Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/920

Simpler and More Efficient Rank Estimation for Side-Channel Security Assessment

Cezary Glowacz and Vincent Grosso and Romain Poussier and Joachim Schueth and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract: Rank estimation algorithms allow analyzing the computational security of cryptographic keys for which adversaries have obtained partial information thanks to leakage or cryptanalysis. They are particularly useful in side-channel security evaluations, where the key is known by the evaluator but not reachable with exhaustive search. A first instance of such algorithms has been proposed at Eurocrypt 2013. In this paper, we propose a new tool for rank estimation that is conceptually simpler and much more efficient than this previous proposal. It allows approximating the key rank of (128-bit, 256-bit) symmetric keys with very tight bounds (i.e. with less than one bit of error), almost instantaneously and with limited memory. It also scales nicely to larger (e.g. asymmetric) key sizes, for which the previous algorithm was hardly applicable.

Category / Keywords: implementation / side-channel analysis, certification, experimental cryptanalysis, security evaluation

Date: received 9 Nov 2014

Contact author: fstandae at uclouvain be

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20141110:070406 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2014/920

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