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Paper 2014/534
Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem
Cong Chen and Thomas Eisenbarth and Ingo von Maurich and Rainer Steinwandt
Abstract
This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Contact author(s)
- teisenbarth @ wpi edu
- History
- 2014-07-08: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/534
- License
-
CC BY