ending with one in which the adversary’s view is independent of $b$. We show that the adversary’s advantage differs negligibly in each pair of adjacent games. This will imply that in the real security game, all adversaries have advantage at most $1/2 + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

The hybrid structure follows closely from [CH16]. Purely for ease of informal exposition, we think of the machines $M^b_1, \ldots, M^b_T$ as being concatenated into one RAM machine $M = M^b$ with running time at most $T$.

Recall that in our construction, if $M^b$ would write $v^b_i$ to address $s^b_i$ at time $t$, then $\hat{M}$ writes $(F_A(t) \oplus v^b_i, F_B(t))$ to $s^b_i$. Our hybrids make the following changes to the way in which the challenger generates $M$ and $\tilde{s}_0$:

1. $\tilde{s}_0$ is now defined as
   
   $$\tilde{s}_0(a) = \begin{cases} (F_A(-a) \oplus s^b_0(a), F_B(-a) \oplus s^b_0(a)) & \text{if } s^b_0(a) \neq \epsilon \\ \epsilon & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

   This is indistinguishable by the puncturable PRF security of $F_B$, because the contents on “B”-track are not decrypted at all in the real garbled program.

2. Let $v^b_1, \ldots, v^b_T$ denote the values that $M^b$ would write when executed on $s^b$. For $i = 1, \ldots, T$, we have a hybrid in which:
   
   - On timesteps $t < i$, $\hat{M}$ writes $(F_A(t) \oplus v^b_i, F_B(t) \oplus v^b_i)$.
   - On subsequent timesteps, $\hat{M}$ writes $(F_A(t) \oplus v^b_i, F_B(t))$.

   Here, the addresses which $\hat{M}$ accesses are determined by the implicit internal execution of $M^b$.

These hybrids are indistinguishable by puncturable PRF security together with fixed-access security: one can freely puncture $F_B$ at $i$ and hard-code its value because no other point in the computation uses $F_B(i)$.

3. Now that $M^b$ and $M^0$ are both being implicitly executed in parallel, we determine where $\hat{M}$ writes by following $M^0$. This is indistinguishable by fixed-access security because $M^0$ and $M^b$ access the same addresses.

4. Symmetrically to step 1, we define another sequence of hybrids for $i = T, \ldots, 1$, in which:
   
   - On timesteps $t < i$, $\hat{M}$ writes $(F_A(t) \oplus v^b_i, F_B(t) \oplus v^b_i)$.
   - On subsequent timesteps, $\hat{M}$ writes $(F_A(t), F_B(t) \oplus v^b_i)$.
Lemma 8.3. $H^b \approx H_{1,0,b,0}$.
Proof. The initial memory configurations in \( H^b \) and \( H_{0,0,b,0} \) differ in the “B”-track. Because \( M^b_i \) and \( M^b_{i,0,b,0} \) don’t “decrypt” the contents in the “B”-track, \( s^b(a) \oplus F_B(0, -a) \) and \( s^0(a) \oplus F_B(0, -a) \) are indistinguishable by the pseudorandomness of \( F_B \) on \( (0, -a), a \in \{ a : s^0(a) \neq c \} \).

The RAM machine \( M^b_i \) and \( M^b_{i,0,b,0} \) have the exact same functionality and are accessing the same memory configuration, so the garbling of them are indistinguishable following the fixed-access security. □

Lemma 8.4. For \( i \in \{2, ..., \ell\} \), \( H_{i-1,T_{i-1},b,0} \approx H_{i,0,b,0} \).

Proof. This follows directly from the underlying fixed-access security. □

Lemma 8.5. For \( i \in \{1, 2, ..., \ell\}, z \in \{0, 1, ..., T_i - 1\}, H_{i,z,b,0} \approx H_{i,z+1,b,0} \).

Proof. For each \( i \) and \( z \), we introduce one more intermediate hybrid \( H_{i,z,b,0,0} \), where the adversary receives

\[ s^b_{i-1,0,b,0} \cdot M'_{i,1,b,0} \cdot M'_{i-1,1,b,0} \cdot M'_{i,z,b,0,0} \cdot M'_{i+1,0,b,0} \cdot \cdots \cdot M'_{\ell,b,0,0} \]

The RAM machine \( M'_{i,z,b,0,0} \) is defined by algorithm 8. The hard-coded ciphertext \( c^* \) in \( H_{i,z,b,0,0} \) is \( F_B(i, z) \oplus v'_B \). The difference of \( H_{i,z,b,0} \) and \( H_{i,z,b,0,0} \) are

1. The \( i \)th RAM machine \( M'_{i,z,b,0} \) versus \( M'_{i,z,b,0,0} \).

2. In the other RAM machines, \( F_B \) is also punctured on \( (i, z) \). Note that this won’t change the functionality of \( M'_{i,T_{i-1},b,0} \cdot \cdots \cdot M'_{i-1,1,b,0} \cdot M'_{i+1,0,b,0} \cdot \cdots \cdot M'_{\ell,b,0,0} \), since the first \( i-1 \) machines won’t read or write with index \( i \), and the last \( \ell - i \) ones won’t read “B”-track or write with index \( i \).

```
Input: State \((t_q, q_A, q_B)\), memory symbol \((i_{in}, t_{in}, c_A, c_B)\)
Data: \(i, z\), RAMs \( M^b_i \), \( M^0_i \), PPRFs \( F_A, F_B^* = F_B(i, z) \), ciphertext \( c^* \).
1. out_A \leftarrow M^b_i(q_A, F_A(i_{in}, t_{in}) \oplus c_A);
2. if out_A \in Y then return out_A;
3. Parse out_A as \((q'_A, \text{ReadWrite}(addr' \rightarrow v'_A))\);
4. if \( t_q < z \) then
5. \hspace{10pt} out_B \leftarrow M^0_i(q_B, F_B^*(i_{in}, t_{in}) \oplus c_B);
6. Parse out_B as \((q'_B, \text{ReadWrite}(addr' \rightarrow v'_B))\);
7. \hspace{10pt} op' := \text{ReadWrite}(addr' \rightarrow \langle i, t_q, F_A(i, t_q) \oplus v'_A, F_B^*(i, t_q) \oplus v'_B \rangle);
8. else if \( t_q = z \) then
9. \hspace{10pt} out_B \leftarrow M^0_i(q_B, F_B^*(i_{in}, t_{in}) \oplus c_B);
10. Parse out_B as \((q'_B, \text{ReadWrite}(addr' \rightarrow v'_B))\);
11. \hspace{10pt} op' := \text{ReadWrite}(addr' \rightarrow \langle i, t_q, F_A(i, t_q) \oplus v'_A, c^* \rangle);
12. else
13. \hspace{10pt} op' := \text{ReadWrite}(addr' \rightarrow \langle i, t_q, F_A(i, t_q) \oplus v'_A, F_B^*(i, t_q) \oplus v'_A \rangle);
14. return \((t_q + 1, q'_A, q'_B), \text{op'}\).
```

Algorithm 8: \( M'_{i,z,b,0,0} \).

Note that \( H_{i,z,b,0,0} \approx H_{i,z+1,b,0} \) by the underlying fixed-access garbling. If we define \( c^* = F_B(i, z) \oplus v'_A \), the RAM machines has the same functionality with those in hybrid \( H_{i,z,b,0} \). By the pseudorandomness of the punctured PRF \( F_B \) on \( (i, z) \), \( H_{i,z,b,0} \approx H_{i,z,b,0} \). This shows that \( H_{i,z,b,0} \approx H_{i,z+1,b,0} \). □

Combining Lemma 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5, we obtain that \( H^b \approx H_{1,0,b,0} \approx \cdots \approx H_{\ell,0,b,0} \approx H_{1,T_{\ell-1},b,0} \).

The rest of the proof can be done symmetrically: First, instead of returning out_A, return out_B, by the underlying fixed-access garbling. Then switch the computation on “A”-track from running \( M^b \) on \( s^b \), and prove the indistinguishability of them analogously via the puncturability \( F_A \) and the underlying fixed-access security. Finally \( b \) is not in the view of the adversary. □
9 Full Garbling

In order to construct a fully secure garbling scheme, we will need to make use of an oblivious RAM (ORAM) \[GO96\] to hide the addresses accessed by the machine.

9.1 Oblivious RAMs

An ORAM is a probabilistic scheme for memory storage and access that provides obliviousness for access patterns with sublinear access complexity. It is convenient for us to model an ORAM scheme as follows. We define a deterministic algorithm \(\text{OProg}\) so that for a security parameter \(1^\lambda\), a memory operation \(\text{op}\), and a space bound \(S\), \(\text{OProg}(1^\lambda, \text{op}, S)\) outputs a probabilistic RAM machine \(M_{\text{op}}\). More generally, for a RAM machine \(M\), we can define \(\text{OProg}(1^\lambda, M, S)\) as one which executes \(\text{OProg}(1^\lambda, \text{op}, S)\) for every operation \(\text{op}\) output by \(M\).

We also define \(\text{OMem}\), a procedure for making a memory configuration oblivious, in terms of \(\text{OProg}\), as follows: Given a memory configuration \(s\) with \(n\) non-empty addresses \(a_1, \ldots, a_n\), all less than or equal to a space bound \(S\), \(\text{OMem}(1^\lambda, s, S)\) iteratively samples

\[s'_0 \leftarrow \epsilon^N\]

and

\[s'_i = \text{NextMem} (\text{OProg}(1^\lambda, \text{ReadWrite}(a_i \mapsto s(a_i)), S), s'_{i-1})\]

and outputs \(s'_n\).

Correctness An ORAM is said to be correct if for all memory operations \(\text{op}_1, \ldots, \text{op}_\ell\) accessing addresses less than or equal to \(S\), it holds with high probability that

\[ (M_{\text{op}_1}; \ldots; M_{\text{op}_\ell})(\epsilon^N) = (\text{op}_1; \ldots; \text{op}_\ell)(\epsilon^N) \]

That is, when one sequentially executes \(M_{\text{op}_1}, \ldots, M_{\text{op}_\ell}\) on the initially empty memory, \(M_{\text{op}_\ell}\) outputs the same result as \(\text{op}_\ell\), when executing \(\text{op}_1, \ldots, \text{op}_\ell\) from the initially empty memory.

