Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem

Cong Chen; Thomas Eisenbarth; Ingo von Maurich; Rainer Steinwandt

Paper 2014/534

Differential Power Analysis of a McEliece Cryptosystem

Cong Chen, Thomas Eisenbarth, Ingo von Maurich, and Rainer Steinwandt

Abstract

This work presents the first differential power analysis of an implementation of the McEliece cryptosystem. Target of this side-channel attack is a state-of-the-art FPGA implementation of the efficient QC-MDPC McEliece decryption operation as presented at DATE 2014. The presented cryptanalysis succeeds to recover the complete secret key after a few observed decryptions. It consists of a combination of a differential leakage analysis during the syndrome computation followed by an algebraic step that exploits the relation between the public and private key.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
Contact author(s): teisenbarth @ wpi edu
History: 2014-07-08: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/534
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/534,
      author = {Cong Chen and Thomas Eisenbarth and Ingo von Maurich and Rainer Steinwandt},
      title = {Differential Power Analysis of a {McEliece} Cryptosystem},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/534},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/534}
}