Paper 2015/037
Analysis and Enhancement of Desynchronization Attack on an Ultralightweight RFID Authentication Protocol
Da-Zhi Sun, Zahra Ahmadian, Yue-Jiao Wang, Mahmoud Salmasizadeh, and Mohammad Reza Aref
Abstract
As low-cost RFID tags become more and more ubiquitous, it is necessary to design ultralightweight RFID authentication protocols to prevent possible attacks and threats. We reevaluate Ahmadian et al.’s desynchronization attack on the ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol with permutation (RAPP). Our results are twofold: (1) we demonstrate that the probability of the desynchronization between the tag and the reader is 15/64 instead of 1/4 as claimed, when RAPP uses Hamming weight-based rotation; (2) we further improve the original attack and make the desynchronization more efficient.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- cryptanalysisidentification protocolRFID securityultralightweight protocolauthenticationdesynchronization attack
- Contact author(s)
- sundazhi @ tju edu cn
- History
- 2016-01-05: last of 3 revisions
- 2015-01-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/037
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/037,
author = {Da-Zhi Sun and Zahra Ahmadian and Yue-Jiao Wang and Mahmoud Salmasizadeh and Mohammad Reza Aref},
title = {Analysis and Enhancement of Desynchronization Attack on an Ultralightweight {RFID} Authentication Protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/037},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/037}
}
