Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/523

Fully Secure and Fast Signing from Obfuscation

Kim Ramchen and Brent Waters

Abstract: In this work we explore new techniques for building short signatures from obfuscation. Our goals are twofold. First, we would like to achieve short signatures with adaptive security proofs. Second, we would like to build signatures with fast signing, ideally significantly faster than comparable signatures that are not based on obfuscation. The goal here is to create an "imbalanced" scheme where signing is fast at the expense of slower verification.

We develop new methods for achieving short and fully secure obfuscation-derived signatures. Our base signature scheme is built from punctured programming and makes a novel use of the "prefix technique" to guess a signature. We find that our initial scheme has slower performance than comparable algorithms (e.g. EC-DSA). We find that the underlying reason is that the underlying PRG is called l^2 times for security parameter l.

To address this issue we construct a more efficient scheme by adapting the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali [GGM86] construction to form the basis for a new puncturable PRF. This puncturable PRF accepts variable-length inputs and has the property that evaluations on all prefixes of a message can be efficiently pipelined. Calls to the puncturable PRF by the signing algorithm therefore make fewer invocations of the underlying PRG, resulting in reduced signing costs.

We evaluate our puncturable PRF based signature schemes using a variety of cryptographic candidates for the underlying PRG. We show that the resulting performance on message signing is competitive with that of widely deployed signature schemes.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography, obfuscation, digital signatures

Date: received 4 Jul 2014

Contact author: kramchen at cs utexas edu

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Version: 20140707:064204 (All versions of this report)

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