Paper 2015/1015
On Bitcoin as a public randomness source
Joseph Bonneau, Jeremy Clark, and Steven Goldfeder
Abstract
We formalize the use of Bitcoin as a source of publicly-verifiable randomness. As a side-effect of Bitcoin's proof-of-work-based consensus system, random values are broadcast every time new blocks are mined. We can derive strong lower bounds on the computational min-entropy in each block: currently, at least 68 bits of min-entropy are produced every 10 minutes, from which one can derive over 32 near-uniform bits using standard extractor techniques. We show that any attack on this beacon would form an attack on Bitcoin itself and hence have a monetary cost that we can bound, unlike any other construction for a public randomness beacon in the literature. In our simplest construction, we show that a lottery producing a single unbiased bit is manipulation-resistant against an attacker with a stake of less than 50 bitcoins in the output, or about US$12,000 today. Finally, we propose making the beacon output available to smart contracts and demonstrate that this simple tool enables a number of interesting applications.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Contact author(s)
- jbonneau @ cs stanford edu
- History
- 2015-10-19: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/1015
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/1015, author = {Joseph Bonneau and Jeremy Clark and Steven Goldfeder}, title = {On Bitcoin as a public randomness source}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/1015}, year = {2015}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1015} }