Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/665
Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking: A Smartcard Friendly Computation Paradigm in a Code, with Builtin Protection against Side-Channel and Fault Attacks
Julien Bringer and Claude Carlet and Hervé Chabanne and Sylvain Guilley and Houssem Maghrebi
Abstract: Secure elements, such as smartcards or trusted platform modules (TPMs), must be protected against implementation-level attacks.
Those include side-channel and fault injection attacks.
We introduce ODSM, Orthogonal Direct Sum Masking, a new computation paradigm that achieves protection against those two kinds of attacks.
A large vector space is structured as two supplementary orthogonal subspaces.
One subspace (called a code $\mathcal{C}$) is used for the functional computation,
while the second subspace carries random numbers.
As the random numbers are entangled with the sensitive data, ODSM ensures a protection against (monovariate) side-channel attacks.
The random numbers can be checked either occasionally, or globally, thereby ensuring a fine or coarse detection capability.
The security level can be formally detailed:
it is proved that monovariate side-channel attacks of order up to $d_\mathcal{C}-1$, where $d_\mathcal{C}$ is the minimal distance of $\mathcal{C}$, are impossible,
and that any fault of Hamming weight strictly less than $d_\mathcal{C}$ is detected.
A complete instantiation of ODSM is given for AES.
In this case, all monovariate side-channel attacks of order strictly less than $5$ are impossible,
and all fault injections perturbing strictly less than $5$ bits are detected.
Category / Keywords: implementation /
Original Publication (with minor differences): WISTP 2014
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-43826-8_4
Date: received 25 Aug 2014, last revised 28 Aug 2014
Contact author: sylvain guilley at telecom-paristech fr
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Clearer MAGMA code
Version: 20140828:234222 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2014/665
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