Paper 2014/959
Attacking Suggest Boxes in Web Applications Over HTTPS Using Side-Channel Stochastic Algorithms
Alexander Schaub, Emmanuel Schneider, Alexandros Hollender, Vinicius Calasans, Laurent Jolie, Robin Touillon, Annelie Heuser, Sylvain Guilley, and Olivier Rioul
Abstract
Web applications are subject to several types of attacks. In particular, side-channel attacks consist in performing a statistical analysis of the web traffic to gain sensitive information about a client. In this paper, we investigate how side-channel leaks can be used on search engines such as Google or Bing to retrieve the client's search query. In contrast to previous works, due to payload randomization and compression, it is not always possible to uniquely map a search query to a web traffic signature and hence stochastic algorithms must be used. They yield, for the French language, an exact recovery of search word in more than 30% of the cases. Finally, we present some methods to mitigate such side-channel leaks.
Note: Adding the cipher suite used after handshake between the server and our client in our experiments.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. CRiSIS 2014
- Contact author(s)
- sylvain guilley @ telecom-paristech fr
- History
- 2014-11-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/959
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/959,
author = {Alexander Schaub and Emmanuel Schneider and Alexandros Hollender and Vinicius Calasans and Laurent Jolie and Robin Touillon and Annelie Heuser and Sylvain Guilley and Olivier Rioul},
title = {Attacking Suggest Boxes in Web Applications Over HTTPS Using Side-Channel Stochastic Algorithms},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/959},
year = {2014},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/959}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/959}
}