Efficiency An ORAM is said to have multiplicative space overhead \(\zeta : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}\) if for all memory operations \(\text{op}\) accessing an address less than or equal to a space bound \(S\), and for all memory configurations \(s\), it holds with probability 1 that

\[\text{Space}(M_{\text{op}}, s) \leq \zeta(S, \lambda) \cdot S\]

An ORAM is said to have multiplicative time overhead \(\eta : \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}\) if for all memory operations \(\text{op}\) and all memory configurations \(s\), it holds with probability 1 that

\[\text{Time}(M_{\text{op}}, s) = \eta(S, \lambda)\]

Security (Strong Localized Randomness). We now define a notion of strong localized randomness\(^1\) for an ORAM, which is satisfied by the ORAM construction of \[CP13\].

Informally, we consider obliviously executing operations \(\text{op}_1, \ldots, \text{op}_t\) on a memory of size \(S\), i.e. executing machines \(M_{\text{op}_1}; \ldots; M_{\text{op}_t}\) using a random tape \(R \in \{0,1\}^N\). This yields a sequence of addresses \(\vec{A} = \vec{a}_1 \parallel \cdots \parallel \vec{a}_t\). There should be a natural way to decompose each \(\vec{a}_i\) (in the Chung-Pass ORAM, we consider each recursive level of the construction) such that we can write \(\vec{a}_i = \vec{a}_{i,1} \parallel \cdots \parallel \vec{a}_{i,m}\). Our notion of strong localized randomness requires that (after having fixed \(\text{op}_1, \ldots, \text{op}_t\)), each \(\vec{a}_{i,j}\) depends on some small substring of \(R\), which does not influence any other \(\vec{a}_{i',j'}\). In other words:

- There is some \(\alpha_{i,j}, \beta_{i,j} \in \mathbb{N}\) such that \(0 < \beta_{i,j} - \alpha_{i,j} \leq \text{poly}(\log S)\) and such that \(\vec{a}_{i,j}\) is a function of \(R_{\alpha_{i,j}, \ldots, R_{\beta_{i,j}}}\).
- The collection of intervals \([\alpha_{i,j}, \beta_{i,j}]\) for \(i \in \{1, \ldots, t\}, j \in \{1, \ldots, m\}\) is pairwise disjoint.

\(^1\)This notion is similar but stronger to the “localized randomness” defined in \[CH16\]
Formally, we say that an ORAM with multiplicative time overhead $\eta$ has strong localized randomness if:

- For all $\lambda$ and $S$, there exists $m$ and $\tau_1 < \tau_2 < \cdots < \tau_m$ with $\tau_1 = 1$ and $\tau_m = \eta(S, \lambda) + 1$, and there exist circuits $C_1, \ldots, C_m$, such that for all memory operations $\text{op}_1, \ldots, \text{op}_t$, there exist pairwise disjoint intervals $I_1, \ldots, I_m \subseteq \mathbb{N}$ such that:
  
  - If we write
    $$\bar{A}_1 \cdots \bar{A}_t \leftarrow \text{addr}(M^{\text{op}_1}_t; \ldots; M^{\text{op}_t}_t, c^N)$$
    
    where $R = R_1 \cdots R_t$ denotes the randomness used by the oblivious accesses and each $\bar{A}_i$ denotes the addresses accessed by $M^{\text{op}_i}_t$, then $(\bar{A}_i)_{[\tau_i, \tau_{i+1})} = C_j(R_{I_j})$ with high probability over $R$. Here $R_{I_j}$ denotes the contiguous substring of $R$ indexed by the interval $I_j \subset [\|R\|]$.
  
  - With high probability over the choice of $R_{N \setminus I_j}$, $\bar{A}_1, \ldots, \bar{A}_{t-1}$ does not depend on $R_{I_j}$ as a function.

- $\tau_j$ and the circuits $C_j$ are computable in polynomial time given $1^\lambda$, $S$, and $j$.
- $I_j$ is computable in polynomial time given $1^\lambda$, $S$, $\text{op}_1, \ldots, \text{op}_t$, and $j$.

**Definition 9.1.** An $S$-ORAM is an ORAM where correctness, efficiency, and security need hold only if the space bound is at most $S$.

**Claim 9.0.1.** For any $c$, there is a $c$-ORAM with multiplicative space overhead of 1 and multiplicative time overhead of $c$.

**Proof.** This is just the brute-force ORAM which accesses the entire memory for each underlying memory operation. Since this ORAM is deterministic, the localized randomness property is trivial.

**Claim 9.0.2.** There is an ORAM with polylogarithmic time and space overhead and localized randomness.

**Proof.** Suppose we have an $S$-ORAM with multiplicative space overhead $\zeta$ and time overhead $\eta$. We show how to build a $2S$-ORAM with multiplicative space overhead $\zeta'(N) = \zeta(N) + \text{poly}(\log N, \lambda)$, and multiplicative time overhead $\eta'(N) = \eta(N) + \text{poly}(\log N, \lambda)$. Our base case will be the brute-force ORAM.

Next we construct an ORAM with strong localized randomness.

**Construction 9.1 (Chung-Pass).** Given a memory operation $\text{op} = \text{ReadWrite}(a \mapsto v')$ with alphabet $\Sigma$, we construct a RAM machine $M_{\text{op}}$, which we describe with pseudocode:

$M_{\text{op}}$’s view of memory has two parts:

- A memory $\mathcal{M}$ with $\zeta(S) \cdot S$ addresses, which we think of as a smaller ORAM.
- A complete binary tree $T$ of depth $\log S$. Each node in $T$ is a bucket with capacity sufficient to hold $\lambda$ tuples of the form $(\text{addr}, \text{pos}, \sigma_0, \sigma_1) \in [S] \times [S] \times \Sigma \times \Sigma$.

