Paper 2014/589
Authenticated Key Exchange from Ideal Lattices
Jiang Zhang, Zhenfeng Zhang, Jintai Ding, Michael Snook, and Özgür Dagdelen
Abstract
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, such as IKE and SSL/TLS, have been widely used to ensure secure communication over the Internet. We present in this paper a practical and provably secure AKE protocol from ideal lattices, which is conceptually simple and has similarities to the Diffie-Hellman based protocols such as HMQV (CRYPTO 2005) and OAKE (CCS 2013). Our protocol does not rely on other cryptographic primitives---in particular, it does not use signatures---simplifying the protocol and resting the security solely on the hardness of the ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem. The security is proven in a version of the Bellare-Rogaway model, with enhancements to capture weak Perfect Forward Secrecy. We also present concrete choices of parameters for different security levels. A proof-of-concept implementation shows our protocol is a practical candidate post-quantum key exchange protocol.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Authenticaed Key ExchangeRLWEHQMV
- Contact author(s)
- jintai ding @ gmail com
- History
- 2014-09-30: last of 3 revisions
- 2014-07-30: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/589
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/589,
author = {Jiang Zhang and Zhenfeng Zhang and Jintai Ding and Michael Snook and Özgür Dagdelen},
title = {Authenticated Key Exchange from Ideal Lattices},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/589},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/589}
}
