

# Improved Short Lattice Signatures in the Standard Model

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## Abstract

We present a signature scheme provably secure in the standard model (no random oracles) based on the worst-case complexity of approximating the Shortest Vector Problem in ideal lattices within polynomial factors. The distinguishing feature of our scheme is that it achieves *short* signatures (consisting of a single lattice vector), and *relatively short* public keys (consisting of  $O(\log n)$  vectors.) Previous lattice schemes in the standard model with similarly *short* signatures, due to Boyen (PKC 2010) and Micciancio and Peikert (Eurocrypt 2012), had substantially longer public keys consisting of  $\Omega(n)$  vectors (even when implemented with ideal lattices). We also present a variant of our scheme that further reduces the public key size to just  $O(\log \log n)$  vectors and allows for a tighter security proof by making the signer stateful.

## 1 Introduction

Lattice based cryptography [Ajt04, AD97], originally an area of primarily theoretical interest, has seen a tremendous growth during the last decade, due both to substantial efficiency improvements obtainable using lattices with algebraic structure [HPS98, Mic07], and to the enormous versatility afforded by the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem [Reg09]. One of the problems that has received most attention so far, is that of lattice based signatures [LM08a, GPV08, Lyu09, Boy10, Rüc10, GLP12, Lyu12, DDLL13, BG14]. From a theoretical point of view, digital signatures can be constructed from any one-way function [Rom90, Lam79]. So, the existence of digital signature schemes based on the hardness of lattice problems directly follows from Ajtai’s seminal work [Ajt04]. But generic constructions are rather inefficient. Inputs and outputs of lattice based cryptographic functions typically consist of one or more  $\tilde{\Omega}(n)$ -dimensional vectors, where  $n$  is the security parameter. Generic digital signature constructions require  $n$  parallel applications of a one-way function. So, even if each one-way function takes as input a single vector, the resulting digital signatures consist of  $n$  vectors, and require  $\tilde{\Omega}(n^2)$  storage even when using algebraic lattices [Mic07]. So, finding efficient constructions of signatures directly based on hard lattice problems has been an important problem since the early days of lattice cryptography, with the main goal of finding “short” signatures, i.e., lattice signatures consisting of a single lattice vector.

The first direct constructions of lattice signatures were given in [LM08a] and [GPV08]. Both schemes achieved “short” signatures, consisting of a single lattice vector, but each work had its own pros and cons. On the one hand [LM08a] gave a scheme provably secure in the standard model of computation, and with very simple signing/verification procedures, but only provided a direct construction of one-time signatures: digital signature schemes that can be used to sign a single message. Such schemes can be turned into general purpose signature schemes with only a logarithmic loss in efficiency using standard tree constructions. However, these transformations can be quite expensive in practice, because they lead to signatures consisting of  $O(\log n)$  vectors. Given that signature size is often the most critical efficiency parameter affecting the practicality of a scheme, such signatures can no longer be considered “short”. On the other hand, [GPV08] gave a scheme that allowed to produce short signatures for arbitrarily many messages, but only offered heuristic security in the random oracle model. Moreover, the scheme of [GPV08] was not entirely practical, involving a rather

complex signing algorithm based on sampling lattice vectors with gaussian distribution, a problem that only recently has found more satisfactory solutions [MP12].

Two lines of research have evolved from [GPV08], trying to address either the security or efficiency limitations of that work:

- A first line of research [Lyu09, Lyu12, GLP12, DDLL13, BG14, HPS<sup>+</sup>13] kept investigating lattice signature in the random oracle model, with the goal of achieving the highest possible levels of performance, and schemes that are efficient enough to be used in practice.
- A second line of work, [CHKP12, Boy10, MP12] kept pursuing the important goal of obtaining security in the standard model of computation (no random oracles) while at the same time improving the efficiency and potential practicality of previous schemes. Our work is part of this second line of research, which we describe in more detail.

The current state of the art, when it comes to short lattice signatures in the standard model, is given by the scheme of Boyen [Boy10], with additional security and efficiency improvements described in [MP12]. This scheme achieved the important goal of “short” lattice signatures (consisting of a single lattice vector), without resorting to the random oracle model. The main drawback of this scheme was the huge public key involved. Lattice public keys, even in the random oracle model [GPV08, Lyu09, Lyu12, GLP12, DDLL13, BG14], consist of one or more  $n \times m$  matrices, each of which typically requires  $\tilde{\Omega}(n^2)$  storage. For the sake of comparison, we consider natural adaptations of [CHKP12, Boy10, MP12] to the algebraic/ring setting, where  $n \times m$  matrices can be implicitly described by a single  $m$ -dimensional vector. Going back to the signature scheme of [Boy10, MP12], public keys consist of  $\Omega(n)$  matrices, and therefore require at least quadratic  $\tilde{\Omega}(n^2)$  total storage even when using “compact” algebraic lattices. We remark that digital signature schemes can be efficiently constructed out of identity based encryption (IBE) by using ciphertexts as signatures, and lattice based IBE with short ciphertexts are also known [CHKP12, ABB10b, ABB10a]. However, lattice IBE schemes are built on top of the signature techniques from [CHKP12, Boy10], and bear the same limitations when it comes to public key size: lattice IBE [CHKP12, ABB10b, ABB10a] use public keys consisting of  $\Omega(n)$  matrices, and result in  $\tilde{\Omega}(n^2)$  or even  $\tilde{\Omega}(n^3)$  public key size depending on the type of lattices employed.

Reducing the size of, not only the signatures, but also the public key, was the main open problem left by [CHKP12, Boy10, MP12, ABB10b, ABB10a]. We remark that the last few years have seen major efficiency progress on lattice signatures in the random oracle model [GPV08, Lyu09, Lyu12, GLP12, DDLL13, BG14], leaving a substantial gap between random oracle and standard model signatures. Still, designing efficient signature schemes without random oracles is an important and well established problem, both for the theory and practice of cryptography. A recent work in this direction is the paper of Bohl *et al.* [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a, BHJ<sup>+</sup>13b, Seo12], which formalized<sup>1</sup> a general “confined guessing” technique applicable to a variety of (not only lattice) settings. Here we describe their results, limited to the case of lattice signatures, and specialized to algebraic/ring lattices. Among other things, [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a] gives a standard model lattice signature with public keys consisting of a single matrix, and therefore requiring only  $O(m) = \tilde{\Omega}(n)$  storage when using algebraic/ring lattices. However, this comes at a substantial cost in terms of signature size: the digital signatures of [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a] consist of  $O(\log n)$  vectors. While a  $O(\log n)$  increase may not seem much, it is quite a high cost when it comes to signature size, both in theory and in practice. In fact, a similar trade-off was already known since the very first direct construction of lattice signatures [LM08a], which, as already discussed, produced general signatures consisting of  $O(\log n)$  vectors (as well as short public keys). In other words, just like [LM08a], the lattice signatures of [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a] are not “short”. (The main contribution of [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a] over the classic scheme of [LM08a], is that the results of [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a] also apply to general lattices.)

**Our results.** We present the first standard model construction of short signatures based on (algebraic/ring) lattices with relatively small public keys: Similarly to [Boy10, MP12], we achieve signatures consisting of a single vector without resorting to random oracles. At the same time, we substantially reduce the public key size from the  $\Omega(n)$  vectors<sup>2</sup> of previously best short lattice signatures [Boy10, MP12] to just  $O(\log n)$

<sup>1</sup>The technique first appeared in the work of Hohenberger and Waters [HW09b, HW09a] and was also used in [BK10].

<sup>2</sup>Remember we are in the ring setting, so only one vector is required to represent each matrix.

Scheme	Pub. Key $\mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times k}$ mat.	Secret Key $\mathcal{R}_q^{k \times k}$ mat.	Signature $\mathcal{R}_q^k$ vec.	Reduction loss	SIS parameter $\beta$
[GPV08](ROM)	1	1	1	1	$\tilde{\Omega}(n)$
[LM08a](Trees)	1	1	$\log n$	$Q$	$\tilde{\Omega}(n^2)$
[CHKP12]	$n$	$n$	$n$	$Q$	$\tilde{\Omega}(n^{3/2})$
[Boy10, MP12]	$n$	$n$	1	$Q$	$\tilde{\Omega}(n^{7/2}), \tilde{\Omega}(n^{5/2})$
[BHJ <sup>+</sup> 13a]	1	1	$\log_c n$	$O(Q^2/\epsilon)^c$	$\tilde{\Omega}(n^{5/2})$
Stateless Scheme (Sec. 3)	$\log_c n$	$\log_c n$	1	$O(Q^2/\epsilon)^c$	$\tilde{\Omega}(n^{7/2})$
Stateful Scheme (Sec. 4.1)	$2 \log_c(\log n)$	$2 \log_c(\log n)$	1	$2Q^c$	$\tilde{\Omega}(n^{3/2})$

$\mathcal{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/f(X)$  for some (cyclotomic) polynomial  $f$  of degree  $n$ ,  $q = n^{O(1)}$ , and  $k = O(\log q)$ .  $Q$  denotes the number of signature queries made by the attacker and  $\epsilon$  is its success probability. The value  $c > 1$  is an arbitrary constant that governs the security/efficiency trade off. The reduction loss is the ratio  $\epsilon'/\epsilon$  between the success probability  $\epsilon'$  of the reduction and the success probability  $\epsilon$  of the attacker.

Figure 1: Comparison to previous work on lattice signatures in the ring setting.

vectors. Our scheme is stateless, i.e., all signatures can be produced independently by running the signing algorithm on input the secret key and message to be signed. We also give an even more efficient scheme that further improves the public key size from  $O(\log n)$  to just  $O(\log \log n)$  vectors (and at the same time also improves the tightness of the reduction,) almost matching the *asymptotic* performance of schemes in the random oracle model [GPV08, Lyu09, Lyu12, GLP12, DDLL13, BG14]. This last improvement comes at the cost of statefulness: the signer has to keep some state information between signatures. However the state information is extremely simple: all that the signer has to do is to maintain a counter keeping track of how many signatures have already been produced.

We remark that it is always possible to reduce the public key size by increasing the size of the signatures, simply by compressing the public key using a collision resistant hash function (which is easily built from lattices [LMPR08, ADL<sup>+</sup>08, LM06, PR06]), and including the original public key in each signature. So, our first scheme (with  $O(\log n)$  vectors in the public key and short signatures) subsumes the results of [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a] in the algebraic/ring lattice setting with  $O(\log n)$  vectors per signatures.

The efficiency of our lattice constructions, compared to previous schemes (all adapted to the ring setting), is detailed in Figure 1. The trick leading to our stateful signature scheme can also be applied to improve the generic construction of [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a]. The description of our generic results is deferred to Section 4.2, Figure 4.3.

**Techniques.** Our results are obtained by combining several techniques previously used in the construction of lattice-based signatures. Most notably, we use the “vanishing trapdoor” technique from [Boy10], and the more recent “confined guessing” method of [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a, HW09b, HW09a]. In fact, the key generation, signing and verification algorithms bear strong similarities with previously proposed schemes. However, the combination appears to be novel and nontrivial. In particular, while both the results in [Boy10] and those in [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a] are presented for general lattices, the way they are combined in our work makes essential use of the commutativity properties of ring/algebraic lattices. More specifically, our proof of security exploits a key homomorphic property of lattice trapdoors (see Lemma 13) which requires certain matrix products to commute. This is trivially verified in the ring setting, where one of the matrices corresponds to a ring scalar, but glamorously fails when the construction is adapted to arbitrary lattices.

**Open problems.** Interestingly, the methods employed in this paper to obtain short lattice signatures with small public key seem specific to the ring/algebraic lattice setting. Only our generic result of Section 4.2 with signatures of  $\log \log n$  many vectors applies to arbitrary lattices. We remark that the question of reducing the public key size is mostly important in the ring setting: when using general lattices, even a single matrix takes quadratic storage, so there is little hope to reduce the public key size to linear or quasilinear in the security parameter. Still, it would be nice to achieve results similar to those in our paper, but for general lattices:

is there a standard model signature scheme based on general lattices with short signatures (consisting of a single vector) and small public keys (consisting of  $O(\log n)$  matrices)?