$M_{\text{op}}$ does the following:

1. Samples a random position $\text{pos}'$, and executes $\text{pos} \leftarrow \text{OProg}(1^\lambda, \text{ReadWrite}(\lfloor \frac{a}{2} \rfloor \mapsto \text{pos}' \setminus S)$ on $\mathcal{M}$.
2. On the path from the root of $T$ to the $\text{pos}'$th leaf, $M_{\text{op}}$ searches for a tuple $(\text{addr}, \text{pos}, \sigma_0, \sigma_1)$ such that $\text{addr} = \lfloor \frac{a}{2} \rfloor$. If such a tuple is found, $M_{\text{op}}$ records $\sigma_0$ and $\sigma_1$, and then overwrites the tuple with $\bot$.
3. Adds a tuple $(\lfloor \frac{a}{2} \rfloor, \text{pos}', \sigma'_0, \sigma'_1)$ to the root bucket, where
   $$\sigma'_b = \begin{cases} v' & \text{if } b \equiv a \pmod{2} \\ \sigma_b & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
4. Traverses a path from the root to a random leaf of $T$, moving every tuple $(\text{addr}, \text{pos}, \sigma_0, \sigma_1)$ to the deepest node on the path which is a prefix of $\text{pos}$. 


Returns $\sigma a \mod 2$.

Correctness and efficiency of Construction 9.1 are easy to see, assuming the following lemma, which is proved in [CP13].

**Lemma 9.2.** For all memory operations $o_1, \ldots, o_t$, with high probability, Construction 9.1 will not exceed the capacity of any of its buckets.

**Claim 9.2.1.** Construction 9.1 has strong localized randomness.

**Proof.** We show how each of the chunks of addresses accessed by Construction 9.1 are functions of prior contiguous chunks of randomnesses.

- In step 1, we access the addresses that the $S$-ORAM would access; hence we get localized randomness for free.
- In step 2, we access all nodes on the path to $pos$, where $pos$ was retrieved from the $S$-ORAM in step 1. $pos$ was chosen at random and written to the $S$-ORAM on the last time that $M$ accessed $a$ (or $a'$ with $\lfloor a'/2 \rfloor = \lfloor a/2 \rfloor$).
- In step 4, we simply choose a fresh random path and access all of the nodes on that path.

**Remark 1.** A more usual definition of obliviousness requires that if two machines $M_0$ and $M_1$ have the same running time, then the addresses accessed by $OProg(M_0)$ and $OProg(M_1)$ will be statistically close. Although it is not immediately clear, our definition of strong localized randomness in fact implies this definition.

### 9.2 Full Garbling Construction

**Theorem 9.3.** If there is an efficient fixed-address garbling scheme, then there is an efficient full garbling scheme.

**Proof.** Suppose we are given a fixed-address garbling scheme $(\text{Setup}', \text{GbMem}', \text{GbPrg}')$ and an oblivious RAM $OProg$ with space overhead $\zeta$ and time overhead $\eta$. We construct a full garbling scheme $(\text{Setup}, \text{GbMem}, \text{GbPrg})$.

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, T, S)$ samples $SK' \leftarrow \text{Setup}'(1^\lambda, \eta(S, \lambda) \cdot T, \zeta(S, \lambda) \cdot S)$ and samples a PPRF $F : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \times \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_R}$, where $\ell_R$ is the length of randomness needed to obliviously execute one memory operation. We will sometimes think of the domain of $F$ as $[2^{2\lambda}]$.

$\text{GbMem}(SK, s_0)$ outputs $\text{GbMem}'(SK', \text{OMem}(1^\lambda, s_0, S))$.

$\text{GbPrg}(SK, M_i, i)$ outputs $\text{GbPrg}'(SK', OProg(1^\lambda, M_i, S)^F(i, i))$.

**Simulator** To show security of this construction, we define the following simulator.

1. The adversary provides $S$, and an initial memory configuration $s_0$. Say that $s_0$ has $n$ non-$\epsilon$ addresses. The simulator samples $SK' \leftarrow \text{Setup}'(1^\lambda, \zeta(S, \lambda) \cdot S)$ and sends $\text{GbMem}'(SK', \text{OMem}(1^\lambda, 0^n, S))$ to the adversary.

2. When the adversary makes a query $M_i, 1^{t_i}$, the simulator computes $s_i = \text{NextMem}(M_i, s_{i-1})$, $t_i = \text{Time}(M_i, s_{i-1})$, and $y_i = M_i(s_{i-1})$, and outputs $\text{GbPrg}'(SK', D_i, \eta(S, \lambda) \cdot T_i, i)$, where $D_i$ is a "dummy program". As described in Algorithm 9, $D_i$ independently samples addresses to access for $t_i$ steps, and then outputs $y_i$. 

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Data: Underlying running time $t_i$, output value $y_i$, PPRF $G_i$, circuits $C_1, \ldots, C_m$ guaranteed by localized randomness

```
for $t = 1, \ldots, t_i$ do
    for $k = 1, \ldots, m$ do
        $r_k \leftarrow G_i(t, k)$;
        Access addresses given by $C_k(r_k)$
    return $y_i$.
```

Algorithm 9: Pseudocode for a dummy RAM machine which simulates pseudorandom addresses to access using the circuits $C_1, \ldots, C_m$ given in the definition of localized randomness, and then outputs $y_i$.

