Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/037

Analysis and Enhancement of Desynchronization Attack on an Ultralightweight RFID Authentication Protocol

Da-Zhi Sun and Zahra Ahmadian and Yue-Jiao Wang and Mahmoud Salmasizadeh and Mohammad Reza Aref

Abstract: As low-cost RFID tags become more and more ubiquitous, it is necessary to design ultralightweight RFID authentication protocols to prevent possible attacks and threats. We reevaluate Ahmadian et al.’s desynchronization attack on the ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol with permutation (RAPP). Our results are twofold: (1) we demonstrate that the probability of the desynchronization between the tag and the reader is 15/64 instead of 1/4 as claimed, when RAPP uses Hamming weight-based rotation; (2) we further improve the original attack and make the desynchronization more efficient.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols/cryptanalysis, identification protocol, RFID security, ultralightweight protocol, authentication, desynchronization attack

Date: received 15 Jan 2015, last revised 21 Jan 2015

Contact author: sundazhi at tju edu cn

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20150121:071902 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/037

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