Another important open problem is to further improve the efficiency of our scheme, and obtain short signatures where the public key is just  $O(1)$  matrices (or vectors, in the ring setting). Indeed, schemes offering both short public key and short signatures<sup>3</sup> in the standard model have been constructed based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and RSA problems [HW09b, HW09a]. The technique used for short signatures from RSA and CDH, and the obstruction to adapt it to lattices are discussed Section 4.3.

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Signatures

We recall the definition of digital signature scheme.

**Definition 1** (Signatures Scheme). *A signature scheme  $\mathcal{SS}$  is a triple  $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verif})$  of PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) algorithms, together with message spaces  $\mathcal{M}_n$ . It is correct if, for all messages  $\mu \in \mathcal{M}_n$ ,  $\text{Verif}(pk, \mu, \sigma) = 1$  holds true, except with negligible probability (in  $n$ ) over the choice of  $(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^n)$  and  $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, \mu)$ .*

The standard definitions of security for digital signature schemes (under adaptive and non-adaptive attacks) is given in Figure 2.

<b>EUF-naCMA<sub>SS</sub>(<math>n, \mathcal{A}</math>)</b>	<b>EUF-CMA<sub>SS</sub>(<math>n, \mathcal{A}</math>)</b>
$\mathcal{A}$ chooses $q$ messages $(\mu^{(j)}) \in \mathcal{M}_n$ $(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^n)$ For all $j = 0 \dots Q - 1$ , $\sigma^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, \mu^{(j)})$ . $\mathcal{A}$ receives $pk, \sigma^{(0)} \dots \sigma^{(Q-1)}$ . $\mathcal{A}$ sends an attempted forgery $(\mu^\diamond, \sigma^\diamond)$ $\mathcal{A}$ wins if $\text{Verif}(pk, \mu^\diamond, \sigma^\diamond) = 1$ and $\mu^\diamond \notin \{\mu^{(j)}\}$ .	$(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^n)$ , $\mathcal{A}$ receives $pk$ For $j = 0 \dots Q - 1$ : $\mathcal{A}$ chooses $\mu^{(j)}$ $\mathcal{A}$ receives $\sigma^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, \mu^{(j)})$ $\mathcal{A}$ sends an attempted forgery $(\mu^\diamond, \sigma^\diamond)$ $\mathcal{A}$ wins if $\text{Verif}(pk, \mu^\diamond, \sigma^\diamond) = 1$ and $\mu^\diamond \notin \{\mu^{(j)}\}$ .

A signature scheme  $\mathcal{SS} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verif})$  is **EUF-naCMA**-secure (or Existentially Unforgeable under non-adaptive Chosen Message Attacks) if no PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the **EUF-naCMA<sub>SS</sub>** game (left) with non-negligible probability  $n^{-O(1)}$ . The scheme is **EUF-CMA**-secure (or Existentially Unforgeable under adaptive Chosen Message Attacks) if no PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the **EUF-CMA<sub>SS</sub>** game (right) with non-negligible probability  $n^{-O(1)}$ .

Figure 2: Definition of security for digital signature schemes.

**From Non-Adaptive to Full Security** There are two standard techniques to transform non adaptively-secure signature schemes to fully secure ones: Chameleon Hashing and One Time Signatures both of which can be implemented using lattices [LM08b, GPV08]. For a description of the solution based on Chameleon Hashing see Appendix B.

### 2.2 Lattices and Gaussian Distributions

A (full rank)  $n$ -dimensional *lattice* is the set  $\Lambda = \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B}) = \{\mathbf{Bz} : \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^n\}$  of all integer linear combinations of  $n$  basis vectors  $\mathbf{B} = [\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n] \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ . We use notation  $(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  for *column* vectors, and similarly write  $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$  for the result of vertically stacking two matrices. The dual lattice  $\Lambda^*$  is the set of all  $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{R}^n$  such that  $\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}$  for every  $\mathbf{x} \in \Lambda$ . If  $\mathbf{B}$  is a basis of  $\Lambda$ , then  $\mathbf{B}^* = \mathbf{B}^{-t}$  is a basis of  $\Lambda^*$ . Many cryptographic applications use a particular family of so-called  $q$ -ary integer lattices, which contain  $q\mathbb{Z}^m$  as a sublattice for

<sup>3</sup>Here by “short” we mean consisting of  $O(1)$  group elements.

some (typically small) integer  $q$ . For positive integers  $n$ , and  $q$ , let  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$  be arbitrary and define the following full-rank  $m$ -dimensional  $q$ -ary lattices:

$$\begin{aligned}\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A}) &= \{\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{A}\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{0} \bmod q\} \\ \Lambda(\mathbf{A}) &= \{\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \exists \mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{A}^t \mathbf{s} \bmod q\}.\end{aligned}$$

It is easy to check that  $\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A})$  and  $\Lambda(\mathbf{A})$  are dual lattices, up to a  $q$  scaling factor:  $q \cdot \Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A})^* = \Lambda(\mathbf{A})$ , and vice-versa. For any  $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  admitting an integral solution to  $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{u} \bmod q$ , define the coset (or “shifted” lattice)  $\Lambda_{\mathbf{u}}^\perp(\mathbf{A}) = \{\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{A}\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{u} \bmod q\} = \Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A}) + \mathbf{x}$ . In the Small Integer Solution problem (SIS $_{p,n,m,\beta}$ ), one is given a matrix  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$  and is asked to find a nonzero vector  $\mathbf{s} \in \Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A})$  such that  $\|\mathbf{s}\| \leq \beta$  where  $\|\mathbf{s}\| = \sqrt{\sum_i s_i^2}$  is the euclidean norm. The geometric quality of a matrix  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$  is measured by its spectral norm  $s_1(\mathbf{A}) = \sup_{\mathbf{x}} \|\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x}\|/\|\mathbf{x}\|$ .

The  $n$ -dimensional Gaussian function  $\rho_s: \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow (0, 1]$  is defined as  $\rho_s(\mathbf{x}) = \exp(-\pi \cdot \|\mathbf{x}\|^2/s^2)$ . For any (countable) set  $X \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ , let  $\rho_s(X) = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in X} \rho_s(\mathbf{x})$ . The *smoothing parameter* of a lattice  $\eta_\epsilon(\Lambda)$  [MR07] is the smallest  $s$  such that  $\rho_{1/s}(\Lambda^*) \leq 1 + \epsilon$ . The discrete gaussian distribution  $D_{\Lambda,s}$  over a lattice  $\Lambda$  is defined as  $D_{\Lambda,s}(\mathbf{x}) = \rho_s(\mathbf{x})/\rho_s(\Lambda)$  for all  $\mathbf{x} \in \Lambda$ .

We say that a random variable  $X$  over  $\mathbb{R}$  is *subgaussian* with parameter  $s > 0$  if for all  $t \in \mathbb{R}$ , the (scaled) moment-generating function satisfies  $\mathbb{E}[\exp(2\pi tX)] \leq \exp(\pi s^2 t^2)$ . If  $X$  is subgaussian, then its tails are dominated by a Gaussian of parameter  $s$ , i.e.,  $\Pr[|X| \geq t] \leq 2 \exp(-\pi t^2/s^2)$  for all  $t \geq 0$ . More generally, we say that a random matrix  $\mathbf{X}$  is subgaussian (of parameter  $s$ ) if all its one-dimensional marginals  $\mathbf{u}^t \mathbf{X} \mathbf{v}$  for unit vectors  $\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v}$  are subgaussian (of parameter  $s$ ). It follows immediately from the definition that the concatenation of independent subgaussian vectors with common parameter  $s$ , interpreted either as a vector or as a matrix, is subgaussian with parameter  $s$ . For any lattice  $\Lambda \subset \mathbb{R}^n$  and  $s > 0$ , the distribution  $D_{\Lambda,s}$  is subgaussian with parameter  $s$ .

We will need the following standard result from the non-asymptotic theory of random matrices; for further details, see [Ver10].

**Lemma 1.** *Let  $\mathbf{X} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$  be a subgaussian random matrix with parameter  $s$ . There exists a universal constant  $C \approx 1/\sqrt{2\pi}$  such that for any  $t \geq 0$ , we have  $s_1(\mathbf{X}) \leq C \cdot s \cdot (\sqrt{m} + \sqrt{n} + t)$  except with probability at most  $2 \exp(-\pi t^2)$ .*

## 2.3 Rings and Ideal Lattices

We consider lattice problems restricted to ideal lattices [Mic07, LM06, PR07]. Most of our results apply to ideal/module lattices over arbitrary cyclotomic rings, but for simplicity we focus our presentation on so-called “SWIFFT” rings [LMPR08, ADL<sup>+</sup>08]. These are rings of the form  $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(\Phi_{2n}(X))$  or  $\mathcal{R}_q = (\mathcal{R}/q\mathcal{R})$ , where  $n$  is a power of 2,  $q$  is an integer, and  $\Phi_{2n}(X) = X^n + 1$  is the cyclotomic polynomial of degree  $n$ . For our construction we will require that  $\Phi_{2n}(X)$  does not split into low degree polynomials modulo the prime factors of  $q$ . More concretely we choose  $q = 3^k$  and rely on the following.

**Fact 2** (Irreducible factors of  $\Phi_{2^k}(X)$  modulo 3. Corollary of [LN83, Theorem 2.47]). *For any  $k \geq 3$  and  $2n = 2^k$  we have  $\Phi_{2n}(X) \equiv (X^{n/2} + X^{n/4} - 1) \cdot (X^{n/2} - X^{n/4} - 1) \pmod{3}$  and both factors are irreducible in  $\mathbb{F}_3[X]$ .*

**Lemma 3** (Hensel Lemma for powers of prime integers). *Let  $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(F(X))$  for some monic polynomial  $F \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$ . For any prime  $p$ , if  $u \in \mathcal{R}_{p^e}$  is invertible mod  $p$  (i.e. it is invertible in  $\mathcal{R}_p$ ) then  $u$  is also invertible in  $\mathcal{R}_{p^e}$ .*

**Corollary 4.** *let  $n \geq 4$  be a power of 2,  $q \geq 3$  a power of 3, and set  $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(\Phi_{2n}(X), q)$ . Then, any nonzero polynomial  $t \in \mathcal{R}_q$  of degree  $d < n/2$  and coefficients in  $\{0, \pm 1\}$  is invertible in  $\mathcal{R}_q$ .*

*Proof.* Fact 2 ensures the invertibility of  $t$  in  $\mathcal{R}_3$ , which extends to any  $\mathcal{R}_{3^k}$  by Hensel lifting (Lemma 3).  $\square$

Elements in  $\mathcal{R}$  have a natural representation as polynomials of degree  $n - 1$  with coefficients in  $\mathbb{Z}$ , and  $\mathcal{R}$  can be identified (as an additive group) with the integer lattice  $\mathbb{Z}^n$ , where each ring element  $\mathbf{a} = a_0 + a_1x + \dots + a_{n-1}x^{n-1} \in \mathcal{R}$  is associated with the coefficient vector  $(a_0, \dots, a_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ . We use the identification  $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}^n$  to define standard lattice quantities like the euclidean length of a ring element  $\|\mathbf{a}\| = \sqrt{\sum_i |a_i|^2}$ , or the spectral norm of a ring element  $s_1(r) = \sup_x \|r \cdot x\|/\|x\|$ . The ring  $\mathcal{R}$  is also identified with the sub-ring of anti-circulant square matrices of dimension  $n$  by regarding each ring element  $r \in \mathcal{R}$  as a linear transformation  $x \mapsto r \cdot x$  over (the coefficient embedding) of  $\mathcal{R}$ . Notice that the definition of spectral norm of a ring element is consistent with the definition of spectral norm of the corresponding anticirculant matrix. The following lemma provides a useful bound on the spectral norm of ring elements.

**Lemma 5.** *For any ring element  $r \in \mathcal{R}$ , we have  $s_1(r) \leq \|r\|_1 = \sum_i |r_i|$ .*

*Proof.* Let  $\omega_k = e^{\pi i(2k-1)/n}$  (for  $k = 1, \dots, n$ ) be the complex roots of the cyclotomic polynomial  $\Phi_{2n}$ . Consider the image of  $r$  under the canonical embedding  $\sigma: \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}^n$ , which is defined as  $\sigma(r) = (r(\omega_1), \dots, r(\omega_n))$ . Using the fact that  $\sigma: \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}^n$  is a ring homomorphism (with the product  $\odot$  in  $\mathbb{C}^n$  defined componentwise) and a scaled isometry (satisfying  $\|\sigma(r)\| = \sqrt{n} \cdot \|r\|$ ) we get

$$s_1(r) = \sup_x \frac{\|r \cdot x\|}{\|x\|} = \sup_x \frac{\|\sigma(r \cdot x)\|}{\|\sigma(x)\|} = \sup_x \frac{\|\sigma(r) \odot \sigma(x)\|}{\|\sigma(x)\|} \leq \|\sigma(r)\|_\infty = \max_i |\sigma(r)_i|.$$

Since for any  $i$ ,  $|\omega_i| = 1$ , we have  $|r(\omega_i)| = \left| \sum_j r_j \omega_i^j \right| \leq \sum_j |r_j| = \|r\|_1$ . It follows that  $s_1(r) \leq \|\sigma(r)\|_\infty \leq \|r\|_1$ .  $\square$

The discrete Gaussian distribution over the ring  $D_{\mathcal{R},s} \equiv D_{\mathbb{Z},s}^n$  is defined as usual by identifying the ring  $\mathcal{R}$  with  $\mathbb{Z}^n$  under the coefficient embedding. It follows that the discrete gaussian distribution over the ring  $x \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R},s}$  is subgaussian of parameter  $s$  when  $x$  is regarded as a vector. For the anti-circulant matrix representation, we have the following fact, (proof in App. A).

**Fact 6.** *If  $\mathbf{R} \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R},s}^{w \times k}$ , then with overwhelming probability we have  $s_1(\mathbf{R}) \leq s\sqrt{n} \cdot O(\sqrt{w} + \sqrt{k} + \omega(\sqrt{\log n}))$ .*

The euclidean length of vectors in  $\mathcal{R}_q^k$  is defined similarly by identifying  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  with the set of representatives  $\{-(q-1)/2, \dots, +(q-1)/2\}$ . Similarly, we define the  $q$ -ary lattices  $\Lambda(\mathbf{A})$  and  $\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A})$  when  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{n \times m}$  is a matrix over the ring  $\mathcal{R}_q$  using the standard isomorphism of  $\mathcal{R}_q$  and the sub-ring of anticirculant matrices in  $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ .

**Definition 2.** *In the Small Integer Solution over Rings problem (RingSIS $_{q,n,m,\beta}$ ), one is given a row vector  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times m}$ , and is asked to find a nonzero vector  $\mathbf{x} \in \Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$  such that  $\|\mathbf{x}\| \leq \beta$ .*

Let  $\mathcal{U}_m$  be the uniform distribution over  $m$ -dimensional row vectors of ring elements  $\mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2, \dots, \mathbf{a}_m] \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times m}$ . The smoothness proof from [GPV08] can be adapted to this specific ring case (proof in App. A). A more general ring regularity result can be found [LPR13, Theorem 7.4], but unfortunately it gives a larger bound (by a factor  $n$ ) on required standard deviation  $s$  than our specialized lemma.

**Lemma 7** (Smoothness Lemma). *Let  $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(\Phi_{2n}(X), q)$  for  $n \geq 4$  a power of 2 and  $q = 3^k$  a power of 3. Let  $w \geq 2\lceil \log_2 q \rceil + 2$  and  $s \geq \omega(\sqrt{\ln nw})$ . With overwhelming probability over the choice of  $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_w$ , if  $\mathbf{x}_i \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R},s}$  (for  $i = 1, \dots, w$ ) are chosen independently at random, then the sum  $\sum_i \mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}_i$  is within negligible statistical distance from the uniform distribution over  $\mathcal{R}$ .*

A handy corollary used several time in our proof is the following.

**Corollary 8** (Min-entropy bound). *Set  $\mathcal{R}_q$  as above, and let  $w \geq 2\lceil \log_2 q \rceil + 3$ ,  $s \geq \omega(\sqrt{\ln nw})$ . With overwhelming probability over the choice of  $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_w$ , if  $\mathbf{x}_i \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R},s}$  (for  $i = 1, \dots, w$ ) are chosen independently at random, then for any nonzero vector  $\mathbf{V} \in \mathcal{R}^w \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$  the conditional min-entropy of  $\sum_i \mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}_i$  given  $\sum_i \mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}_i$  is at least  $\Omega(n)$ .*

## 2.4 Lattice Trapdoors

We use the strong lattice trapdoor construction and algorithms of [MP12]. For a modulus  $q = 3^k$  and integer dimension  $n$ , define the gadget matrix  $\mathbf{G} = [\mathbf{I}_n \mid 3 \cdot \mathbf{I}_n \mid \dots \mid 3^{k-1} \cdot \mathbf{I}_n] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times kn}$ .

**Definition 3.** For any  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (m+kn)}$ , and (invertible)  $\mathbf{H} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ , a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor for  $\mathbf{A}$  with tag  $\mathbf{H}$  is a matrix  $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times kn}$  such that  $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{H}\mathbf{G}$ . The definition is extended to trapdoors  $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m' \times kn}$  with  $m' \leq m$  by padding them with zero columns so that  $[\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{O}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times kn}$ .

The quality of a trapdoor  $\mathbf{R}$  is measured by the spectral norm  $s_1(\mathbf{R})$ , and [MP12] gives efficient algorithms to generate uniformly random matrices  $\mathbf{A}$  together with high quality trapdoors, and to sample cosets  $\Lambda_{\mathbf{u}}^\perp(\mathbf{A})$  with Gaussian distribution  $D_s$  for sufficiently large  $s$ . Notice that the tag  $\mathbf{H}$  can immediately be recovered from  $\mathbf{A}$  and  $\mathbf{R}$  as the first block of  $\mathbf{H}\mathbf{G}$ , and does not need to be specified explicitly. But when one says that  $\mathbf{R}$  is a trapdoor, it is usually assumed that the associated tag  $\mathbf{H}$  is an invertible matrix.

**Theorem 9** ([MP12]). *There is an efficient algorithm  $\text{SampleD}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{R}, s)$  that on input a matrix  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (m+kn)}$ , a syndrome  $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ , a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor  $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times kn}$  for  $\mathbf{A}$ , and parameter  $s > \omega(\sqrt{\log n}) \cdot s_1(\mathbf{R})$ , produces a sample from the distribution  $D_{\Lambda_{\mathbf{u}}^\perp(\mathbf{A}), s}$ .*

The efficient trapdoor generation algorithm of [MP12] follows immediately from the definition of  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor: one simply chooses  $\mathbf{A}' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$  uniformly at random, samples a trapdoor matrix  $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times nk}$  with small entries, and outputs  $\mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{H}\mathbf{G} - \mathbf{A}'\mathbf{R}]$ . As pointed out in [MP12], the algorithm is immediately adapted to ideal lattices, using the observation that the identity matrix  $\mathbf{I}_n$  is precisely the matrix corresponding to the ring element  $1 \in \mathcal{R}$ , so the gadget matrix  $\mathbf{G}$  can be regarded as a row vector of ring elements  $[1, 3, 9, \dots, 3^{k-1}] \in \mathcal{R}^{1 \times k}$ . The trapdoor generation algorithm is then analyzed using Theorem 7, and the trapdoor quality is bounded applying Fact 6 to the concatenation of subgaussian random variables  $\mathbf{r}_i \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R}, s} \equiv D_{\mathbb{Z}, s}^n$ . The formal result is stated below.

**Theorem 10.** *There is a polynomial time algorithm  $\text{GenTrap}(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{H}, s)$  that on input a matrix  $\mathbf{A}' \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times w}$ , tag  $\mathbf{H} \in \mathcal{R}_q$ , and parameter  $s > \omega(\sqrt{\ln nw})$ , outputs a matrix  $\mathbf{A}'' \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times k}$  and a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor  $\mathbf{R} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{w \times k}$  for  $\mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{A}'']$  with tag  $\mathbf{H}$  such that  $s_1(\mathbf{R}) = s \cdot O(\sqrt{w} + \sqrt{k} + \omega(\sqrt{\log n}))$ . Moreover, if  $w \geq 2(\lceil \log_2 q \rceil + 1)$  then with overwhelming probability over the choice of  $\mathbf{A}' \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_w$ , the distribution of  $\mathbf{A}''$  is statistically close to uniform.*

In order to allow for the generation of trapdoors for multiple matrices that share the same  $\mathbf{A}'$ , we made  $\mathbf{A}'$  an explicit input to the trapdoor generation algorithm. When  $\mathbf{A}' \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_w$  is chosen freshly at random, we simply write  $\text{GenTrap}(w, \mathbf{H}, s)$  and let  $\text{GenTrap}$  output the whole  $\mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{A}']$ .

Notice that  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoors generated in the ring setting also satisfy the definition of  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor for general lattices. So, Theorem 9 can be used as it is, simply by viewing ring trapdoors  $\mathbf{R} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{w \times k}$  as matrices  $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{Z}^{wn \times kn}$  under the standard embedding from  $\mathcal{R}$  to the subring of anticirculant matrices. For convenience, we reformulate Theorem 9 as a corollary specialized to the ring setting.

**Corollary 11.** *There is an efficient algorithm  $\text{SampleD}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{R}, s)$  that on input a matrix  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times (w+k)}$ , a syndrome  $\mathbf{u} \in \mathcal{R}_q$ , a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor  $\mathbf{R} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{w \times k}$  for  $\mathbf{A}$  with invertible tag  $\mathbf{H} \in \mathcal{R}$ , and parameter  $s > \omega(\sqrt{\log n}) \cdot s_1(\mathbf{R})$ , produces a sample statistically close to the distribution  $D_{\Lambda_{\mathbf{u}}^\perp(\mathbf{A}), s}$ .*

We remark that  $\text{GenTrap}$  can be called with arbitrary (not necessarily invertible) tags  $\mathbf{H}$ . The algorithm still outputs a uniformly random  $\mathbf{A}$  and small  $s_1(\mathbf{R})$ , but the inversion algorithm of Corollary 11 cannot be used with such invalid trapdoors.

## 3 Our Scheme

The scheme is parametrized by an integer  $n$  which we assume is a power of 2, and a modulus  $q = 3^k$  which we assume to be a power of 3. (Other parameter settings are possible, but we consider these specific

values for concreteness.) These parameters define the ring  $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(\Phi_{2n}(X), q)$ , where (for  $n$  a power of 2)  $\Phi_{2n}(X) = X^n + 1$  is the cyclotomic polynomial of degree  $n$ . The scheme also uses the parameters  $w = 2\lceil \log_2 q \rceil + 2$ ,  $m = w + k$ ,  $s = n^{3/2} \cdot \omega(\log n)^{3/2}$ , and a collection of tags defined below. We recall that the polynomial  $\Phi_{2n}(X)$  is irreducible in  $\mathbb{Z}[X]$ , but it can be factored in  $\mathbb{F}_p[X]$  for some primes  $p$ . Our choice of  $q = 3^k$  ensures that, in  $\mathbb{F}_3[X]$ , the polynomial  $\Phi_{2n}(X)$  factors into the product of just 2 irreducible polynomials of degree  $n/2$ . (See Fact 2.) In particular, by Corollary 4, any nonzero polynomial of degree less than  $n/2$  with coefficients in  $\{0, \pm 1\}$  is invertible in  $\mathcal{R}_q$ .

**Tags** For any real constants  $c > 1$  and  $\alpha \geq \frac{1}{c-1}$  (fixed throughout the rest of this section) define the sets of *tag prefixes*  $\mathcal{T}_i = \{0, 1\}^{c_i}$  of (strictly increasing) lengths  $c_0 = 0$ ,  $c_i = \lfloor \alpha c^i \rfloor$  for  $i \in \{1, \dots, d\}$  where  $d = \lfloor \log_c(n/(2\alpha)) \rfloor = O(\log n)$ . We identify each tag prefix  $t = [t_0, \dots, t_{c_i-1}] \in \mathcal{T}_i$  with a corresponding ring element  $t(X) = \sum_{j < c_i} t_j X^j \in \mathcal{R}_q$  with binary coefficients  $t_j \in \{0, 1\}$  and degree less than  $c_i \leq c_d \leq n/2$ . It follows that for any two distinct tag prefixes  $t, t' \in \mathcal{T}_i$ , the difference  $(t(X) - t'(X))$  is invertible in  $\mathcal{R}_q$ . For any *full tag*  $t \in \mathcal{T} = \mathcal{T}_d$  and  $i \leq d$ , we write  $t_{\leq i} \in \mathcal{T}_i$  for its prefix of length  $c_i$ , and  $t_{[i]}$  for the (ring) difference  $t_{\leq i}(X) - t_{\leq i-1}(X) \in \mathcal{R}_q$ .

Unlike previous work using tags [MP12, CHKP12, Boy10], our construction relies not only on the algebraic (invertibility) properties of tags, but also on their geometric properties, described in the following lemma.

**Lemma 12.** *For any  $i \leq d$  and tags  $t, t' \in \mathcal{T}$ , one has  $s_1((t - t')_{[i]}) \leq c_i - c_{i-1}$ .*

*Proof.* Since the difference  $(t - t')_{[i]}$  is a trinary polynomial with at most  $c_i - c_{i-1}$  nonzero coefficients, we have  $\|(t - t')_{[i]}\|_1 \leq c_i - c_{i-1}$ . It follows from Lemma 5 that  $s_1((t - t')_{[i]}) \leq \|(t - t')_{[i]}\|_1 \leq c_i - c_{i-1}$ .  $\square$

### 3.1 Our Scheme

We are now ready to define our signature scheme.

**Key Generation**  $\text{naSS.KeyGen}(n)$ : The key generation algorithm runs  $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{R}) \leftarrow \text{GenTrap}(w, \mathbf{I}, \sigma)$  with  $\sigma = \omega(\sqrt{\log n})$ , and chooses  $\mathbf{A}_{[0]}, \mathbf{A}_{[1]}, \dots, \mathbf{A}_{[d]}, \mathbf{U} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times k}$  and  $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{R}_q$  uniformly at random. It then outputs the secret key  $sk = \mathbf{R}$ , and public key  $pk = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_{[0]}, \mathbf{A}_{[1]}, \dots, \mathbf{A}_{[d]}, \mathbf{U}, \mathbf{v})$ . The public key implicitly defines a collection of matrices  $\mathbf{A}_t = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}_{[0]} + \sum_{i=1}^d t_{[i]} \cdot \mathbf{A}_{[i]}]$  indexed by the tags  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ .

Since  $\sigma = \omega(\sqrt{\log n})$ , by Theorem 10 and Lemma 6, the distribution of  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times m}$  is statistically close to  $\mathcal{U}_m$ , and  $\mathbf{R}$  is a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor for  $\mathbf{A}$  (and therefore also for all  $\mathbf{A}_t$ ) with invertible tag  $\mathbf{I}$  and quality  $s_1(\mathbf{R}) \leq \sqrt{n} \cdot \omega(\log n)$ .

**Signature**  $\text{naSS.Sign}(sk = \mathbf{R}, \boldsymbol{\mu} \in \{0, 1\}^{nk} \subset \mathcal{R}_q^k)$ : Parse  $\boldsymbol{\mu}$  as a vector of  $\mathcal{R}_q^k$  splitting the  $nk$  bits into  $k$  binary polynomials. Choose a uniformly random tag  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , and compute the matrix  $\mathbf{A}_t$  and ring element  $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{U} \cdot \boldsymbol{\mu} + \mathbf{v}$ . Then, use the  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor  $\mathbf{R}$  to sample a vector  $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \text{SampleD}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{R}, s)$ . Output the pair  $\sigma = (t, \mathbf{s})$  as the signature.

**Verification**  $\text{naSS.Verif}(pk, \boldsymbol{\mu} \in \{0, 1\}^{nk} \subset \mathcal{R}_q^k, \sigma = (t, \mathbf{s}))$ : Compute  $\mathbf{A}_t$  and  $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{U} \cdot \boldsymbol{\mu} + \mathbf{v}$  as in the signing algorithm. Then, check that  $\|\mathbf{s}\| \leq s\sqrt{nm}$  and that  $\mathbf{A}_t \cdot \mathbf{s} = \mathbf{u}$ .

**Correctness** The correctness of the scheme is easily verified: Since  $s > \omega(\sqrt{\log n}) \cdot s_1(\mathbf{R})$ , by Corollary 11 the vector  $\mathbf{s}$  produced during the signature generation process follows the distribution  $D_{\Lambda_{\mathbf{u}}^+(\mathbf{A}_t), s}$  and has length at most  $s\sqrt{nm} = O(s\sqrt{nk})$  with overwhelming probability. So, the signature  $(t, \mathbf{s})$  is accepted by the verification algorithm.

## 3.2 Security Proof

The security of the scheme is based on the following homomorphic property of  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoors over rings. We remark that the property makes essential use of the commutativity of matrices corresponding to ring elements in  $\mathcal{R}_q$ , so it does not trivially adapt to general lattices, unless one restricts the set of tags to scalar matrices.

**Lemma 13.** *For  $i = 0, \dots, d$ , let  $\mathbf{R}_{[i]} \in \mathcal{R}^{w \times k}$  be a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor for  $[\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_{[i]}]$  with tag  $\mathbf{H}_{[i]} \in \mathcal{R}_q$ , where  $\mathbf{A}_{[i]} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times k}$ . Then, any linear combination  $\mathbf{R} = \sum_i c_i \cdot \mathbf{R}_{[i]}$  with  $c_i \in \mathcal{R}_q$  is a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor for  $[\mathbf{A}, \sum_i c_i \mathbf{A}_{[i]}]$  with tag  $\mathbf{H} = \sum_i c_i \mathbf{H}_{[i]}$ .*

*Proof.* By definition of  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor, we know that  $[\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_{[i]}](\mathbf{R}_{[i]}, \mathbf{I}) = \mathbf{H}_{[i]} \mathbf{G}$  for all  $i$ . Therefore

$$\begin{aligned} \left[ \mathbf{A}, \sum_i c_i \mathbf{A}_{[i]} \right] (\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{I}) &= \mathbf{A} \mathbf{R} + \sum_i c_i \mathbf{A}_{[i]} = \sum_i c_i (\mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{[i]} + \mathbf{A}_{[i]}) \\ &= \sum_i c_i [\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_{[i]}] (\mathbf{R}_{[i]}, \mathbf{I}) = \sum_i c_i \mathbf{H}_{[i]} \mathbf{G} = \mathbf{H} \mathbf{G}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore  $\mathbf{R}$  is a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor with tag  $\mathbf{H}$ . □

We can now prove the security of our signature scheme.

**Theorem 14** (Security against Existential Forgery under non-adaptive Chosen Messages Attacks). *Under the RingSIS $_{n,m,q,\beta}$  assumption for  $\beta = \tilde{O}(n^{7/2})$ , the above scheme naSS is **EUF-naCMA** secure. More precisely, if there exists an attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  against **EUF-naCMA** $_{\text{naSS}}$  that runs in time  $T$ , makes at most  $Q$  queries where  $1 \leq Q \leq 2^{o(n)}$  and succeeds with probability  $\epsilon \geq 2^{-o(n)}$ , then, there exists an algorithm  $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{A}}$  that runs in time  $T' = T + \text{poly}(n)$ , and solves SIS $(n, w, q, \beta)$  with probability  $\epsilon' \geq \Omega\left(\frac{\epsilon^{1+c}}{Q^{2c}}\right)$ .*

The rest of the section is devoted to the proof of the theorem.

**Confined Guessing Stage** We assume we have an attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  against the EUF-naCMA security of naSS that makes at most  $Q = 2^{o(n)}$  signature queries, and succeeds with probability  $\epsilon \geq 2^{-o(n)}$ . Let  $i^*$  the smallest index such that  $2Q^2/\epsilon \leq |\mathcal{T}_{i^*}|$ . (Notice that such index exists because  $2Q^2/\epsilon = 2^{o(n)} \leq 2^{\lfloor \frac{n}{2c} \rfloor} \leq |\mathcal{T}|$ .) This guarantees that, if one chooses  $Q$  tags at random in  $\mathcal{T}_{i^*}$ , then they will be all distinct except with probability at most  $\epsilon/2$ .

The simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  receives  $Q$  non-adaptive signature queries  $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{(0)} \dots \boldsymbol{\mu}^{(Q-1)}$  from  $\mathcal{A}$ . For each message  $\boldsymbol{\mu}^{(j)}$ , the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses a uniformly random tag  $t^{(j)} \in \mathcal{T}$ . If a collision of prefixes happens (i.e., if  $t_{\leq i^*}^{(j)} = t_{\leq i^*}^{(k)}$  for some  $j \neq k$ ) the simulator aborts. (This happens with probability at most  $\epsilon/2$ .) Otherwise,  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses a prefix  $t_{\leq i^*}^* \in \mathcal{T}_{i^*}$  uniformly at random. (The rest of the tag  $t^*$  will be specified later on.) The hope is that the adversary will output a forgery  $(t^\circ, \mathbf{s}^\circ)$  such that  $t_{\leq i^*}^\circ = t_{\leq i^*}^*$ . We will make the adversary's view statistically independent from the choice of  $t_{\leq i^*}^* \in \mathcal{T}_{i^*}$ , so that  $t_{\leq i^*}^\circ = t_{\leq i^*}^*$  will hold true with probability  $1/|\mathcal{T}_{i^*}|$ .

**Simulating Key Generation and Signatures** The simulator also receives a RingSIS challenge, the row vector  $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_m$ , from which it will build the public key. This is done by running  $(\mathbf{A}_{[i]}, \mathbf{R}_{[i]}) \leftarrow \text{GenTrap}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{H}_{[i]}, \sigma')$  with  $\sigma' = \omega(\sqrt{\log n})$  for  $i = 0, \dots, d$  and

$$\mathbf{H}_{[i]} = \begin{cases} 0 \in \mathcal{R}_q & \text{if } i > i^* \\ 1 \in \mathcal{R}_q & \text{if } 1 \leq i \leq i^* \\ -t_{\leq i^*}^* & \text{if } i = 0. \end{cases}$$

Since  $\omega(\sqrt{\log n}) \leq \sigma'$ , by Theorem 10 the matrices  $\mathbf{A}_{[i]}$  are statistically close to uniform. Moreover, by Fact 6, each  $\mathbf{R}_{[i]} \in \mathcal{R}^{m \times k}$  is a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor for  $[\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_{[i]}]$  with  $s_1(\mathbf{R}_{[i]}) \leq \sqrt{n} \cdot \omega(\log n)$ . Therefore, by Lemma 13,

$\mathbf{R}_t = \mathbf{R}_{[0]} + \sum_{i=1}^d t_{[i]} \cdot \mathbf{R}_{[i]}$  is a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor for  $\mathbf{A}_t = [\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}_{[0]} + \sum_i t_{[i]} \cdot \mathbf{A}_{[i]}]$  with tag  $\mathbf{H}_t = t_{\leq i^*} - t_{\leq i^*}^*$ . The quality of this trapdoor is

$$\begin{aligned} s_1(\mathbf{R}_t) &\leq s_1(\mathbf{R}_{[0]}) + \sum_i s_1(t_{[i]} \cdot \mathbf{R}_{[i]}) \leq \left(1 + \sum_i s_1(t_{[i]})\right) \max_i s_1(\mathbf{R}_{[i]}) \\ &\leq \left(1 + \sum_i (c_i - c_{i-1})\right) \sqrt{n} \cdot \omega(\log n) = n^{3/2} \cdot \omega(\log n) \end{aligned}$$

where we have used the geometric bound  $s_1(t_{[i]}) \leq c_i - c_{i-1}$  from Fact 12. So, the simulator can use  $\mathbf{R}_t$  as a trapdoor to sign messages with tag  $t$  as long as  $\mathbf{H}_t$  is invertible. We observe that  $\mathbf{H}_t = \mathbf{0}$  whenever  $t_{\leq i^*}^* = t_{\leq i^*}$  (i.e., when  $t_{\leq i^*}^*$  is a prefix of  $t$ ), and it is invertible otherwise. So, the simulator can efficiently answer all signature queries except at most for one index  $j$  such that  $t_{\leq i^*}^{(j)} = t_{\leq i^*}^*$ . If such index exists, set  $\boldsymbol{\mu}^* = \boldsymbol{\mu}^{(j)}$  and  $t^* = t^{(j)}$  (recall that we've only chosen the prefix  $t_{\leq i^*}^*$  of  $t^*$  at the confined guessing stage), otherwise  $\mathcal{S}$  chooses a random  $\boldsymbol{\mu}^*$  and a random  $t^*$  extension of  $t_{\leq i^*}^*$ . We will use our last degree of freedom  $\mathbf{v}$  to “program” a signature for this only message  $\boldsymbol{\mu}^*$ : choose a signature  $\mathbf{s}^* \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R}, \mathbf{s}}^m$ , and set  $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{A}_{t^*} \mathbf{s}^* - \mathbf{U} \boldsymbol{\mu}^*$ . Applying Lemma 7, we check that  $\mathbf{v}$  is close to uniform and independent of  $\mathbf{A}_{t^*}$ ,  $\mathbf{U}$  and  $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ . This shows how to efficiently simulate public key and signatures that are indistinguishable from a real attack.

Notice that we have not specified how to choose  $\mathbf{U}$  yet. In order to for the simulator to exploit the forgery, we want  $\mathbf{U} = \mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}}$  for some  $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}}$  with small entries. We can set  $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}} \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R}, \sigma'}$  so that, by Lemma 7,  $\mathbf{U} = \mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}}$  is statistically close to uniform, and  $s_1(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}}) = \sqrt{n} \cdot \omega(\log n)$ .

**Exploiting the forgery** After all those shenanigans from the simulators  $\mathcal{S}$ , with probability at least  $\epsilon/2$ , the adversary outputs a forgery  $(t^\diamond, \mathbf{s}^\diamond)$  for some message  $\boldsymbol{\mu}^\diamond$  of his choice. The simulator's secret hope that  $t_{\leq i^*}^\diamond = t_{\leq i^*}^*$  is fulfilled with probability  $1/|\mathcal{T}_{i^*}|$ ; if not,  $\mathcal{S}$  aborts. Otherwise we have

$$\mathbf{A}_{t^*} \cdot \mathbf{s}^* = \mathbf{U} \cdot \boldsymbol{\mu}^* + \mathbf{v} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{A}_{t^\diamond} \cdot \mathbf{s}^\diamond = \mathbf{U} \cdot \boldsymbol{\mu}^\diamond + \mathbf{v}$$

Recall that for any tag  $t \in \mathcal{T}$  we have  $\mathbf{A}_t = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{H}_t \mathbf{G} - \mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_t]$  ( $\mathbf{R}_t$  is a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor of  $\mathbf{A}_t$  with tag  $\mathbf{H}_t$ ); additionally the condition  $t_{\leq i^*}^\diamond = t_{\leq i^*}^*$  ensures  $\mathbf{H}_{t^*} = \mathbf{H}_{t^\diamond} = \mathbf{0}$ . We derive

$$[\mathbf{A} | -\mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{t^*} | -\mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}}] \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{s}_1^* \\ \mathbf{s}_2^* \\ \boldsymbol{\mu}^* \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{v} = [\mathbf{A} | -\mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{t^\diamond} | -\mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}}] \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{s}_1^\diamond \\ \mathbf{s}_2^\diamond \\ \boldsymbol{\mu}^\diamond \end{bmatrix}.$$

In particular we obtain  $\mathbf{A} \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{0}$  for

$$\mathbf{w} = (\mathbf{s}_1^* - \mathbf{s}_1^\diamond - (\mathbf{R}_{t^*} \cdot \mathbf{s}_2^* - \mathbf{R}_{t^\diamond} \cdot \mathbf{s}_2^\diamond) - \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}}(\boldsymbol{\mu}^* - \boldsymbol{\mu}^\diamond)).$$

Quite obviously,  $\mathbf{w}$  is small (we will quantify below). Less obviously, it is nonzero, except with negligible probability. We split our analysis into 4 different cases, corresponding to different types of forgeries  $(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, t^*, \mathbf{s}^*) \neq (\boldsymbol{\mu}^\diamond, t^\diamond, \mathbf{s}^\diamond)$ :

- case 1  $\mathbf{s}_2^* \neq \mathbf{s}_2^\diamond$ . Even revealing  $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}}$  and all  $\mathbf{R}_{[i]}$  for  $i > 0$ , one has that  $\mathbf{R}_{[0]} \cdot (\mathbf{s}_1^* - \mathbf{s}_1^\diamond)$  conditioned on the knowledge of  $\bar{\mathbf{A}}$  and  $\mathbf{A}_{[0]} = \mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{[0]}$  contains at least  $\Omega(n)$  bits of min-entropy, using Corollary 8. In particular the probability that  $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{0}$  is less than  $2^{-\Omega(n)}$ .
- case 2  $\boldsymbol{\mu}^* \neq \boldsymbol{\mu}^\diamond$ . Even revealing all  $\mathbf{R}_{[i]}$  for  $i \geq 0$ , one has that  $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}} \cdot (\mathbf{s}_1^* - \mathbf{s}_1^\diamond)$  conditioned on the knowledge of  $\bar{\mathbf{A}}$  and  $\mathbf{U} = \mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}}$  contains at least  $\Omega(n)$  bits of min-entropy, using Corollary 8. In particular the probability that  $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{0}$  is less than  $2^{-\Omega(n)}$ .
- case 3  $\mathbf{s}_1^* = \mathbf{s}_1^\diamond, t^* \neq t^\diamond$ . Choose some  $i$  such that  $t_{[i]}^* \neq t_{[i]}^\diamond$ . Even revealing  $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{U}}$  and all  $\mathbf{R}_{[j]}$  for  $j \neq i$ , one has that  $\mathbf{R}_{[i]} \cdot \mathbf{s}_1^*$  conditioned on the knowledge of  $\bar{\mathbf{A}}$  and  $\mathbf{A}_{[i]} = \mathbf{A} \mathbf{R}_{[i]}$  contains at least  $\Omega(n)$  bits of min-entropy, using Corollary 8. So does  $(t_{[i]}^* - t_{[i]}^\diamond) \cdot \mathbf{R}_{[i]} \cdot \mathbf{s}_1^*$  since  $t_{[i]}^* - t_{[i]}^\diamond$  is an invertible element of  $\mathcal{R}_q$  (Corollary 4). In particular the probability that  $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{0}$  is less than  $2^{-\Omega(n)}$ .
- case 4  $\mathbf{s}_2^* = \mathbf{s}_2^\diamond, \boldsymbol{\mu}^* = \boldsymbol{\mu}^\diamond, t^* = t^\diamond, \mathbf{s}_1^* \neq \mathbf{s}_1^\diamond$ . In this case one notices that  $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{s}_1^* - \mathbf{s}_1^\diamond \neq \mathbf{0}$  and concludes.

**Size of the extracted SIS solution** Because  $\mathbf{s}^*, \mathbf{s}^\diamond$  are valid signatures,  $\|\mathbf{s}^*\|, \|\mathbf{s}^\diamond\| \leq s\sqrt{m} \leq n^2w \cdot \omega(\log n)^{3/2}$ . Additionally  $s_1(\mathbf{R}_t) \leq n^{3/2} \cdot \omega(\log n)$  for any tag  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , as proved above, and  $\|\boldsymbol{\mu}^*\|, \|\boldsymbol{\mu}^\diamond\| \leq \sqrt{m} = O(\sqrt{nk})$  and  $\mathbf{R}_U \leq \sqrt{n} \cdot \omega(\log n)$ . Combining all those bounds we obtain

$$\|\mathbf{w}\| \leq n^{7/2} \cdot \log n \cdot \omega(\log n)^{5/2}.$$

**Success probability of the simulation** The success probability  $\epsilon'$  of the simulator is at least  $(\epsilon - \epsilon/2)/|\mathcal{T}_{i^*}| - 2^{-\Omega(n)}$  where

- $\epsilon$  is the success probability of the attacker,
- $\epsilon/2$  bounds the probability of a collision of tags,
- $1/|\mathcal{T}_{i^*}|$  is the probability that the confined guess is correct, i.e.,  $t_{\leq i^*}^\diamond = t_{\leq i^*}^*$ , and
- $2^{-\Omega(n)}$  bounds the probability that the extracted SIS solution is zero.

Our choice of  $i^*$  (see confined guessing stage) guarantees that  $2^{c_{i^*-1}} < \frac{2Q^2}{\epsilon} \leq 2^{c_{i^*}} = |\mathcal{T}_{i^*}|$ . We also have  $c_{i^*} \leq \alpha c^{i^*} = c(\alpha c^{i^*-1}) < c(c_{i^*-1} + 1)$ . Therefore  $|\mathcal{T}_{i^*}| = 2^{c_{i^*}} \leq 2^{c \cdot (c_{i^*-1} + 1)} \leq \left(\frac{4Q^2}{\epsilon}\right)^c$ . Overall the success probability of solving the SIS instance is at least

$$\epsilon' \geq \frac{\epsilon}{2} \left(\frac{\epsilon}{4Q^2}\right)^c - 2^{-\Omega(n)} = \Omega\left(\frac{\epsilon^{1+c}}{Q^{2c}}\right).$$

□

## 4 Stateful schemes

One drawback of the previous scheme is the success probability loss in its security reduction, that can get as large as a factor  $1/O(\epsilon^{-c}Q^{2c})$ ; moreover, while it is quite common that the loss depends on the number of signature queries  $Q$ , it is a not so desirable aspect of the confined guessing strategy introduced by Bohl *et al.* [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a, BHJ<sup>+</sup>13b] that it also depends on success probability  $\epsilon$  of the attacker.

In this section, we show that a simple tweak on the previous scheme can greatly improve the security loss of the proof, in particular removing the dependency in  $\epsilon$ . The trick is to include some statefulness (a simple counter) in the signature to avoid collision without relying on costly probabilities.

### 4.1 A stateful variant of section 3

We define a variant scheme  $\text{naSS}'$  that has a state  $S \in \mathbb{Z}$  initialized to 0; and differs only with  $\text{naSS}$  of section 3.1 only for the choice of the tag  $t \in \mathcal{T}$  in the  $\text{Sign}$  algorithm.

**Signature**  $\text{naSS}'.\text{Sign}(sk = \mathbf{R}, \boldsymbol{\mu} \in \{0, 1\}^{nk})$  :

Set the tag  $t = \sum_i s_i X^i \in \mathcal{T}$  to be the binary representation of  $S = \sum_i s_i 2^i$ .

Update the state  $S \leftarrow S + 1$

Continue similarly to  $\text{naSS}'.\text{Sign}$ .

**Theorem 15** (Security against Existential Forgery non-adaptive Chosen Messages Attacks). *Under the  $\text{RingSIS}_{n,m,q,\beta}$  assumption for  $\beta = \tilde{O}(n^{7/2})$ , the above scheme  $\text{naSS}'$  is **EUF-naCMA** secure. More precisely, if there exists an attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  against **EUf-naCMA** $_{\text{naSS}'}$  that runs in time  $T$ , makes at most  $Q \leq 2^{\epsilon^d}$  queries and succeed with probability  $\epsilon$ , then, there exists an algorithm  $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{A}}$  that runs in times  $T' = T + \text{poly}(n)$ , and solves  $\text{RingSIS}(n, w, q, \beta)$  with probability  $\epsilon' \geq \frac{\epsilon}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2Q}\right)^c$ .*

**Security proof update.** The security proof only differs from the original (Sec. 3.2) at the confined guessing stage. Note that the tag prefix  $t_{\leq i}^{(j)}$  for the  $j^{\text{th}}$  query ( $j \in \{0 \dots Q - 1\}$ ) is simply the binary representation of  $j \bmod 2^{c_i}$ ; in particular, setting  $i^*$  to the smallest index such that  $2^{c_i} \geq Q$  guarantees that no collision  $t_{\leq i^*}^{(j)} = t_{\leq i^*}^{(k)}, j \neq k$  happens; while bounding the tag-space size  $|\mathcal{T}_{i^*}| \leq 2Q^c$ .  $\square$

**Scheme with improved efficiency** While we believe that one shouldn't dismiss adversaries that have super-polynomially small success probability from the security reduction, it is much more reasonable to assume adversaries makes at most a polynomial numbers of signature queries. If ones indeed assumes that  $Q \leq n^{O(1)}$ , one can choose a smaller parameter  $d$ : a sufficient condition for the security proof is that  $2^{c_d} \geq n^{\omega(1)} = 2^{\omega(\log_2 n)}$ . One can thus choose  $d = \lfloor 2 \log_c((\log_2 n)/\alpha) \rfloor \geq \log_c(\omega(\log_2 n))$ ; and thus reducing the public key size from about  $\log_c(n/(2\alpha))$  to  $2 \log_c((\log_2 n)/\alpha)$  many  $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$  matrices.

