Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/613
A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305
Abstract: This note contains a security reduction to demonstrate that Langley's composition of Bernstein's ChaCha20 and Poly1305, as proposed for use in IETF protocols, is a secure authenticated encryption scheme.
The reduction assumes that ChaCha20 is a PRF, that Poly1305 is epsilon-almost-Delta-universal, and that the adversary is nonce respecting.
Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography /
Date: received 11 Aug 2014
Contact author: gordon procter 2011 at live rhul ac uk
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Version: 20140813:234043 (All versions of this report)
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