In this paper, we propose a different approach to outsourcing computational tasks. We are not concerned with hiding the job or the data, but our main task is to ensure that the job is computed correctly. We also observe that not all contractors are malicious; rather, majority are rational. Thus, our approach brings together elements from cryptography, as well as game theory and mechanism design. We achieve the following results: (1) We incentivize all the rational contractors to perform the outsourced job correctly, (2) we guarantee high fraction (e.g., 99.9%) of correct results even in the existence of a relatively large fraction (e.g., 33%) of malicious irrational contractors in the system, (3) and we show that our system achieves these while being almost as efficient as running the job locally (e.g., with only 3% overhead). Such a high correctness guarantee was not known to be achieved with such efficiency.
Category / Keywords: applications / Outsourced Computation, Cloud Computation, Crowdsourcing, Malicious Contractors, Fair Payments Date: received 12 Dec 2014 Contact author: akupcu at ku edu tr Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20141218:033350 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2014/992 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion