Paper 2014/492

Fault attacks on pairing-based protocols revisited

Sanjit Chatterjee, Koray Karabina, and Alfred Menezes

Abstract

Several papers have studied fault attacks on computing a pairing value e(P,Q), where P is a public point and Q is a secret point. In this paper, we observe that these attacks are in fact effective only on a small number of pairing-based protocols, and that too only when the protocols are implemented with specific symmetric pairings. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the fault attacks on a public-key encryption scheme, an identity-based encryption scheme, and an oblivious transfer protocol when implemented with a symmetric pairing derived from a supersingular elliptic curve with embedding degree 2.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Fault attackspairing-based cryptographysupersingular elliptic curves
Contact author(s)
kkarabina @ fau edu
History
2014-07-10: revised
2014-06-23: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/492
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/492,
      author = {Sanjit Chatterjee and Koray Karabina and Alfred Menezes},
      title = {Fault attacks on pairing-based protocols revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/492},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/492}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.