Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/741
Eliminating Leakage in Reverse Fuzzy Extractors
André Schaller, Boris Skoric, Stefan Katzenbeisser
Abstract: In recent years Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed as a promising building block for security related scenarios like key storage and authentication. PUFs are physical systems and as such their responses are inherently noisy, precluding a straightforward derivation of cryptographic key material from raw PUF measurements. To overcome this drawback, Fuzzy Extractors are used to eliminate the noise and guarantee robust outputs. A special type are Reverse Fuzzy Extractors, shifting the computational load of error correction towards a computationally powerful verifier. However, the Reverse Fuzzy Extractor reveals error patterns to any eavesdropper, which may cause privacy issues (if the PUF key is drifting, the error pattern is linkable to the identity) and even security problems (if the noise is data-dependent and multiple protocol transcripts can be linked to the same user). In this work we investigate this leakage and propose a modified protocol that eliminates the problem.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Physically Unclonable Functions, Fuzzy Extractors, Authentication, Privacy, Security
Date: received 23 Sep 2014
Contact author: schaller at seceng informatik tu-darmstadt de
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20140926:083103 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2014/741
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