Paper 2015/045
Reliable Information Extraction for Single Trace Attacks
Valentina Banciu, Elisabeth Oswald, and Carolyn Whitnall
Abstract
Side-channel attacks using only a single trace crucially
rely on the capability of reliably extracting side-channel
information (e.g. Hamming weights of intermediate target values)
from traces. In particular, in original versions of simple power
analysis (SPA) or algebraic side channel attacks (ASCA) it was
assumed that an adversary can correctly extract the Hamming
weight values for all the intermediates used in an attack. Recent
developments in error tolerant SPA style attacks relax this
unrealistic requirement on the information extraction and bring
renewed interest to the topic of template building or training
suitable machine learning classifiers.
In this work we ask which classifiers or methods, if any, are
most likely to return the true Hamming weight among their first
(say
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. DATE'15 Proceedings
- Keywords
- template attacksmachine learning
- Contact author(s)
- valentina banciu @ bristol ac uk
- History
- 2015-01-20: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/045
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/045, author = {Valentina Banciu and Elisabeth Oswald and Carolyn Whitnall}, title = {Reliable Information Extraction for Single Trace Attacks}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/045}, year = {2015}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/045} }