Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/762

Access Control in Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation

James Alderman and Christian Janson and Carlos Cid and Jason Crampton

Abstract: Publicly Verifi able Outsourced Computation (PVC) allows devices with restricted resources to delegate expensive computations to more powerful external servers, and to verify the correctness of results. Whilst this is highly benefi cial in many situations, it also increases the visibility and availability of potentially sensitive data, and thus we may wish to limit the set of entities with access to input data and results. Additionally, within an organization it is extremely unlikely that every user would have uncontrolled access to all functionality. It is also not always reasonable to publish the results of a sensitive computation. Thus there is a need to apply access control mechanisms in PVC environments. In this work, we defi ne a new framework for Publicly Verifi able Outsourced Computation with Access Control (PVC-AC) that applies cryptographic enforcement mechanisms to address these concerns, and we provide a provably secure instantiation using Key Assignment Schemes. We also discuss example policies of interest in this setting.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation, Access Control Policies, Key Assignment Scheme

Original Publication (with major differences): ASIACCS 2015

Date: received 29 Sep 2014, last revised 25 Mar 2015

Contact author: Christian Janson 2012 at live rhul ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20150325:102818 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2014/762

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