The rest of this section is devoted to proving that this simulator is indistinguishable from the real challenger.

**Hybrid $H_{i,j}$** We show indistinguishability by giving a sequence of “hybrid” challengers $H_{i,j}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, \ell$ and $j = 1, \ldots, T$, and show that they are all indistinguishable. In hybrid $H_{i,j}$, the challenger:

- Answers the memory query $s_0$ with $GbMem'(SK', OMem(1^\lambda, s_0, S))$ as in the real game.
- For $k < i$, the $k$th query $M_k, 1^{T_k}$ is answered with $GbPrg'(SK', OProg(1^\lambda, M_k, S), \eta(S, \lambda) \cdot T_k, k)$, just as in the real game.
- The $i$th query $M_i, 1^{T_i}$ is answered with $GbPrg(SK', N_{i,j}, \eta(S, \lambda) \cdot T_i, i)$, where $N_i$ is a RAM machine which acts like $M_i$ for the first $j$ underlying steps, and acts like $D_i$ for the rest of the steps. $N_{i,j}$ is described more precisely in Algorithm 10.
- For $k > i$, the $k$th query $M_k, 1^{T_k}$ is answered with $GbPrg'(SK', D_k, \eta(S, \lambda) \cdot T_k, k)$ for a dummy program $D_k$, just as in the simulator.

```
Data: RAM machine $M_i$, Underlying running time $t_i$, output value $y_i$, PPRFs $F$ and $G_i$
1 op := ReadWrite(0 → 0);
2 for $t = 1, \ldots, j$ do
    Execute $OProg(op)^{F(i,t)}$, yielding a result $v$;
3 Run one step of $M_i$ with memory input $v$, yielding a new value for op;
4 for $t = j + 1, \ldots, t_i$ do
    for $k = 1, \ldots, m$ do
        $r_k := G_i(t, k)$;
        Access addresses given by $C_k(r_k)$
    return $y_i$.
```

Algorithm 10: Pseudocode for a RAM machine $N_{i,j}$ which starts acting like a dummy machine after $j$ steps.

$H_{\ell+1,0}$ is identical to the real world, so it remains to show the following three claims:

**Claim 9.3.1.** $H_{i,T} \approx H_{i+1,0}$.

*Proof.* This follows directly from fixed-address security, because the semi-dummy machine $N_{i,0}$ accesses the same addresses and has the same output as the dummy machine $D_i$. $\square$

**Claim 9.3.2.** $H_{1,0}$ is indistinguishable from the simulator.
Proof. This follows from fixed-address security, and from the fact that the set of non-empty addresses in $\text{OMem}(1^\lambda, s, S)$ is simulatable given $\|s\|_0$.

Our main claim is the following:

**Claim 9.3.3.** $H_{i,j} \approx H_{i,j+1}$.

**Proof.** Recall the definition of an ORAM with strong localized randomness. The addresses accessed in the oblivious execution of $\text{op}_{i,j}$ consist of $m$ different chunks $\vec{a}_1, \ldots, \vec{a}_m$. Each $\vec{a}_k$ depends on some contiguous substring of the random tape $R$, indexed by an interval $I_k$, via a circuit $C_k$. The interval $I_k$ depends on the underlying operations being executed.

We present $m + 1$ hybrids $H_{i,j,m}$ through $H_{i,j,0}$. In hybrid $H_{i,j,k}$, the addresses $\vec{a}_1, \ldots, \vec{a}_k$ are generated honestly, and addresses $\vec{a}_{k+1}, \ldots, \vec{a}_m$ are simulated as $C_{k+1}(r_{k+1}), \ldots, C_m(r_m)$ for pseudorandomly chosen $r_{k+1}, \ldots, r_m$.

We prove that no adversary $A$ can distinguish between $H_{i,j,k}$ and $H_{i,j,k} - 1$ if $A$ first commits to $2\log(T \cdot \ell_R)$ bits about what it is going to do. Specifically, we suppose that $A$ initially sends $I_k$ (which depends on the machines $M_1, \ldots, M_i$). In this case, we can show the indistinguishability of $H_{i,j,k}$ and $H_{i,j,k} - 1$ by making a sequence of indistinguishable changes.

1. The puncturable PRF $F$ sampled during $\text{Setup}$ is punctured at $I_k$, and has the values $F(I_k)$ hard-coded in all machines. This is indistinguishable because of fixed-address security of the underlying garbling scheme.

2. The machine $M'_i$ has $\vec{a}_k$, the addresses accessed in the $k^{th}$ chunk of $M_i$'s $j^{th}$ operation, hard-coded. This also is indistinguishable because of fixed-address security.

3. The hard-coded values $F(I_k)$ are replaced by truly random values $r_k$, and $\vec{a}_k$ is replaced by $C_k(r_k)$. This is indistinguishable by the security of the punctured PRF $F$.

4. $r_k$ is replaced by $F(I_k)$ and $F$ is unpunctured. By localized randomness properties – namely, no other $\vec{A}$ depends on $R_{I_k}$ and $I_1, \ldots, I_m$ are pairwise disjoint – this doesn’t affect the addresses accessed by $M'_1, \ldots, M'_m$. So this is indistinguishable by fixed-address security.

5. $C_k(r_k)$ is replaced by $C_k(G_i(j,k))$. This is indistinguishable by the puncturable PRF security of $G_i$.

It suffices to analyze this semi-selective game because (by a usual complexity leveraging technique) if no adversary has advantage $\epsilon$ in this game, then no adversary has advantage $\epsilon' = \epsilon / (T \ell_R)^2$ in distinguishing $H_{i,j,k}$ from $H_{i,j,k-1}$. Since $T$, $\ell_R$, and $S$ are polynomial in the security parameter, if $\epsilon$ is negligible then $\epsilon'$ is as well.

10 Database delegation

We define security for the task of delegating a database to an untrusted server. Here we have a database owner that wishes to keep the database on a remote server. Over time, the owner wishes to update the database and query it. Furthermore, the owner wishes to enable other parties to do so as well, perhaps under some restrictions. Informally, the security requirements from the scheme are:

**Verifieriability:** The data owner should be able to verify the correctness of the answers to its queries, relative to the up-to-date state of the database following all the updates made so far.
Secrecy of database and queries: For queries made by the database owner and honest third parties, the adversary does not learn anything other than the size of the database, the sizes and runtimes of the queries, and the sizes of the answers. This holds even if the answers to the queries become partially or fully known by other means. For queries made by adversarially controlled third parties, the adversary learns in addition only the answers to the queries. (We note that these two secrecy requirement are incomparable and complementary. In the case of honest third parties the adversary does not see the processing done on the receiver side, but then she should not learn anything. In the case of dishonest third parties the adversary sees all the computation involved in the evaluation of the query, but then the answer is not protected. This distinction will become clearer in the actual definition.)

More precisely, a database delegation scheme consists of the following algorithms:

**DBDelegate:** Initial delegation of the database. Takes as input a plaintext database, and outputs an encrypted database (to be sent to the server), public verification key \( vk \) and private master key \( msk \) to be kept secret.

**Query:** Delegation of a query or database update. Takes a RAM program and the master secret key \( msk \), and outputs a delegated program to be sent to the server and a secret key \( sk_{enc} \) that allows recovering the result of the evaluation from the returned response.

**Eval:** Evaluation of a query or update. Takes a delegated database \( \tilde{D} \) and a delegated program \( \tilde{M} \), runs \( \tilde{M} \) on \( \tilde{D} \). Returns a response value \( a \) and an updated database \( \tilde{D}' \).

**AnsDecVer:** Local processing of the server’s answer. Takes the public verification key \( vk \), the private decryption key \( sk_{enc} \) and outputs either an answer value or \( \perp \).

**Security.** Essentially, the security requirement is that the scheme UC-emulates the database delegation ideal functionality \( F_{dd} \) defined as follows. (For simplicity, it is assumed that the database owner is uncorrupted.)

1. When activated for the first time, \( F_{dd} \) expects to obtain from the activating party (the database owner) a database \( D \). It then records \( D \) and discloses \( |D| \) to the adversary.

2. In each subsequent activation by the owner, that specifies a program \( M \) and party \( P \), run \( M \) on \( D \), obtain an answer \( a \) and a modified database \( D' \), store \( D' \) and disclose \( P \) and the length of \( a \) to the adversary. If the adversary returns \( ok \) then output \((M, a)\) to \( P \).

To make the requirements imposed by \( F_{dd} \) more explicit, we also formulate the definition in terms of a distinguishability game. Specifically, we require that there exists a simulator \( \text{Sim} \) such that no adversary (environment) \( A \) will be able to distinguish whether it is interacting with the real or the ideal games as described here:

**Real game** \( REAL_A(1^\lambda) \):

1. \( A \) provides a database \( D \), receives the public outputs of \( \text{DBDelegate}(D) \).

2. \( A \) repeatedly provides a program \( M_i \) and a bit that indicates either honest or dishonest. In response, \( \text{Query} \) is run to obtain \( sk_{enc} \) and \( \tilde{M}_i \). \( A \) obtains \( \tilde{M}_i \), and in the dishonest case also the decryption key \( sk_{enc} \).

3. In the honest case \( A \) provides the server’s output \( \text{out}_i \) for the execution of \( M_i \), and obtains in response the result of \( \text{AnsDecVer}(vk, sk_{enc}, \text{out}_i) \).
Ideal game $IDEAL_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda)$:

1. $\mathcal{A}$ provides a database $D$, receives the output of $\text{Sim}(|D|)$.
2. $\mathcal{A}$ repeatedly provides a program $\mathcal{M}_i$ and either honest or dishonest. In response, $\mathcal{M}_i$ runs on the current state of the database $D$ to obtain output $a$ and modified database $D'$. $D'$ is stored instead of $D$. In the case of dishonest, $\mathcal{A}$ obtains $\text{Sim}(a, s, t)$, where $s$ is the description size of $\mathcal{M}$ and $t$ is the runtime of $\mathcal{M}$. In the case of honest, $\mathcal{A}$ obtains $\text{Sim}(s, t)$.
3. In the honest case $\mathcal{A}$ provides the server’s output $\text{out}_i$ for the execution of $\mathcal{M}_i$, and obtains in response $\text{Sim}(\text{out}_i)$, where here $\text{Sim}(\text{out}_i)$ can take one out of only two values: either $a$ or ⊥.

