Paper 2014/513
RSA meets DPA: Recovering RSA Secret Keys from Noisy Analog Data
Noboru Kunihiro and Junya Honda
Abstract
We discuss how to recover RSA secret keys from noisy analog data
obtained through physical attacks such as cold boot and side channel
attacks. Many studies have focused on recovering correct secret keys
from noisy binary data. Obtaining noisy binary keys typically involves
first observing the analog data and then obtaining the binary data
through quantization process that discards much information pertaining
to the correct keys. In this paper, we propose two algorithms for
recovering correct secret keys from noisy analog data, which are
generalized variants of Paterson et al.'s algorithm. Our algorithms
fully exploit the analog information. More precisely, consider observed
data which follows the Gaussian distribution
with mean
Note: This is the full version of our paper in CHES2014.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in CHES 2014
- Keywords
- RSAKey-RecoveryCold Boot AttackSide Channel AttackMaximum Likelihood
- Contact author(s)
- kunihiro @ k u-tokyo ac jp
- History
- 2014-07-01: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/513
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/513, author = {Noboru Kunihiro and Junya Honda}, title = {{RSA} meets {DPA}: Recovering {RSA} Secret Keys from Noisy Analog Data}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/513}, year = {2014}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/513} }