Paper 2015/097

Surreptitiously Weakening Cryptographic Systems

Bruce Schneier, Matthew Fredrikson, Tadayoshi Kohno, and Thomas Ristenpart

Abstract

Revelations over the past couple of years highlight the importance of understanding malicious and surreptitious weakening of cryptographic systems. We provide an overview of this domain, using a number of historical examples to drive development of a weaknesses taxonomy. This allows comparing different approaches to sabotage. We categorize a broader set of potential avenues for weakening systems using this taxonomy, and discuss what future research is needed to provide sabotage-resilient cryptography.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Sabotagecryptographic weaknessesbackdoors
Contact author(s)
rist @ cs wisc edu
History
2015-02-23: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/097
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/097,
      author = {Bruce Schneier and Matthew Fredrikson and Tadayoshi Kohno and Thomas Ristenpart},
      title = {Surreptitiously Weakening Cryptographic Systems},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/097},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/097}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/097}
}
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