**Definition 10.1.** We say that a delegation scheme $(\text{DBDelegate}, \text{Query}, \text{Eval}, \text{AnsDecVer})$ is secure if there exists a simulator $\text{Sim}$ such that no $\mathcal{A}$ can guess with non-negligible advantage whether it is interacting in the real interaction or in the ideal interaction with $\text{Sim}$.

**Theorem 10.1.** If there exist adaptive succinct garbled RAM schemes with persistent memory, unforgeable signature schemes and symmetric encryption schemes with pseudorandom ciphertexts, then there exist secure database delegation schemes with succinct queries and efficient delegation, query preparation, query evaluation, and response verification.

**Proof.** Let $(\text{Setup}, \text{GbMem}, \text{GbPrg})$ be an adaptively secure garbling scheme for RAM with persistent memory. We construct a database delegation scheme as follows:

\[\text{DBDelegate}(1^\lambda): \text{Run } SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, D) \text{ and } ˜D \leftarrow \text{GbMem}(SK, D, |D|). \text{ Generate signing and verification keys } (vk_{\text{sign}}, sk_{\text{sign}}) \text{ for the signature scheme. Set } msk \leftarrow (SK, sk_{\text{sign}}) \text{ and } vk \leftarrow vk_{\text{sign}}.\]

**Query**($\mathcal{M}_i, msk, pk$): Generate a symmetric encryption key $sk_{\text{enc}}$. Generate the extended version of $\mathcal{M}'_i$ of $\mathcal{M}_i$ as in Algorithm 11. Output $\hat{\mathcal{M}} \leftarrow \text{GbPrg}(SK, \mathcal{M}'_i|sk_{\text{sign}}, sk_{\text{enc}}, i)$

**Eval**: Run $\hat{\mathcal{M}}$ on $\hat{D}$ and return the output value $a$ and an updated database $\hat{D}'$.

**AnsDecVer**($i, \text{out}, vk, sk$): Parse $\text{out} = (\text{ct}, \sigma)$. If $\text{Verify}(vk, \text{ct}||i, \sigma) \neq 1$, output ⊥. Else output $\text{Dec}(sk, \text{ct})$.

We construct a simulator $\text{Sim}$ for the delegation scheme as follows:

**DBDelegate**: $\text{Sim}$ generates signing and verifications keys $sk_{\text{sign}}, vk_{\text{sign}}$. $\text{Sim}$ runs the simulator $\text{Sim}_{\text{GRAM}}$ for a GRAM scheme to obtain a simulated garbled database $\hat{D}$. It provides $\hat{D}$ and $vk_{\text{sign}}$ as output to the adversary $\mathcal{A}$.
Query: If Sim is executed with inputs \((a, s, t)\) on the \(i\)-th iteration, it generates symmetric encryption key \(sk_{\text{enc}}\). It computes \(ct = \text{Enc}(sk_{\text{enc}}, a)\), \(\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_{\text{sign}}, ct \mid i)\) and runs the simulator \(\text{Sim}_{\text{GRAM}}\) with inputs \((ct \mid i, \sigma)\) to obtain simulated garbled RAM \(M_i\). It returns \(M_i\) and \(sk_{\text{enc}}\) to \(A\).

If Sim is executed with inputs \((s, t)\) on the \(i\)-th iteration, it generates a random value \(ct\), computes \(\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_{\text{sign}}, ct \mid i)\) and runs the simulator \(\text{Sim}_{\text{GRAM}}\) with inputs \((ct \mid i, \sigma)\) to obtain simulated garbled RAM \(M_i\). It returns \(M_i\) to \(A\).

AnsDecVer: If Sim executes on input \(out_i\), then it outputs AnsDecVer(vk, sk_{\text{enc}}, out_i).

To show validity of Sim, We construct the following hybrids.

**\(H_0\):** This is the real world execution.

**\(H_1\):** In this hybrid we start using the simulator for the GRAM \(\text{Sim}_{\text{GRAM}}\) to generate simulated database \(D'\). We generate the signature scheme keys \((vk_{\text{sign}}, sk_{\text{sign}})\) honestly. We also use \(\text{Sim}_{\text{GRAM}}\) to generate the garbling for the programs \(M'_i\) given inputs \(ct_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk_{\text{enc}}, out) \mid i, \sigma_i \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_{\text{sign}}, ct_i)\) and \(out\) is the result of the evaluation of \(M_i\) with the memory state after the previous \(i - 1\) evaluations.

The indistinguishability of \(H_0\) and \(H_1\) follows from the simulation security of the GRAM scheme.

**\(H_2\):** In this hybrid for all honest executions for machines \(M_i\) where the adversary \(A\) does not get \(sk_{\text{enc}}\), we run \(\text{Sim}_{\text{GRAM}}\) to generate the garbling for the programs \(M'_i\) with inputs \(ct_i \leftarrow r\), where \(r\) is a random value, and \(\sigma_i \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_{\text{sign}}, ct_i)\).

The indistinguishability of \(H_1\) and \(H_2\) follows from the pseudorandom property of symmetric encryption ciphertexts.

