Paper 2014/913
Fully Leakage-Resilient Signatures Revisited: Graceful Degradation, Noisy Leakage, and Construction in the Bounded-Retrieval Model
Antonio Faonio, Jesper Buus Nielsen, and Daniele Venturi
Abstract
We construct new leakage-resilient signature schemes. Our schemes remain unforgeable against an adversary leaking arbitrary (yet bounded) information on the entire state of the signer (sometimes known as *fully* leakage resilience), including the random coin tosses of the signing algorithm.
The main feature of our constructions is that they offer a graceful degradation of security in situations where standard existential unforgeability is impossible. This property was recently put forward by Nielsen, Venturi, and Zottarel (PKC 2014) to deal with settings in which the secret key is much larger than the size of a signature. One remarkable such case is the so-called Bounded-Retrieval Model (BRM), where one intentionally inflates the size of the secret key while keeping constant the signature size and the computational complexity of the scheme.
Our main constructions have leakage rate
Note: Fixed minor inconsistencies.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. ICALP 2015
- Keywords
- leakage resilient cryptography
- Contact author(s)
- faonio @ di uniroma1 it
- History
- 2016-10-26: last of 2 revisions
- 2014-11-06: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/913
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/913, author = {Antonio Faonio and Jesper Buus Nielsen and Daniele Venturi}, title = {Fully Leakage-Resilient Signatures Revisited: Graceful Degradation, Noisy Leakage, and Construction in the Bounded-Retrieval Model}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/913}, year = {2014}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/913} }