Moreover, doing so also improves the security reduction, namely this decreased parameter  $d = 2 \log_c(\log_2 n)$  gives  $c_d \leq \log_2(n)^2$ ; this impact the size of the trapdoor matrices. We now can prove that, for any tag  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ :

$$s_1(\mathbf{R}_t) \leq \sqrt{n} \cdot \omega(\log n) \cdot (1 + c_d) \leq \sqrt{n} \cdot (\log n)^2 \cdot \omega(\log n).$$

Overall, this decrease the parameter  $s$  and the length of the SIS solution to

$$s = \sqrt{n} \cdot (\log n)^2 \cdot \omega(\log n)^{3/2}; \quad \beta = n^{3/2} \cdot (\log n)^5 \cdot \omega(\log n)^{5/2}$$

that is as good as the RingSIS reduction of schemes with much larger public key size [CHKP12, Boy10, MP12] up to log factors.

## 4.2 Generic stateful scheme

We will use parameters similar to the one of section 3.1: constants  $c > 1$  and  $\alpha \geq \frac{1}{c-1}$  (fixed throughout the rest of this section) and the strictly increasing sequence  $c_0 = 0, c_i = \lfloor \alpha c^i \rfloor$  for  $i \in \{1, \dots, d\}$  where  $d = \lfloor \log_c(n/\alpha) \rfloor = O(\log n)$ ; in particular  $c_d = \Omega(n)$ .

**Definition 4** (Tag-based Signatures [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a, BHJ<sup>+</sup>13b]). *A tag based signature scheme  $\text{SS}_t$  is a triple  $(\text{KeyGen}_t, \text{Sign}_t, \text{Verif}_t)$  of PPT algorithm, together with message spaces  $\mathcal{M}_n$  and tag spaces  $\mathcal{T}_n$  for  $n > 0$ . It is said correct if, except with probability negligible in  $n$ , for all message  $m \in \mathcal{M}_n$  and all tags  $t \in \mathcal{T}_n$ , over the randomness of*

$$(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_t(1^n) \text{ and } \sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}_t(sk, \mu, t) \quad \text{it holds that} \quad \text{Verif}_t(pk, \mu, \sigma, t) = 1.$$

**Definition 5** (Mild-Security  $m$ -**EUF-naCMA**<sup>\*</sup>). *A tag based signature scheme  $\text{SS}_t = (\text{KeyGen}_t, \text{Sign}_t, \text{Verif}_t)$  is said  $m$ -**EUF-naCMA**<sup>\*</sup> secure if no PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$  wins the following game.*

$m$ -**EUF-naCMA**<sup>\*</sup> $_{\text{SS}_t}(n, \mathcal{A})$ :

$\mathcal{A}$  chooses  $Q$  pairs  $(\mu^{(j)}, t^{(j)}) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{T}$

$(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}_t(1^n)$  and  $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}_t(sk, \mu^{(j)}, t^{(j)})$ .  $\mathcal{A}$

receives  $pk, \sigma^{(0)} \dots \sigma^{(Q-1)}$ .

$\mathcal{A}$  sends an attempt forgery  $(\mu^*, t^*, \sigma^*)$ ; count  $C = |\{j | t^{(j)} = t^*\}|$ .

$\mathcal{A}$  loose if  $\text{Verif}_t(pk, \mu, \sigma, t) \neq 1$ , or  $\mu^* = \mu^{(j)}$  for some  $j$ , or if  $C \notin \{1 \dots m\}$ .

Note that  $m$ -**EUF-naCMA**<sup>\*</sup> security implies  $m'$ -**EUF-naCMA**<sup>\*</sup> security for any  $m' \leq m$ .

**Theorem 16** (Security of the Generic stateful scheme). *If  $\text{SS}_t$  is 1-**EUF-naCMA**<sup>\*</sup>-secure tag-based signature scheme with tag space  $\mathcal{T}$  of size at least  $2 \cdot 2^{c_d}$ , then  $\text{SS}$  (Fig. 3) is **EUF-naCMA**-secure signature scheme. More precisely, if there exists an attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  against **EUF-naCMA** $_{\text{SS}}$  that runs in time  $T$ , makes at most  $Q \leq 2^{c_d}$  queries and success with probability  $\epsilon$ , then, there exists an algorithm  $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{A}}$  that runs in times  $T' = T + Q \cdot \text{poly}(n)$ , and wins against 1-**EUF-naCMA** $_{\text{SS}_t}^*$  with probability at least  $\epsilon - \frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|}$  making at most  $Q' \leq dQ + 2Q^c$  queries.*

SS.KeyGen( $1^n$ )	SS.Sign( $sk, m$ )	SS.Verif( $pk, m, \sigma$ )
$(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{SS}_t.\text{KeyGen}_t(1^n)$ Set state $S = -1$ Return $(pk, sk)$ .	Update state $S \leftarrow S + 1$ For all $i = 1 \dots d$ : $t_i \leftarrow (S \bmod 2^{c_i}, i)$ $\sigma_i \leftarrow \text{SS}_t.\text{Sign}_t(sk, m, t_i)$ Return $\sigma = (S, \sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_d)$ .	Parse $(S, \sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_d) = \sigma$ For all $i = 1 \dots d$ : $t_i \leftarrow (S \bmod 2^{c_i}, i)$ Reject if $\text{SS}_t.\text{Verif}_t(pk, m, \sigma_i, t_i) \neq 1$ . Accept.

Figure 3: Generic construction from tag-based signatures  $\text{SS}_t$  to stateful signatures  $\text{SS}$

*Proof.* The simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  interacts with the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  trying to simulate the game interface **EUF-naCMA** $_{\text{SS}}$  while itself playing against the game **1-EUF-naCMA** $_{\text{SS}_t}^*$ . Notice that, in the definition of  $\text{SS}$  (Fig. 3), we have implicitly defined tag spaces  $\mathcal{T}_i = \{0 \dots 2^{c_i} - 1\} \times \{i\}$  and  $\mathcal{T} = \bigcup_i \mathcal{T}_i$ , then check that  $|\mathcal{T}| = \sum_i 2^{c_i} \leq 2 \cdot 2^{cd}$ .

First,  $\mathcal{S}$  receives  $Q$  messages  $\mu^{(0)} \dots \mu^{(Q-1)}$  from the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ . Knowing  $Q$  it sets  $i^*$  to be the smallest index such that  $2^{c_{i^*}} \geq Q$  (which implies  $2^{c_{i^*}} \leq 2Q^c$ ). It transmits the following requests to **1-EUF-naCMA** $_{\text{SS}_t}^*$ :

$$(\mu^{(j)}, t_i^{(j)} = (j \bmod 2^{c_i}, i)) \text{ for all } (j, i) \in \{0 \dots Q - 1\} \times \{1 \dots d\}$$

$$(\mu^\dagger, t) \text{ for all } t \in \{Q \dots 2^{\lfloor c_{i^*} \rfloor} - 1\} \text{ and a fixed value } \mu^\dagger \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{M})$$

Notice that the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  has made exactly 1 query for each tag  $t \in \mathcal{T}_{i^*}$ . He then receives a public key  $pk$  that he transmit to the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  directly; as well as answer to its signature queries. Lets denote  $\sigma_i^{(j)}$  the response signature for the query  $(\mu^{(j)}, t_i^{(j)})$ , ignoring the response to other queries. It then builds the signature  $\sigma^{(j)} = (j, \sigma_1^{(j)} \dots \sigma_d^{(j)})$  and use it to answer  $\mathcal{A}$  signature query on message  $\mu^{(j)}$ . One checks that this output distribution matches perfectly the output of the game **EUF-naCMA** $_{\text{SS}}$ .

Then, with probability  $\epsilon$ , the adversary outputs a valid forgery  $(\mu^\diamond, \sigma^\diamond = (j^\diamond, \sigma_1^\diamond \dots \sigma_d^\diamond))$  such that  $\mu^\diamond \neq \mu^{(j)}$  for all  $j$ ; moreover  $\mu^\diamond \neq \mu^\dagger$  except with probability  $1/|\mathcal{M}|$ . Because this is a valid forgery for the scheme  $\text{SS}$  with public key  $pk$ , we have in particular that  $\text{SS}_t.\text{Verif}_t(pk, \mu^\diamond, \sigma_{i^*}^\diamond, t_{i^*}^\diamond) = 1$  where  $t_{i^*}^\diamond = (j^\diamond \bmod 2^{\lfloor c_{i^*} \rfloor}, i^*) \in \mathcal{T}_{i^*}$ ; in particular this tag  $t_{i^*}$  appears in exactly one signature queries to **1-EUF-naCMA** $_{\text{SS}_t}^*$ . The simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  thus answer  $(\sigma_{i^*}^\diamond, t_{i^*}^\diamond)$  as a forgery and wins the game **1-EUF-naCMA** $_{\text{SS}_t}^*$ .  $\square$

### 4.3 Discussion

Assuming that the number of queries  $Q$  is polynomially bounded, (but  $\epsilon$  might be sub-exponentially small), and that  $m$  is fixed, comparison between our construction and the one of [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a] is given in figure 4.3.

Generic transf. to <b>EUF-naCMA</b>	State	Assumptions	Signature blow-up factor $d$	Queries made by the reduction $Q'$
[BHJ <sup>+</sup> 13a] $m \geq 1$	None	$m$ - <b>EUF-naCMA</b> $^*$ , PRF	$\log_c n$	$2(2Q)^{c \cdot (1+1/m)} / \epsilon^{c/m}$
Section 4.2	Counter	<b>1-EUF-naCMA</b> $^*$	$2 \log_c(\log_2 n)$	$2Q^c + dQ$

Figure 4: Generic Transformations from tag-based signatures

To be fair, we mention that the signature blow-up factor of [BHJ<sup>+</sup>13a] can also be brought down to  $2 \log_c(\log_2 n)$  by choosing  $m = O(n)$ ; yet the given constructions of  $m$ -**EUF-naCMA** $^*$ -secure scheme based either on RSA or CDH, requires public key that grows by  $m$  elements (and therefore are less efficient than the ones build in [HW09b, HW09a]). In the lattice case it isn't yet known how to build  $m$ -**EUF-naCMA** $^*$  for any  $m > 1$ . Technically, building a  $m$ -**EUF-naCMA** $^*$ -secure scheme relies on programming a one-way function to have certain random value on some inputs while still being hard to invert for other values; known techniques relies on Lagrange interpolation polynomials (a.k.a. Reed-Muller Codes or Shamir's Secret Sharing) in the domain of the one-way function. The same technique was also at the core of Hohenberger-Waters proofs.

While this applies on domain that are field or quasi-fields as for CDH or RSA based construction, it is much less clear how to adapt this idea for a domain of small norm polynomials.

