In this work, we construct the \textit{first} unidirectional, single-hop CCA-secure certificateless proxy re-encryption scheme \textit{without} \textit{pairing} by extending the PKI based construction of Chow et al. proposed in 2010. We prove its security in the random oracle model under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Prior to this work, the only secure certificateless proxy re-encryption scheme is due to Guo et al. proposed in 2013 using bilinear pairing. They proved their construction is RCCA-secure under $q$-weak Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. The construction proposed in this work is more efficient than that system and its security relies on more standard assumptions. We also show that the recently proposed construction of Yang et al. is insecure with respect to the security model considered in this work.
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption, Random Oracle, Computational Diffie-Hellman Original Publication (with minor differences): ACM Asia-CCS SCC 2015 Date: received 14 Nov 2014, last revised 9 Feb 2015 Contact author: akshayram1993 at gmail com Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20150210:062005 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2014/933 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion