Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/501

WhirlBob, the Whirlpool variant of StriBob

Markku--Juhani O. Saarinen and Billy Bob Brumley

Abstract: WhirlBob is an AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) algorithm derived from the first round CAESAR candidate StriBob and the Whirlpool hash algorithm. As with StriBob, the reduced-size Sponge design has a strong provable security link with a standardized hash algorithm. The new design utilizes only the LPS or $\rho$ component of Whirlpool in flexibly domain-separated BLNK Sponge mode. The number of rounds is increased from 10 to 12 as a countermeasure against Rebound Distinguishing attacks. The $8 \times 8$ - bit S-Box used by Whirlpool and WhirlBob is constructed from $4 \times 4$ - bit ``MiniBoxes''. We report on fast constant-time Intel SSSE3 and ARM NEON SIMD WhirlBob implementations that keep full miniboxes in registers and access them via SIMD shuffles. This is an efficient countermeasure against AES-style cache timing side-channel attacks. Another main advantage of WhirlBob over StriBob (and most other AEADs) is its greatly reduced implementation footprint on lightweight platforms. On many lower-end microcontrollers the total software footprint of $\pi$+BLNK = WhirlBob AEAD is less than half a kilobyte. We also report an FPGA implementation that requires 4,946 logic units for a single round of WhirlBob, which compares favorably to 7,972 required for Keccak / Keyak on the same target platform. The relatively small S-Box gate count also enables efficient 64-bit bitsliced straight-line implementations. We finally present some discussion and analysis on the relationships between WhirlBob, Whirlpool, the Russian GOST Streebog hash, and the recent draft Russian Encryption Standard Kuznyechik.

Category / Keywords: WhirlBob, StriBob, Authenticated Encryption, Sponge Designs, Timing Attacks, Whirlpool, Streebog, CAESAR Competition.

Date: received 25 Jun 2014, last revised 15 Jun 2015

Contact author: mjos at iki fi

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Was accepted for publication at INSCRYPT '14 but the Author was unable to attend conference -- hence not in proceedings.

Version: 20150615:074436 (All versions of this report)

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]