Paper 2014/887
Hardware Implementation of Secure Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme
Pei Luo, Yu-Lun Lin, Zhen Wang, and Mark Karpovsky
Abstract
Shamir's secret sharing scheme is an effective way to distribute secret to a group of shareholders. But this scheme is vulnerable to cheaters and attackers and thus how to protect the system from cheating and attacks is a big problem. In this paper, we proposed to use robust codes and algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes to protect the secret sharing module. Simulation and synthesis results show that the proposed architecture can improve the security level significantly even under strong cheating and attack models with some extra area and timing overheads.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. High-Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE), 2014 IEEE 15th International Symposium on
- Keywords
- Secret sharing
- Contact author(s)
- silenceluo @ gmail com
- History
- 2014-10-30: last of 4 revisions
- 2014-10-30: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/887
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/887,
author = {Pei Luo and Yu-Lun Lin and Zhen Wang and Mark Karpovsky},
title = {Hardware Implementation of Secure Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/887},
year = {2014},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/887}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/887}
}
