Paper 2014/960

Non-Interactive Secure Multiparty Computation

Amos Beimel, Ariel Gabizon, Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Sigurd Meldgaard, and Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky

Abstract

We introduce and study the notion of non-interactive secure multiparty computation (NIMPC). An NIMPC protocol for a function f(x1,,xn) is specified by a joint probability distribution R=(R1,,Rn) and local encoding functions Enci(xi,Ri), 1<=i<=n. Given correlated randomness (R1,,Rn)RR, each party Pi, using its input xi and its randomness Ri, computes the message mi=Enci(xi,Ri). The messages m1,,mn can be used to decode f(x1,,xn). For a set T[n], the protocol is said to be T-robust if revealing the messages (Enci(xi,Ri))iT together with the randomness (Ri)iT gives the same information about (xi)iT as an oracle access to the function f restricted to these input values. Namely, a coalition can learn no more than the restriction of fixing the inputs of uncorrupted parties, which, in this non-interactive setting, one cannot hope to hide. For , the protocol is -robust if it is -robust for every of size at most and it is fully robust if it is -robust. A 0-robust NIMPC protocol for coincides with a protocol in the private simultaneous messages model of Feige et al.~(STOC 1994). In the setting of computational (indistinguishability-based) security, fully robust NIMPC is implied by multi-input functional encryption, a notion that was recently introduced by Goldwasser et al. (Eurocrypt 2014) and realized using indistinguishability obfuscation. We consider NIMPC in the information-theoretic setting and obtain unconditional positive results for some special cases of interest: Group products. For every (possibly non-abelian) finite group , the iterated group product function admits an efficient, fully robust NIMPC protocol. Small functions. Every function admits a fully robust NIMPC protocol whose complexity is polynomial in the size of the input domain (i.e., exponential in the total bit-length of the inputs). Symmetric functions. Every symmetric function , where is an input domain of constant size, admits a -robust NIMPC protocol of complexity . For the case where is a -out-of- threshold function, we get a fully robust protocol of complexity . On the negative side, we show that natural attempts to realize NIMPC using private simultaneous messages protocols and garbling schemes from the literature fail to achieve even 1-robustness.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2014
Keywords
secure multiparty computationobfuscationprivate simultaneous messages protocolsrandomized encoding of functionsgarbling schemesmulti-input functional encryption
Contact author(s)
amos beimel @ gmail com
History
2014-11-25: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/960
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/960,
      author = {Amos Beimel and Ariel Gabizon and Yuval Ishai and Eyal Kushilevitz and Sigurd Meldgaard and Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky},
      title = {Non-Interactive Secure Multiparty Computation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/960},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/960}
}
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