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## A Missing proofs

**Fact** (Restatement of Fact 6). *Let  $\mathbf{R} \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R},s}^{w \times k}$ ; with overwhelming probability we have  $s_1(\mathbf{R}) \leq s\sqrt{n} \cdot O(\sqrt{w} + \sqrt{k} + \omega(\sqrt{\log n}))$ .*

*Proof.* For a vector  $\mathbf{v} \in R^n$  over ring  $R$ , let  $\text{Diag}(\mathbf{v})$  denotes the diagonal matrix with entries  $v_1 \dots v_n$ . Notice that the component wise product of two vectors  $\mathbf{f} \odot \mathbf{g}$  can be written as the matrix-vector product  $\text{Diag}(\mathbf{f}) \cdot \mathbf{g}$ . This gives the identity  $\sigma(f \cdot g) = \text{Diag}(\sigma(f)) \cdot \sigma(g)$  for  $f, g \in \mathcal{R}$  with  $\sigma : \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}^n$  denoting the canonical embedding:

$$\sigma : f \in \mathcal{R} \mapsto (f(\omega_1), \dots, f(\omega_\ell)) \in \mathbb{C}^n \text{ where } \omega_\ell = e^{(2\ell-1)\pi/n}$$

. Let  $\mathbf{R} = (r_{i,j}) \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R},s}^{w \times k}$ ; and set

$$\mathbf{D} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{D}_{1,1} & \cdots & \mathbf{D}_{1,k} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ \mathbf{D}_{w,1} & \cdots & \mathbf{D}_{w,k} \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{C}^{nw \times nk} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{D}_{i,j} = \text{Diag}(\sigma(r_{i,j})) \in \mathbb{C}^{n \times n}.$$

We extend the canonical embedding  $\sigma : \mathcal{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}^n$  to vectors in  $\mathcal{R}^d$  as its componentwise application;  $\sigma(\mathbf{v}) = (\sigma(v_1), \dots, \sigma(v_k)) \in \mathbb{C}^{nk}$ . With this notation, we have  $\sigma(\mathbf{R} \cdot \mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{D} \cdot \sigma(\mathbf{v})$ ; and because the canonical embedding  $\sigma$  is a scaled isometry, we have  $s_1(\mathbf{R}) = s_1(\mathbf{D})$ .

Permuting rows and column,  $\mathbf{D}$  can be rewritten as the block-diagonal matrix  $\mathbf{B} = \text{Diag}(\mathbf{B}_1, \dots, \mathbf{B}_n) \in \mathbb{C}^{nw \times nk}$ ,  $\mathbf{B}_\ell \in \mathbb{C}^{w \times k}$  where the coefficients of  $\mathbf{B}_\ell$  are all the embeddings  $\sigma_\ell(r_{i,j}) = r_{i,j}(\omega_\ell)$  for  $(i, j) \in \{1 \dots w\} \times \{1 \dots k\}$ . The coefficients of  $\text{Re}(\mathbf{B}_\ell)$  (the real part of  $\mathbf{B}_\ell$ ) are independent and sub-gaussian of parameter  $s\sqrt{n}$ . Indeed

$$\text{Re}(\mathbf{B}_\ell) = \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} \text{Re}(\omega_\ell^k) \cdot (r_{i,j})_k$$

where the  $(r_{i,j})_k$  are independent and sub-gaussian of parameter  $s$  while  $|\text{Re}(\omega_\ell^k)| \leq 1$ . Therefore by Lemma 1

$$s_1(\text{Re}(\mathbf{B}_\ell)) \leq s\sqrt{n} \cdot O(\sqrt{w} + \sqrt{k} + \omega(\sqrt{\log n}))$$

with overwhelming probability. The same results hold for the imaginary part  $\text{Im}(\mathbf{B}_\ell)$  of  $\mathbf{B}_\ell$ . We conclude

$$\begin{aligned} s_1(\mathbf{D}) \leq s_1(\mathbf{B}) &\leq \max_{\ell} s_1(\mathbf{B}_\ell) \leq \max_{\ell} \sqrt{s_1(\text{Re}(\mathbf{B}_\ell))^2 + s_1(\text{Im}(\mathbf{B}_\ell))^2} \\ &\leq s\sqrt{n} \cdot O(\sqrt{w} + \sqrt{k} + \omega(\sqrt{\log n})). \end{aligned}$$

□

**Lemma** (Smoothness Lemma, Restatement of Lemma 7). *Let  $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(\Phi_{2n}(X), q)$  for  $n \geq 4$  a power of 2 and  $q = 3^k$  a power of 3. Let  $w \geq 2(\lceil \log_2 q \rceil + 1)$  and  $s \geq \omega(\sqrt{\ln nw})$ . With overwhelming probability over the choice of  $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_w$ , if  $\mathbf{x}^{(i)} \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R}, s}$  (for  $i = 1, \dots, w$ ) are chosen independently at random, then the sum  $\sum_i \mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}^{(i)}$  is negligibly close to the uniform distribution over  $\mathcal{R}$ .*

*Proof.* The proof is adapted from [GPV08, Lemma 5.3]. Consider the lattice  $\Lambda(\mathbf{A}^\top)$  spanned by the columns of  $\mathbf{A}^\top$  and the vectors of  $q\mathbb{Z}^{nw}$ ; it is the (scaled) dual of  $\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ . We will first show that the minimal distance  $\lambda_1^\infty(\Lambda(\mathbf{A}^\top))$  is at least  $q/12$  with overwhelming probability, and conclude using [GPV08, Lemma 2.6] that  $\eta_\epsilon(\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A})) \leq \omega(\sqrt{\ln nw})$  for some negligible function  $\epsilon(n)$ .

Recall that the irreducible factors of  $\Phi_{2n}(X) \bmod 3$  are  $P_1(X) = X^{n/2} + X^{n/4} - 1$  and  $P_2(X) = X^{n/2} - X^{n/4} - 1$ . Setting  $\mathfrak{p}_1 = (P_1(X))$ ,  $\mathfrak{p}_2 = (P_2(X))$  the nonzero ideals of  $\mathcal{R}_q$  are exactly  $\mathfrak{p}_1, 3\mathfrak{p}_1 \dots 3^{k-1}\mathfrak{p}_1; \mathfrak{p}_2, 3\mathfrak{p}_2 \dots 3^{k-1}\mathfrak{p}_2$  and  $(1), (3), (3^2), \dots, (3^{k-1})$ .

Now, fix some  $x \in \mathcal{R} \setminus \{0\}$ , et set  $\mathfrak{J} = (x)$ , it is one of the nonzero ideal listed above. Let  $r \geq n/2$  denotes its rank. Our goal is to prove, that over the randomness of  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}^{1 \times w}$ , the probability that  $\mathbf{A}x$  falls in in the hypercube  $\mathcal{C}^w = \{\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{R}^w \mid \|\mathbf{v}\|_\infty < q/12\}$  is less than  $2^{-O(wr)}$ . Because  $x$  is a generator of  $\mathfrak{J}$  the distribution of  $\mathbf{A}x$  is uniform over  $\mathfrak{J}^w$ . We proceed by bounding the ratio  $|\mathcal{C} \cap \mathfrak{J}|/|\mathfrak{J}|$ .

**Case 1:** ( $\mathfrak{J} = (3^h)$  for  $h \in \{0 \dots k-1\}$ ). Observe that  $|\mathcal{C} \cap \mathfrak{J}| \leq |\{3^h \mathbb{Z} \cap (-q/12, q/12)\}^n| \leq \lceil 3^{k-h}/6 \rceil^n$ ; which leads to

$$|\mathcal{C} \cap \mathfrak{J}|/|\mathfrak{J}| \leq \left( \frac{3^{k-h}/6 + 1}{3^{k-h}} \right)^n \leq \left( \frac{1}{6} + \frac{1}{3^{k-h}} \right)^n \leq 2^{-n}.$$

**Case 2:** ( $\mathfrak{J} = 3^h \mathfrak{p}_i$  for  $h \in \{0 \dots k-1\}$ ). Start by noting that any element  $e$  of  $\mathfrak{J}$  can be uniquely written  $e = P_i(X) \cdot s$  where  $s = \sum_{i=0}^{n/2-1} s_i X^i$  is a polynomial and of degree strictly less than  $n/2$  in the ideal  $(3^h)$  of  $\mathcal{R}$ . Also note that  $\|e\|_\infty \leq q/12$  implies  $\|s\|_\infty \leq q/12$ , indeed for  $i \in \{0 \dots n/4-1\}$  we have  $e_i = -s_i$  and for  $i \in \{n/4 \dots n/2-1\}$  we have  $e_{i+n/2} = s_i$ . Using a similar counting argument on valid values of  $s$  we derive

$$|\mathcal{C} \cap \mathfrak{J}|/|\mathfrak{J}| \leq \left( \frac{3^{k-h}/6 + 1}{3^{k-h}} \right)^{n/2} \leq \left( \frac{1}{6} + \frac{1}{3^{k-h}} \right)^{n/2} \leq 2^{-n/2}.$$

Taking the union bound over all nonzero  $x$  we conclude that  $\lambda_1^\infty(\Lambda(\mathbf{A}^\top)) \geq q/12$  except with probability  $q^n \cdot 2^{-nw/2} \leq 2^{-\Omega(n)}$ .  $\square$

**Corollary** (Min-entropy bound, restatement of corollary 8). *Let  $\mathcal{R}_q$  be a ring as above, and let  $w \geq (\lceil \log_2 q \rceil + 3)/2$ ,  $s \geq \omega(\sqrt{\ln nw})$ . With overwhelming probability over the choice of  $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}_w$ , if  $\mathbf{x}^{(i)} \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R},s}$  (for  $i = 1, \dots, w$ ) are chosen independently at random; for any nonzero vector  $\mathbf{V} \in \mathcal{R}^w \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}$  the min-entropy of  $\sum_i \mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}^{(i)}$  with the knowledge of  $\sum_i \mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}^{(i)}$  is at least  $\Omega(n)$ .*

*Proof.* Without loss of generality assume that  $\mathbf{v}_1 \neq 0$ . Applying the previous Lemma 7 on  $\sum_{i \geq 2} \mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}^{(i)}$ , the knowledge of  $\sum_i \mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}^{(i)} = \mathbf{a}_1 \cdot \mathbf{x}_1 + \sum_{i \geq 2} \mathbf{a}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}^{(i)}$  reveals only negligible any information about  $\mathbf{x}_1$ . Also note that  $\mathbf{x}_1 \bmod 3$  is negligibly close to uniform ( $\eta_\epsilon(3\mathbb{Z}) \leq \omega(\sqrt{\ln n})$  for some negligible function  $\epsilon(n)$ ).

Setting  $\mathfrak{J} = (\mathbf{v}_1) \neq (0)$  we deduce that  $\mathbf{v}_1 \cdot \mathbf{x}_1 \bmod 3\mathfrak{J}$  is almost uniform in  $\mathfrak{J}/3\mathfrak{J}$ . Recall from the previous proof that the only nonzero ideals of  $\mathcal{R}_q$  are exactly  $\mathfrak{p}_1, 3\mathfrak{p}_1 \dots 3^{k-1}\mathfrak{p}_1$ ;  $\mathfrak{p}_2, 3\mathfrak{p}_2 \dots 3^{k-1}\mathfrak{p}_2$  and  $(1), (3), (3^2), \dots (3^{k-1})$  where both  $\mathfrak{p}_1$  and  $\mathfrak{p}_2$  are ideals of rank  $n/2$ . This implies that  $|\mathfrak{J}/3\mathfrak{J}| = 3^{n/2}$  or  $3^n$ . We conclude that  $\mathbf{v}_1 \cdot \mathbf{x}_1$  has at least  $\Omega(n)$  bits of entropy and so has  $\sum_i \mathbf{v}_i \cdot \mathbf{x}^{(i)}$ .  $\square$

## B Adaptive Security from Chameleon Hash

### B.1 Definition of Chameleon Hashes

Our definition might slightly differs from the literature; where for a fixed message  $\mu$  the function  $\text{Hash}(ek; \mu, r)$  was (sometime implicitly) assumed to be bijective in the variable  $r$ . When this is not the case, it is essential to specify the preimage sampling distribution of  $\text{Hash}^{-1}(td; y)$ ; and this distribution to be independent of the secret key.