Now, consider the event where, in execution \(H_2\), the adversary provides a value \(out_i\) such that \(\text{AnsDecVer}(vk, sk_{\text{enc}}, out_i) = a'\) and \(a \neq a' \neq \bot\), where \(a\) is the correct answer for the \(i\)-th query in this execution. We argue that:

- Conditioned on this event not happening, \(A\)'s view of \(H_2\) is identical to its view in the ideal interaction.
- The event happens with at most negligible probability. Otherwise \(A\) can be used to break the unforgeability of the signature scheme. To see this consider an interaction between \(A\) and \(\text{Sim}\) that is the same as \(H_2\) except that \(\text{Sim}\) queries the signature scheme challenger \(C\) to obtain verification key \(vk_{\text{sign}}\) and signatures \(\sigma_i\) for the values \(ct_i\). Then \(out_i\), which \(A\) returns, contains a signature of a message that \(\text{Sim}\) has not queried. Hence, \(\text{Sim}\) breaks the unforgeability property of the signature scheme.

\(\Box\)

### 11 Reusable GRAM with Persistent Memory

Our basic construction of adaptively secure garbled RAM can naturally support program/input reusability. That is, the garbler is able to garble the RAM machines or the inputs once, and reuse them for many times. In the previous works [GKP+13, GHRW14], reusability is viewed as a security feature. The techniques are built up in order to reuse the resulting garbled program.

In this work, we are not trying to reuse the garbled program. Instead, we take the advantage of the persistent memory, and simply store the plaintext code of the RAM program/input into the memory. To evaluate, garble an universal RAM machine that executes the specific machine and input in the memory. Since the size of universal RAM machine is independent of the sizes of the input and program it takes [CR73], the size of garbled universal RAM is only dependent on the security parameter. So the reusability we achieve is essentially an efficiency feature, which shares the same spirit with previous works but instantiated in a way that is closer to the real world scenario.
Definition 11.1 (Reusable garbled RAM). A garbling scheme is said to be reusable if the total time of garbling the program $M$ to be reused for $d$ times is $O(|M|, \text{poly}(\lambda)) + d \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$; the total time of garbling the input $x$ to be reused for $d$ times is $O(|x|, \text{poly}(\lambda)) + d \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

Our construction use the basic adaptively secure garbled scheme $(\text{Setup}', \text{GbMem}', \text{GbPrg}')$ as a black-box. Without loss of generality, we store the plaintext code of machines and inputs under an index system $I = (I.\text{setup}, I.\text{store}, I.\text{fetch})$, where $I.\text{setup}$ outputs initialization parameter $i$, $I.\text{store}(i, z)$ stores $z$ under index $i$, $I.\text{fetch}(i)$ outputs the content stored at index $i$. There is a data structure where the size of $\text{store}(i, z)$ and $\text{fetch}(i)$ are $\log(|i|)$, and they run in time $\log(|i|) + |z|$.

Construction 11.1 (Reusable garbled RAM). Let $(\text{Setup}', \text{GbMem}', \text{GbPrg}')$ be an adaptively secure garbled RAM with persistent memory, we construct one that is reusable $(\text{Setup}, \text{GbMem}, \text{GbInp}, \text{GbPrg}, \text{GbExe})$ as follows:

- $(\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, S)$ runs $SK' \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, S)$, $i \leftarrow I.\text{setup}$.  
- $\text{GbMem}(SK, \bot, S)$ by default, runs $s'_0 \leftarrow \text{GbMem}'(SK', \bot, S)$ to garble an empty memory for initialization.  
- $\text{GbInp}(SK, x, i)$ runs $W'_i \leftarrow \text{GbPrg}'(SK', W_{x,i}, i)$, where the functionality of $W_{x,i}$ is “$I.\text{store}(i, x_i)$, outputs $\bot$.” Then evaluate $W'_i$ on memory $s'_{i-1}$.  
- $\text{GbPrg}(SK, M,j)$ runs $W'_j \leftarrow \text{GbPrg}'(SK', W_{M,j}, j)$, where the functionality of $W_{M,j}$ is “$I.\text{store}(j, M_j)$, outputs $\bot$.” Then evaluate $W'_j$ on memory $s'_{j-1}$.  
- $\text{GbExe}(SK, i, j, g)$ runs $U'_i \leftarrow \text{GbPrg}'(SK', U_{i,j}, g)$, evaluate $U'_i$ on the garbled memory configuration $s'_{i-1}$. The functionality of $U_{i,j}$ is “$U(I.\text{fetch}(j), I.\text{fetch}(i))$”, where $U$ a universal RAM machine.

Correctness, (simulation-based) adaptive security, persistence of the memory follows directly from the basic scheme. The time cost of garbling a program or input is the same with the basic scheme. That is, the running time of the garbler is linear w.r.t. the size of the program or input. The total size of garbled programs produced to reuse a machine $M$ for $d$ times is

$$|\text{GbPrg}(SK, M,j)| + |\text{GbExe}(SK, i, j, g)| = O(|M|, \text{poly}(\lambda)) + d \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$$

The total size of garbled programs produced to reuse an input $x$ for $d$ times is

$$|\text{GbPrg}(SK, x, i)| + |\text{GbExe}(SK, i, j, g)| = O(|x|, \text{poly}(\lambda)) + d \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$$

The definition and construction can be easily generalized to the setting where a universal RAM machine takes more than 1 RAM machine, 1 input (cf. the decomposable garbling studied in [AIK11, AIKW15]).

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References


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