**Definition 6** (Chameleon Hash). *A Chameleon Hash is a triplet of algorithms  $\text{CH} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Hash}, \text{Hash}^{-1})$ , together with efficiently computable distributions  $\mathcal{X}_n, \mathcal{Y}_n$  for each positive integer  $n$ ; the fail symbol  $\perp$  does not belong to the support of  $\mathcal{Y}_n$ . The desired properties are listed below (holding except with negligible probability over the random choice of  $(ek, td) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(n)$ )*

- **Uniformity:** *For any valid message  $\mu$ , the distribution of  $\text{Hash}(ek, \mu, x)$  for  $x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_n$  is statistically close to  $\mathcal{Y}_n$ .*
- **Preimage Sampling Correctness:** *For any message  $\mu$  and any hash value  $y$ , the distribution of  $x \leftarrow \text{Hash}^{-1}(td, \mu, y)$  is statistically close to the conditional distribution  $\{x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_n \mid \text{Hash}(ek, \mu, x) = y\}$*
- **Collision Resistance:** *For any PPT algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  the success probability of  $\mathcal{A}$  against  $\text{ColRes}_{\text{CH}}$  is negligible in  $n$  where  $\text{ColRes}_{\text{CH}}(n, \mathcal{A})$  is defined as the following game:*

$$(ek, td) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(n); \quad (\mu, r, \mu', r') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ek);$$

*A wins if  $(\mu, r) \neq (\mu', r')$  and  $\text{Hash}(ek, \mu, r) = \text{Hash}(ek, \mu', r') \neq \perp$ .*

*The Chameleon Hash is said secure if the those three properties hold except with negligible probability over the random choice of  $(ek, td) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(n)$ .*

### B.2 Full Security from Chameleon Hash

**Generic Construction of Fully Secure Scheme** Let  $\text{naSS} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verif})$  be a signature scheme, and  $\text{CH} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Hash}, \text{Hash}^{-1})$  be a chameleon hash. We define the following generic construction  $\text{SS}$ :

- $\text{SS.KeyGen}(n)$ : Generate  $(ek, td) \leftarrow \text{CH.Gen}(n)$  and  $(pk', sk') \leftarrow \text{naSS.KeyGen}(n)$ . Output the key-pair  $(pk = (pk', ek); sk = (sk', ek))$
- $\text{SS.Sign}(sk, \mu)$ : Sample  $x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_n$ ; compute  $y = \text{CH.Hash}(ek, \mu, x)$  and sign  $y$ :  $\sigma' = \text{naSS.Sign}(sk', y)$ . Output the signature  $\sigma = (x, \sigma')$

- $\text{SS.Verif}(pk, \mu, \sigma = (x, \sigma'))$ : compute  $y = \text{CH.Hash}(ek, \mu, x)$ , and check that  $y \neq \perp$ . If the test passes, run the verification  $\text{naSS.Verif}(pk', y, \sigma')$ .

**Theorem 17** (Generic Full security from Chameleon Hash). *If naSS is Existentially Unforgeable under non-adaptive Chosen Message Attack, and CH is a secure Chameleon Hash, then the above construction SS is Existentially Unforgeable under (adaptive) Chosen Message Attack. More precisely if there exists an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  against  $\text{EUF-CMA}_{\text{SS}}$  that runs in time  $T$ , and success with probability  $\epsilon$ ; then there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{A}}$  that runs in time  $T + \text{poly}(n)$  and succeed with probability at least  $\epsilon/2 - \text{negl}(n)$  either against  $\text{EUF-naCMA}_{\text{SS}}$  or  $\text{ColRes}_{\text{CH}}$ .*

**Remark:** This theorem can in fact be generalized to signature scheme naSS that are only Existentially Unforgeable under *Random Message Attack*, if the random message distribution match the output distribution  $\mathcal{X}_n$  of the Chameleon Hash CH.

*Proof.* Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an attacker on the scheme SS as above. There can be two types of forgery. The simulator first guess which type  $\tau \in \{1, 2\}$  of forgery  $\mathcal{A}$  will produce.

**Type 1: Hash collision.** If  $\tau = 1$ , the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  receives an evaluation key  $ek$  from  $\text{CH.Gen}(n)$  as a challenge to the game  $\text{ColRes}_{\text{CH}}$ . He runs  $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{naSS.KeyGen}(n)$ . The adversary makes  $Q$  adaptive queries for messages  $\mu^{(i)}$ , the simulator answers by: picking a random  $x^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_n$ , computing  $y^{(i)} = \text{CH.Hash}(ek, \mu, x)$  and returning  $\sigma^{(i)} = (x^{(i)}, \text{naSS.Sign}(sk, \mu^{(i)}))$ .

The attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  then produce a valid forgery  $(\mu, \sigma = (x, \sigma'))$  with probability  $\epsilon$ . If

$$\exists i, (\mu, x) \neq (\mu^{(i)}, x^{(i)}) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{CH.Hash}(ek, \mu, x) = \text{CH.Hash}(ek, \mu^{(i)}, x^{(i)}) = y^{(i)} \quad (1)$$

then the simulator outputs  $(\mu, x, \mu^{(i)}, x^{(i)})$  as a collision on  $\text{CH.Hash}(ek, \cdot, \cdot)$ .

**Type 2: Non-Adaptive Forgery.** If  $\tau = 2$ , the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  runs  $(ek, td) \leftarrow \text{CH.Gen}(n)$ , and generates  $q$  values  $y^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}_n$ , and transmits those queries to the  $\text{EUF-naCMA}_{\text{naSS}}$  challenger. He receives a public key  $pk$  as a  $\text{EUF-naCMA}_{\text{naSS}}$  challenge, and a signature  $\sigma'^{(i)}$  for each request  $y^{(i)}$ .

He then interacts with the attackers  $\mathcal{A}$ ; for each signature query  $\mu^{(i)}$  the simulator use the chameleon hash trapdoor  $td$  to sample  $x^{(i)} = \text{CH.Hash}^{-1}(ek, \mu^{(i)}, y^{(i)})$  and answers with the signature  $\sigma^{(i)} = (x^{(i)}, \sigma'^{(i)})$ . The attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  then produce a valid forgery  $(\mu, \sigma = (x, \sigma'))$  with probability  $\epsilon$ . If

$$\forall i, \sigma' \neq \sigma'^{(i)} \quad (2)$$

then the simulator outputs  $(\mu, \sigma')$  as a forgery to the  $\text{EUF-naCMA}_{\text{naSS}}$  challenger.

**Conclusion.** Note that by definition, with probability  $\epsilon$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a forgery  $(\mu, \sigma = (x, \sigma'))$  that verifies either property (1) or (2). Moreover, according to the uniformity and preimage sampling correctness of the behaviors of the simulation  $\mathcal{S}$  when  $\tau = 1$  and when  $\tau = 2$  are statistically indistinguishable from the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  point of view; therefore the simulation makes the correct guess with probability  $1/2$ .

**Generalization to schemes naSS secure against Random Message Attacks.** Simply note that in the Type 2 case, the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  could receives the  $x^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_n$  from the simulator rather than sampling  $x^{(i)}$  itself.  $\square$

### B.3 Lattice based Chameleon Hash

The parameters are as follows:  $q = \text{poly}(n)$ ,  $k = w = \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$ ,  $\sigma = \omega(\sqrt{\log n})$ ,  $s = n \cdot \omega(\log n)$ ;  $n\ell$  is the length in bits of messages for some  $\ell = O(\log n)$ . The underlying distributions are  $\mathcal{X}_n = D_{\mathcal{R}, s}^{2w}$  and  $\mathcal{Y}_n = \mathcal{U}_1$ .

- CH.Gen( $n$ ): Sample a uniform matrix  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times 2w}$  together with a  $\mathbf{G}$ -trapdoor  $\mathbf{R} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{w \times w}$ :  $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{R}) \leftarrow \text{GenTrap}(2w, 1, \sigma)$  and a uniform matrix  $\mathbf{B} \in \mathcal{R}^{1 \times \ell}$ . Out the keys  $ek = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$ ,  $td = \mathbf{R}$ .
- CH.Hash( $ek, \boldsymbol{\mu} \in \{0, 1\}^{n\ell} \subset \mathcal{R}_q^\ell, \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{2w}$ ): Fail if  $\|\mathbf{x}\| > s \cdot \sqrt{2nw}$ : output  $\perp$ . Otherwise, interpret  $\boldsymbol{\mu}$  as a vector of  $\mathcal{R}_q^\ell$  whose coefficients are binary polynomials, and output  $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{B} \cdot \boldsymbol{\mu} + \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{x}$ .
- CH.Hash $^{-1}(td, \boldsymbol{\mu} \in \{0, 1\}^{n\ell} \subset \mathcal{R}_q^\ell, \mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{R}_q)$ : Compute  $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{y} - \mathbf{B} \cdot \boldsymbol{\mu}$ . Output  $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{SampleD}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{u}, s)$ .

**Theorem 18** (Secure Chameleon Hash based on RingSIS). *Under a RingSIS assumption, the above Chameleon Hash is secure. More precisely, it has the uniformity and Preimage Sampling Correctness properties; and if there exists an algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  that succeed against  $\text{ColRes}_{\text{CH}}$  in time  $T$  with probability  $\epsilon$ , then there exists an algorithm that solves RingSIS( $n, w + \ell, q, \beta$ ) for  $\beta = \tilde{O}(n^{3/2})$  in time  $T + \text{poly}(n)$  and probability  $\epsilon - \text{negl}(n)$ .*

*Proof.* The uniformity property follows from Lemma 7. Preimage Sampling Correctness is exactly the correctness of algorithm  $\text{SampleD}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{u}, s)$  stated as Theorem 11.

For collision resistance, let  $[\bar{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{B}]$  be a RingSIS( $n, 2w, q, \beta$ ) instance. Simulate Gen public key generation by setting  $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{R}) \leftarrow \text{GenTrap}(\bar{\mathbf{A}}, 0, \sigma)$ , and send  $ek = (\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{A})$ . Recall that this sets  $\mathbf{A} = [\bar{\mathbf{A}} | \bar{\mathbf{A}} \cdot \mathbf{R}]$ . The adversary outputs  $(\boldsymbol{\mu}, \mathbf{r}, \boldsymbol{\mu}', \mathbf{r}')$  such that  $\mathbf{B}(\boldsymbol{\mu} - \boldsymbol{\mu}') + \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{r} - \mathbf{r}') = \mathbf{0}$  but  $\|\mathbf{r}\|, \|\mathbf{r}'\| \leq s\sqrt{m}$  and  $(\boldsymbol{\mu}, \mathbf{r}) \neq (\boldsymbol{\mu}', \mathbf{r}')$ . Splitting  $\mathbf{r} = (\mathbf{r}_1, \mathbf{r}_2)$  and  $\mathbf{r}' = (\mathbf{r}'_1, \mathbf{r}'_2)$  one can rewrite

$$\mathbf{B} \underbrace{(\boldsymbol{\mu} - \boldsymbol{\mu}')}_{\mathbf{w}_1} + \bar{\mathbf{A}} \underbrace{(\mathbf{r}_1 - \mathbf{r}'_1 + \mathbf{R}(\mathbf{r}_2 - \mathbf{r}'_2))}_{\mathbf{w}_2} = \mathbf{0}.$$

It remains to check that  $\mathbf{w} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{w}_1 \\ \mathbf{w}_2 \end{bmatrix}$  is a short non-null vector. Shortness  $\|\mathbf{w}\| \leq \beta$  follows from the bound on  $s_1(\mathbf{R})$  of Fact 6. Finally, note that  $\mathbf{r}_2 = \mathbf{r}'_2$  implies  $\mathbf{w} \neq \mathbf{0}$  (otherwise  $(\boldsymbol{\mu}, \mathbf{r}) = (\boldsymbol{\mu}', \mathbf{r}')$ ). The remaining case,  $\mathbf{r}_2 \neq \mathbf{r}'_2$  implies that  $\mathbf{R}(\mathbf{r}_2 - \mathbf{r}'_2)$ , has at least  $\Omega(n)$  bits of entropy even given  $\bar{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}$  by Corollary 8; therefore, except with probability negligible in  $n$  we indeed have  $\mathbf{w} \neq \mathbf{0}$ .  $\square$